Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

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Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Sat Jan 31, 2015 3:05 pm

On p 214 of The Final Solution: A Genocide, Bloxham argued this:
On 23 October an order prohibiting the emigration of Jews was sent by the RSHA to its representatives in occupied France and Belgium. The order is usually cited as a general instruction to prevent further emigration of any Jews from Germany as well as the territories under control, but the offices of the order's recipients and the vagueness of the of the wording shows this this was not necessarily so. The order, which was one of a number of related instructions running through into early 1942, refers only to 'Jews', not German Jews in Germany, which leaves open the possibility that it referred only to Jews in Belgium and France. . . . [O]ne reason for hindering the flight of Jews from Belgium and France may have been to maximize the opportunities for any remaining Jews with the ability to leave German soil.
The order of 23 October is of course the famous stop instruction issued by Gestapo Müller (T/1209, text below), which Bloxham has reinterpreted here as (probably) aimed not at halting emigration in general but at encouraging emigration from the Reich. This is pure bollocks.

As we will see below, Bloxham ignores 1) a variety of documents on the preparatory steps and context for Müller’s circular (these include later reflections on the order from German officials) and 2) reverberations in recorded responses to the emigration halt.

(1) Preparations and context In a sense, the phrase ”the Mueller order" is often used as shorthand for a number of actions, orders, memoranda, etc. Longerich in Holocaust (pp 284-285), for example, places the ban issued by Gestapo Mueller into a context of “administrative preparations for the deportations.” He mentions, inter alia, the yellow star order of 19 September 1941; the decree of 3 October on employment of Jews along with the 31 October implementation order "withdrawing almost all kinds of employment protection from those Jews still in work"; the early November regulations on property of Reich deportees made by the Finance Ministry; and, of course, Gestapo Mueller's emigration halt order, which Longerich describes as affecting "the emigration of Jews from the German sphere of influence," including, as with the other deportation preparation steps, the Reich itself, contra Bloxham. Longerich presents these steps as a cluster of preparations for the deportations which began in mid-October (around the same time as Müller’s order) - from the Reich - and on account of the steps taken with regard to France's planned release of Spanish Jews.

Here, Longerich more or less follows Browning (Origins, pp 368-369), who quoted from Luther's 17 October memorandum reversing what a few days earlier had been approved as within policy, that is, encouraging such Jews simply to leave to somewhere:
In addition these Jews would also be too much out of the direct reach of the measures for a basic solution to the Jewish question to be enacted after the war.
For Browning and Longerich this "not releasing" of the Spanish Jews, the reversal of the decision coinciding with the commencement of the deportations, was an indicator of a "fundamental shift" (Browning) in Judenpolitik, for deportation (and, in Browning's view, for the final solution). (Interestingly, presumably because the stop-order, and this interpretation of it, cause problems for Longerich’s “decision” date of spring ’42, in his massive biography of Himmler, into which long passages of Holocaust are jimmied, Longerich omits this discussion – and any mention of the Mueller order!)

Where Bloxham relies on a supposed close reading of T/1209, Browning adds still more context:
On October 18, 1941, one day after Heydrich informed Luther that the Spanish Jews in France could not be allowed to go to Morocco, Heinrich Himmler made a note on a telephone conversation with Heydrich: "No emigration by Jews to overseas.”

(Gerwarth, Hitler’s Hangman, p 205, also foregrounds this diary entry and explains the 23 October as extending from the Reich to all German occupied territory the new policy – “evacuation” and not emigration.) In this context, then, five days later, over Himmler's name, Gestapo Müller issued the circular letter. But Browning adds still more, already addressing the issues of clarity raised by Bloxham:
If the measure had not been clear enough already, Franz Rademacher in the Foreign Office received official confirmation from Eichmann on November 4 that the half to Jewish emigration did not just apply to the case of Spanish Jews and Morocco, but to all Jews in Europe.
"To all Jews in Europe." Per Eichmann. November 4th.

Further to this, according to Kulka & Jackel, The Jews in Secret Nazi Reports on Public Opinion in Germany, 1933-1945, p 705, Himmler's actual order dated to 1 October, just prior to the start of deportations and meant
to put a halt to the emigration of Jews, effective immediately . . . The evacuation measures are not affected by this order.
(Baumann in Modernity and the Holocaust, p 17, also gives this 1 October date.)

Further context - from this fateful (Browning) period - should include items we can find at HDOT:

- Himmler's note to Greiser of 18 September 1941 ("The Führer wishes that, from the West to the East, the Altreich and the Protektorat be emptied and freed of Jews as soon as possible. I am therefore striving to transport the Jews of the Altreich and the Protektorat in the Eastern Territories that became part of the Reich two years ago. It is desirable that this is be accomplished by the end of this year")

- Goebbels's pressure on the Fuhrer regarding marking Jews and ridding Berlin of Jews, for example, his 24 September diary entry ("we must evacuate the Jews from Berlin as soon as possible. . . . In the end, they should all be transported to the camps set up [by the] Bolsheviks. These camps have been constructed by the Jews; what would be more apt than to now have them peopled by the Jews")

- Hitler on 6 October (according to Longerich at HDOT, "all Jews from the Protektorat needed to be 'removed' (entfernt) - and not into the Generalgouvernement first, but - 'straight on to the East'. This was said to be impossible at the moment, due to lack of transport capacity. Parallel to the deportation of the 'Protektorat-Jews' the Jews of Vienna and Berlin should 'disappear' (verschwinden)"

- Heydrich on 10 October in Prague ("As the Führer wishes the Jews to be brought out of the German sphere by the end of the year if possible, all open questions must be solved immediately")

- again in Longerich's words, instructions to German officials in France ("The expert on Jewish Questions of the German Embassy in Paris Carltheo Zeitschel, succeeded (through the aid of Ambassador Abetz) in securing Himmler's fundamental approval for the eastward deportation of the foreign Jews interned in France").

Discussion of the context would not to be complete without mentioning the matter-of-fact explication Heydrich gave all this after the fact at the Wannsee Conference:
The Reichsfuhrer-SS and the Chief of the German Police (Chief of the Security Police and the SD) was entrusted with the official central handling of the final solution of the Jewish question without regard to geographic borders.

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD then gave a short report of the struggle which has been carried on thus far against this enemy, the essential points being the following:

a) the expulsion of the Jews from every sphere of life of the German people,
b) the expulsion of the Jews from the living space of the German people.

In carrying out these efforts, an increased and planned acceleration of the emigration of the Jews from Reich territory was started, as the only possible present solution. . . .

In the meantime the Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police had prohibited emigration of Jews due to the dangers of an emigration in wartime and due to the possibilities of the East.

III. Another possible solution of the problem has now taken the place of emigration, i.e. the evacuation of the Jews to the East
. . . .
Heydrich’s important statement does not limit the “prohibition” of emigration to Belgium and France and does not imply an effort to encourage and accelerate emigration of Jews from the Reich. Quite the reverse, in fact.

In addition, Heydrich’s Wannsee formulation echoes the wording of the Müller halt order.

In this vein, there is also a document introduced in session 31 of the Eichmann trial:
State Attorney Bach: The next document, No. 1179, signed by the Accused, is a letter from him to the Foreign Ministry. He refers to an earlier letter and says:

"With reference to the last paragraph in the report of the German Embassy in Paris of 22 October 1941, I give notice that, in view of the impending Final Solution of the European Jewish Question, the emigration of Jews from the areas occupied by us has to be stopped. I ask to deal with this matter in strictest confidence and should like to add in this connection that the Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered in the meantime that all - jede - emigration of Jews has to be prevented."

And he repeats that the rest of the instruction was already formulated by Mueller.

Presiding Judge: T/395.

(http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eic ... 31-02.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;)
"In the areas occupied by us." And "in view of the impending Final Solution of the European Jewish Question." "All" emigration to be prevented.

We also have Bormann’s circular 3422-PS in which he reviews Party Judenpolitik and sets out talking points for functionaries, giving thereby the propaganda explanation for a general prohibition on emigration:
PS-3244, Red Series, v5, pp 945-946

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3244-PS
DECREES, REGULATIONS, ANNOUNCEMENTS

[Verfuegungen, Anordnungen, Beltanntgaben]
vol. 2, Pages 131-132.

Preparatory Measures for the Solution of the Jewish Problem in Europe-Rumors About the Position of the Jews in the East.

V.I. 66/881 of the 9 Oct., 1942

. . . Only since 1933 have we started to find ways and means in order to enable a complete separation of Judaism from the German masses.

The work toward a solution which has previously been accomplished can in the main be divided as follows:
The repulsion of Jews from the individual spheres of living of the German people. The laws issued by the lawmakers are hereby to be the basis, which guarantees that future generations will also be protected from a possible new overflooding by the enemy.

The attempt to completely drive out the enemy from the area of the Reich. In view of the only very limited living space [Lebensraum] at the disposal of the German people it was hoped this problem could be solved in the main by speeding up the Jewish emigration.

Since the outbreak of war in 1939 these possibilities of emigration decreased to an ever greater extent. On the other hand, in addition to the living space [of the German people, their economic space grew steadily, so that in view of the large numbers of Jews residing in these territories a complete repulsion of the Jews by emigration is no longer possible. . . .

Starting with the territory of the Reich and proceeding to the remaining European countries included in the final solution, the Jews are currently being deported to large camps which have already been established or which are to be established in the East, where they will either be used for work or else transported still farther to the East. . . .
This circular is of a piece with the rationale and language used months earlier at Wannsee. So too is the report by statistician Korherr, yet another well-studied document which forms yet another blow against Bloxham on this issue. Drafted in early 1943, Section V of the Korherr Report begins with a statement explicitly tying the emigration halt to the very opposite of what Bloxham raised as likely ("one reason for hindering the flight of Jews from Belgium and France may have been to maximize the opportunities for any remaining Jews with the ability to leave German soil"), namely, stopping Jewish emigration from the Reich:
The evacuation of the Jews replaced the emigration of the Jews, at least on Reich territory. Following the prohibition of Jewish emigration in the fall of 1941, the evacuation was prepared on a large scale and largely implemented throughout the entire Reich territory in 1942.
We can conclude that where Korherr wrote "wenigstens im Reichsgebiet," he did so because he was beginning his analysis of the demographics with a note on the consequences of the emigration halt first and foremost for the Altreich and Ostmark, also the Protectorate, which is precisely what his first table in section V focused on. And since the Müller circular addressed two countries outside the Reich, Belgium and France, we can be confident that the prohibition applied beyond "wenigstens im Reichsgebiet."

With Maryzilla all lathered up about UFOs, I hesitate to offer still another “trace” working against Bloxham’s proposal - but what the heck: In his interrogation of Eichmann, Avner Less asked “the little man” about a half dozen Dutch Jews who'd been dismissed from the NSB (Dutch National Socialist Party) as it "Germanized" itself - and in whether decisions on how to treat these people an emigration exception was one option: Eichmann reminded Less, (Eichmann Interrogated, p 184), mixing up the exact date, of Himmler's emigration stop-order:
Since December 20, 1941, we had the Reichsführer's general order prohibiting all emigration.
In addition, to challenge Bloxham further on the European-wide ambition and dimensions of the Final Solution, here, in a small parallel to Confino's Corfu example, we have Eichmann in April 1943 deciding (his admission to Less) to deport (formally, “change the residence of”) these 5-6 former NSB Jews to Theresienstadt and agreeing with those on the ground in the Netherlands that their removal could be "deferred" only on the condition that (p 183)
they would be the last to be deported.
(A note on the results of this small case: Yes, of course, a bit later, in pressing Eichmann on Theresienstadt, Less got Eichmann to concede that he helped arrange the deportation of Jews from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz, Eichmann saying (p 185)
Yes, by order of Himmler, "disencumberment measures" calling for the evacuation of so and so many Jews from Theresienstadt.)
There’s another example of “Corfu-like” attention to small numbers of Jews wishing to emigrate but “sought” for the Final Solution in the Eichmann interrogations: On pp 153-154, Eichmann reminded Less that
top leadership allowed certain Jews to emigrate for certain economic reasons, and so on.

Eichmann's "And so on" could include people like the Strausses from Essen, discussed below. Eichmann continued explaining that agencies interested in the emigration of identified Jews, that is, exceptions to the rule,
had to go through channels for an authorization, because of the general order that no one should be allowed to emigrate.
All this goes back to what Müller’s order said for Belgium and France as well.

Less at this point gave Eichmann the examples of Professor Fleischmann and Kapellmeister Kollman, both of Vienna, whose requested emigration to Afghanistan Eichmann had squelched in February 1941 (Eichmann ordered the two men deported to the GG "in the framework of the deportation of Jews from Vienna to the Government General," quoting from his February order; the "deportation framework" mentioned by Eichmann must have referred to transports during February 1941 from Vienna to Kielce, Opole Lubelskie, and Janow Lubelski - and the "next train" to Poland to which Eichmann referred must have been Transport no. 5 from Vienna, departing 2 March 1941 for Łagów, near Opatow). 

One could question whether Eichmann isn't blame-shifting in his responses to Less, along these lines: But, Herr Hauptmann, you see, I was fulfilling a "general order" only, a top-down order from the Reichsführer - and even today I have trouble, I tell you in all honesty, pronouncing that title - and my superior Müller had prohibited all emigration and I was under such order - you might say a compulsion and a duty - to arrange the evacuations, er, shipments, under the very terms of this superior order. For transportation purposes, only, you see. Or whatever.



But I think on this point, Eichmann isn't doing that. Why? If this was a case of his trying to use a "top-down/general order," to excuse himself and blame Himmler, Eichmann would not have corrected Less on the timing of the decision regarding the request of Fleischmann and Kollmann, informing Less that
You see, on February 28, 1941 . . . emigration was still possible and would be for some time to come.
In short, Eichmann was not at the time operating under the Himmler general emigration stop order; Eichmann’s blame shifting would thus aim not at Himmler in this case but at "a local State Police office" making the decision or something:
Well, it must have . . . it is . . . I can't . . . I can't tell you any more about it, Herr Hauptmann, than the way I figure . . . it must have been . . .
Which is hardly a compelling explanation: in any event, the general stop order, which Eichmann says came "some time" after February 1941, seems not to be a deus ex machina for Eichmann but rather something he understood to have happened - and, contra Bloxham, to have applied generally. This testimony strongly supports the fall 1941 timing of a general halt to emigration.

And a final two examples from Eichmann’s interrogation: In discussion of the establishment of the Central Office in Berlin, then Eichmann's move to IV B 4, Eichmann, and lamenting that emigration had for all intents and purposes stopped by late 1939 as a result of the war, Eichmann jumped ahead in his testimony to 1941 (Eichmann Interrogated, p 63):
I'm referring to the shutdown of emigration which would become definitive with the onset of war against the Soviet Union.

I can only assume that Eichmann here meant "a few months after" rather than "with" and was again referring to Müller's October 1941 circular to RSHA staff in Belgium and France and other distribution of this "definitive" "shutdown" which Bloxham has tried limiting to only Belgium and France.



Again, on p 90, Eichmann told Less, relative to the policy shift from emigration to "evacuation" as articulated in this case in the Wannsee protocol that
Since emigration was prohibited, they [the Jews] are to be deported to the East. This was the new - er - conception in behalf of which the conference of the state secretaries was called.
(2) Reverbations Here I am thinking of fallout from and reactions to a general halt to emigration that Bloxham thinks didn’t occur. Without going into emigration data for the Reich, Austria, and the Protectorate, let’s look at some further traces:

According to Roseman (in A Past in Hiding, p 106,
In August 1941, the Berlin community was reeling from the news that Jewish men and women between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were banned from emigrating.

I don’t know what this refers to as the ban distributed by Mueller came in late October – and was kept secret from the public. Be that as it may, in the case of Siegfried and Alfred Strauss, Jews from Essen, who attempted to gain an exception (for the purpose of serving as Abwehr agents following their proposed emigration to the US!), Roseman quotes (pp 142-143) from a skeptical telegram sent by Eichmann himself to the Dusseldorf Gestapo, 2 December 1941,
. . . this is to inform you that the recent evacuation transports have been accompanied by a noticeable number of interventions on behalf of Jews from individual Wehrmacht  offices or officers.

. . . applications have been made for Jews’ exemption from evacuations and for issuance of emigration permits on the grounds that the Jews are ostensibly to be used for Abwehr purposes after their emigration. . . .

Exemption of the Jews in question from the evacuation and the issues of an emigration permit cannot be approved prior to receipt of a letter from the OKW, specifically confirming the use of these Jews for Abwehr purposes. . . .
With the bureaucracy grinding slowly, complexities on the US end, and the Strauss’s application apparently confirmed and their “evacuation” repeatedly delayed, Eichmann would send a reply, part of an apparent game of cat and mouse with the Abwehr, to Dusseldorf on 14 December 1942, just about a year later, that read,
The application for the exceptional approval of the emigration of the above-named Jews to the USA was passed on 23.12.1941 in the interests of the Reich’s counterintelligence. The emigration has not yet taken place. In view of the lengthy interval, I assume that the case is no longer of any interest. In this context, it should also be noted that as a result of the efforts of the Jews Strauss to achieve their own and their families’ emigration at all cost, significant groups, particularly Jewish organizations, have learned about the exceptional treatment, so that in our view the procedure is no longer secret. Communication of your views on the matter is requested.
Eichmann’s telegrams in this case are in keeping with the interpretation of the 23 October stop order explicitly rejected by Bloxham – the mutual dependency of the emigration halt and deportations, the prevention of Reich and other Jews from emigrating, the applicability of the emigration stop to the Reich and not only to Belgium and France, the evacuation net placed over all the Jews within the control of the Third Reich, emigration permits to be granted only on an exception basis for the interests of the German Reich and by the RSHA (“Permission for the emigration of individual Jews can only be approved in single very special cases ; for instance, in the event of a genuine interest on  the part of the Reich, and then only after a prior decision has been obtained from the Reich Security Main Office”), etc.

It would not be until 1943 - when Himmler clipped the Abwehr’s wings and forced, in the context of a shakeup of the Abwehr, the agency to discontinue the use of “unreliable elements” (pp 250-251) - that the Strauss’s attempt to emigrate was finally refused, in keeping with the general policy laid down in fall 1941, and the family were deported, at the incredibly late time, of August 1943. (By the way, Eichmann unsurprisingly seems to have lied at his trial on the question of his role in such matters, passing the buck to Müller: http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eic ... 82-02.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;.)

A report reproduced in Kulka & Jackel (Emigration Consultation Office Cologne, Activity Report for the First Quarter 1942, p 578) noted that
Since the emigration of the Jews came to a halt in December, only 3 Jews are now among the applicants. So the activity of the Emigration Consultation Office as a consultant in matters of passports for Jewish emigrants has thus also come to an end . . .
(Note to Bloxham: Cologne is within the Reich borders and not a city of Belgium or France. Why would the Cologne emigration think that emigration from the Reich had been halted if it were being encouraged? This note referenced, interestingly, a December halt, as Eichmann told Less - a later order that we lack a copy of?)

Further, on 13 April 1942, the RSHA, Office IV (Gestapa), in a document headed "Reporting on Events of Importance for the Gesapo," p 583, we learn that
The Staatspolizeistelle Frankfurt a.M. has learned that Jews are attempting to emigrate illegally from Frankfurt a.M. via Cologne, Brussels, and France to Spain or Portugal, and that the contact point for this in Cologne is being run by the Jew Eduard Israel Haas . . . He is providing Jews with the possibility for illegal departure for the fee of 1,200 RM. On the basis of inquiries that have been initiated, four Jews have now been taken into custody together with the Jew Haas.
(Frankfurt a.M. was of course in the Reich, not in Belgium or France, and Cologne was still within the Reich at the time these five Jews were arrested for attempting to emigrate from the Reich, illegally, after the prohibition of emigration ordered in the fall 1941. German agencies certainly seem to have taken notice of the order which Bloxham believes wasn’t given!)

If Jewish emigration from the Reich had not been prohibited, but only emigration of Jews from France and Belgium, why did the Strauss brother’s case, an attempt to gain an exemption under terms like those in Mueller’s order, take place at all, with Eichmann’s intervention? Why do we have documents surrounding the Mueller stop order speaking of a general halt to Jewish emigration? Why did Heydrich at the Wannsee Conference explain the final solution in terms of a general halt to Jewish emigration in favor of evacuation to the East? Why did the Emigration Consultation Office for Jews in Cologne mention, in passing, that emigration had been halted? Why did this same office imagine emigration had been prohibited and close down for lack of remit? Why, post-fall 1941, were Jews being arrested for attempting to get their butts far away from Germany and danger, something previously sought by the Nazi rulers of Germany?

I don't think Bloxham's proposed reading of the Müller stop order holds water: the order applied generally and was indeed part of the fundamental shift (Eichmann: "new conception") in Reich Judenpolitik to the "impending" Final Solution - and toward forced and mandatory evacuation of virtually every Jew the Germans could lay their hands on - that is, toward the policy of forcing Jews throughout Nazi-controlled Europe to the East, certainly beginning with those Jews still living in the Greater Reich. In short, Bloxham's error, which supports other misinterpretations in his book, is non-trivial, as it prevents him from fully appreciating the turn in Nazi policy toward Europe's Jews that occurred in late 1941-early 1942.

(all boldface is mine)

- - - - - -

Text of Mueller order - http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Micro ... 203264.pdf" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;:
Reich Security Main Office ( Reichssicherheitshauptamt) Berlin, October 23, 1941 IV B 4 b(Rz) 2920/41 g (984)

To... The Officer appointed by the Chief of the Security Police and the SD for Belgium and France SS Brigadefuehrer Thomas Brussels

Secret

Re : Emigration of Jews
Reference : none

The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police has decreed that the emigration of Jews is to be prevented, taking effect immediately. (Evacuation Aktionen will remain unaffected.)

I request that the internal German Authorities concerned in the area of service there may be informed of this order.

Permission for the emigration of individual Jews can only be approved in single very special cases ; for instance, in the event of a genuine interest on the part of the Reich, and then only after a prior decision has been obtained from the Reich Security Main Office.

signed Mueller

See also under the following keywords: Emigration, Gestapo.

Source:
Yad Vashem Archive, TR-3/1209.
Last edited by Statistical Mechanic on Mon Feb 02, 2015 8:59 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Balsamo » Sat Jan 31, 2015 5:50 pm

I just need some times to digest all this, and i'll be back.
Thank you very much.

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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Balsamo » Sun Feb 01, 2015 8:01 pm

Hi StatMec, and let me thank you for your notes on this issue, they are brilliant.
I have much less time to dedicate myself to this subject. But as forecast, i made some comments. As i wrote them over a couple of days when i had the opportunity to do so, the result may seem fuzzy...Well here there is anyway.

I also do think that Bloxham is a bit confused about this one. I even think that his interpretation is the exact opposite to what really happened. But one should notice that he is not firm on his interpretation as he speaks about an interpretation being “left open”.

Indeed, it should not be left open and it is bullocks!
As you might remember my interpretation about the Wannsee conference, I see this order, along with the other measures, as a preparation of the taking over of the Jewish Question by the sole SS. I do even think that on the contrary, this order specifically target Germany and exclude (even not expressly) territories like Belgium and France.
If one look at the “Judenverordnung” number 6 for Belgium (including part of northern France), establishing the “Vereinigung der Juden in Belgien”, it clealy states as one of the mission of the Association is to “activate jewish emigration”… It was promulgated on the 25 of November 1941. Up to that date, the only measure was that emigrated Jews were not allowed to return ( “Interdiction du Retour” Judenverordnung 1 (28 october 40))
In fact, one will have to wait for the Judenverordnung 8 (17 January 42) to see the interdiction to leave the territory without a written authorization.
(Maxime Steinberg, La persecution des Juifs en Belgique, p 307-310)

In my view, what was the real target of Müller’s letter was the local initiative concerning the Jews, like the massive expulsion from Bad Wurtenberg (?) where the Jews were just dumped to France…by authorities who still interpreted the Final Solution as getting their territories judenfrei, which was basically the main objective of the Final Solution as defined by Goering, and which differs from the Final Solution as thought by Himmler and his team.
What is difficult as far as this transitional period is concerned is to make a distinction between what belongs to the actual JudenPoiltiek (the old one) and to the project (still only wished but still with obstacles to its full implementation).
This is the issue that I have been focus on for a couple of time. A issue that seems at least to explain why there are so many divergence between Historians about the so-called SHIFT, about when, how and why it took place. It is quite a complex issue as basically it all depends on the perception and the conceptualization of the Final Solution.
The more I think it through, the more I tend to accept the hypothesis that there might have been two Final Solutions - the one of 1939 and Himmler’s one which is undatable in his origin but imposed itself round 41-early 42 - that coexisted for a short period of time, which created a kind of anarchy in how the Jewish problem was to be resolved.

So let's go back to Goering's order:
To Gruppenführer Heydrich:

Supplementing the task assigned to you by the decree of January 24, 1939, to solve the Jewish problem by means of emigration and evacuation in the best possible way according to present conditions, I hereby charge you to carry out preparations as regards organizational, financial, and material matters for a total solution (Gesamtlösung) of the Jewish question in all the territories of Europe under German occupation.

Where the competency of other central organizations touches on this matter, these organizations are to collaborate.
I charge you further to submit to me as soon as possible a general plan of the administrative material and financial measures necessary for carrying out the desired final solution (Endlösung) of the Jewish question.
Now there is two ways to read this note. One is to see a link between the two men and the two organizations (Goering’s and Himmler’s through Heydrich) which would support that the Final Solution that would later take place through extermination was known and thought by most of the Nazi authority. In consequence, all the measures that have been implemented in all occupied Europe can be seen as being part of the process of extermination. In other words, that the Final Solution as thought in 1939 already had extermination in mind.

The other view would focus on the differences and the divergences implied by Goering’s wording. It is obvious that the means of the Final Solution 39 are emigration (coerced to but freely leaving a territory) and evacuation (which by that time did not automatically mean to the East, but just to expulse by force the Jews from one territory to another). Goering seems to make the execution of the FS through collaboration with other authorities, but maybe not through a complete submission to the SS. That seems to be confirmed by the last sentence in which he clearly orders Heydrich to submit his proposition to HIM and to HIS approval.

AFAIK, I am not aware of any proposal addressed by Hendrich to Goering! Quite the contrary as Goering would soon be kicked out from the implementation of the Final Solution to come. There will be no collaboration, but complete submission asked to other authorities when possible, the concept of emigration will be dropped, and the one of evacuation redefined to evacuation to the East. And as I said, no proposition have ever been submitted to Goering’s approval.

If you remember my last Wannsee post, I defined the East as the region where Himmler held most of his power, a power almost absolute, a power that did not have in the West at that time, as shown in the France 42-44 discussion.
If one has a closer look at the sources you give concerning the context. Well here they are:
“Himmler's note to Greiser of 18 September 1941 ("The Führer wishes that, from the West to the East, the Altreich and the Protektorat be emptied and freed of Jews as soon as possible. I am therefore striving to transport the Jews of the Altreich and the Protektorat in the Eastern Territories that became part of the Reich two years ago. It is desirable that this is be accomplished by the end of this year")”
It concerns the consolidation of Himmler’s power in the East where those RK could be painful to deal with. The wording is also important, Himmler speaks of Hitler’s wishes, not orders. Those wishes are nothing new, as there are also behind Goering’s Final Solution. ASAP means that there a no real time frame, and those wishes only concern the Altreich and the Protektorat. I am not denying that those were indeed Hitler’s wishes, but there is a difference between a wish and an order, the first does not have to be clearly defined as opposed to the second. From a wish you can define you own policy, from the second you are to apply or implenet someone else's policy.

We find the same ambiguity in the second:
“Hitler on 6 October (according to Longerich at HDOT, "all Jews from the Protektorat needed to be 'removed' (entfernt) - and not into the Generalgouvernement first, but - 'straight on to the East'. This was said to be impossible at the moment, due to lack of transport capacity. Parallel to the deportation of the 'Protektorat-Jews' the Jews of Vienna and Berlin should 'disappear' (verschwinden)"”
Enfernt being more taken away than just remove. Again it just illustrates how Himmler used the wishes to gain authority on the whole Jewish question, as in this case are only concerned Jews from Germany including Berlin, the Protektorat and Austria. And those wishes were already present in the final Solution as concieved in 1939.
again in Longerich's words, instructions to German officials in France ("The expert on Jewish Questions of the German Embassy in Paris Carltheo Zeitschel, succeeded (through the aid of Ambassador Abetz) in securing Himmler's fundamental approval for the eastward deportation of the foreign Jews interned in France").
This kind of brings us back to the France 42-44 thread, but it shows the limit of Himmler’s authority at that time, as the order concerned foreign Jews as opposed to all Jews (which was Himmler’s own wish). The difference is that the fate of foreign Jews in France was covered and rendered feasible through the existent treaties ( Armistice, and occupation treaties)
All those sources illustrates that a New final Solution had to replace the old one which showed its limits, and where not profitable for the only SS.

StatMec wrote:
We can conclude that where Korherr wrote "wenigstens im Reichsgebiet," he did so because he was beginning his analysis of the demographics with a note on the consequences of the emigration halt first and foremost for the Altreich and Ostmark, also the Protectorate, which is precisely what his first table in section V focused on. And since the Müller circular addressed two countries outside the Reich, Belgium and France, we can be confident that the prohibition applied beyond "wenigstens im Reichsgebiet."
In some aspects, you are right. But as I have shown, prohibition of emigration will only be imposed in Belgium three months after Muller’s order, and I fail to see where such an interdiction existed in the French free-zone at least for those who were not in Concentration camps. And even then, in Belgium, the MBH held the right to authorize such emigration, as long as the Jews were not from Germany or from the German empire so to speak – the MBH and not the RSHA. So my interpretation for Korherr “at least” means where such order could be imposed without restriction, where the order has been effective.

When Eichmann says:
“Since December 20, 1941, we had the Reichsführer's general order prohibiting all emigration.”
He tells the truth, but forget to mention that his Reichsführer’s lacked the authority for his order to be implemented everywhere. As only two authorities were obviously responsible for emigration in Nazi Germany: the Foreign office and the RKF…But the authority of the RKF will not be extended to the west before well into 1942, and the foreign office could only imposes its plan when the Jews concerned fell into his competence, that is foreign Jews.

What I want to stress out, is that there is no doubt that Himmler wanted to have the most Jews under his sole authority, but that there was a temporal gap between his wishes and what he could effectively impose. My wife best friend was one of those Spanish Jew who fled to Morroco, by the way, whether Himmler liked it or not, tens of thousands followed the way, among them Arno Meyer’s family, whether through Spain or even Vichy France. By 1948, 400.000 Jews were living in Morocco! From there the more wealthy could even reach the USA

Here we have the typical example of the two Final Solutions opposition. Vichy wanted as much as Germany to get rid of the Jews – even the French ones – but as long as they moved away, leaving their properties behind, the Solution was completed- aryanization and emigration or evacuation, whatever that would make them leave. Which was in fine the sole purpose of the Nurnberg Laws, right?
Obviously Himmler and his RSHA had other plans, but those plans could only be achieved in the East…full of new opportunities as they said…
Well, I am not sure that I was really clear.
But to sum up, I interpret the Muller’s order to a premise of the Wannsee take over, as a step in the passing of one Final Solution to the other, along with all other initiatives made by the RSHA to secure its property over the European Jews.

But we agree that Bloxham has it all wrong. Emigration to Belgium and France, especially the Free zone was the opposite that Himmler and his Men wanted, as the sole Dutch Jews who basically survived were the ones who managed to escape to Belgium and got away from hell through the Resistances networks (which mostly were passing through the French free zone and Spain)
No wonder Himmler wanted to halt this.

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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Sun Feb 01, 2015 9:29 pm

Thanks, Balsamo.

This point is one I'd not thought enough about, so I appreciate your highlighting it and need to look into it (and will let you know if I have any thoughts):
Balsamo wrote:I do even think that on the contrary, this order specifically target Germany and exclude (even not expressly) territories like Belgium and France.
If one look at the “Judenverordnung” number 6 for Belgium (including part of northern France), establishing the “Vereinigung der Juden in Belgien”, it clealy states as one of the mission of the Association is to “activate jewish emigration”… It was promulgated on the 25 of November 1941. Up to that date, the only measure was that emigrated Jews were not allowed to return ( “Interdiction du Retour” Judenverordnung 1 (28 october 40))
In fact, one will have to wait for the Judenverordnung 8 (17 January 42) to see the interdiction to leave the territory without a written authorization.
(Maxime Steinberg, La persecution des Juifs en Belgique, p 307-310)
I will also look for France and the Netherlands specifics with this in mind.
Balsamo wrote:What is difficult as far as this transitional period is concerned is to make a distinction between what belongs to the actual JudenPoiltiek (the old one) and to the project (still only wished but still with obstacles to its full implementation).
This is the issue that I have been focus on for a couple of time. A issue that seems at least to explain why there are so many divergence between Historians about the so-called SHIFT, about when, how and why it took place. It is quite a complex issue as basically it all depends on the perception and the conceptualization of the Final Solution.
For sure. And historians like Christopher Browning, Christian Gerlach, Peter Longerich have all explored this question - and differed on it!
Balsamo wrote:The more I think it through, the more I tend to accept the hypothesis that there might have been two Final Solutions - the one of 1939 and Himmler’s one which is undatable in his origin but imposed itself round 41-early 42 - that coexisted for a short period of time, which created a kind of anarchy in how the Jewish problem was to be resolved.
What about Hitler's role? What about the assignment of the Final Solution (comprehensive/total solution) to Himmler's man Heydrich in summer 1941?
Balsamo wrote:So let's go back to Goering's order:
To Gruppenführer Heydrich:

Supplementing the task assigned to you by the decree of January 24, 1939, to solve the Jewish problem by means of emigration and evacuation in the best possible way according to present conditions, I hereby charge you to carry out preparations as regards organizational, financial, and material matters for a total solution (Gesamtlösung) of the Jewish question in all the territories of Europe under German occupation.

Where the competency of other central organizations touches on this matter, these organizations are to collaborate.
I charge you further to submit to me as soon as possible a general plan of the administrative material and financial measures necessary for carrying out the desired final solution (Endlösung) of the Jewish question.
Now there is two ways to read this note.
Ok, that's what I was referring to! Right.
Balsamo wrote:One is to see a link between the two men and the two organizations (Goering’s and Himmler’s through Heydrich) which would support that the Final Solution that would later take place through extermination was known and thought by most of the Nazi authority. In consequence, all the measures that have been implemented in all occupied Europe can be seen as being part of the process of extermination. In other words, that the Final Solution as thought in 1939 already had extermination in mind.
What about a third reading - as Eichmann calls it the "new conception" and which comes from the Führer in various ways - through Göring and as things radicalize in summer-fall 1941 through the 12 December meeting of Reich and Gau leaders, which Gerlach describes and which Frank replays in the G-G and with reverbations of Hitler's speech also in Goebbels' diary, through Himmler ("as partisans" on 18 December), Rosenberg's "suppressed" speech, etc . . . ?
Balsamo wrote: Goering seems to make the execution of the FS through collaboration with other authorities, but maybe not through a complete submission to the SS. That seems to be confirmed by the last sentence in which he clearly orders Heydrich to submit his proposition to HIM and to HIS approval.
It could never be via SS only - remember my post on Luther's memorandum. The RSHA was to exercise leadership and to orchestrate the various authorities, but they had to be included, from Gauleiter to military, from foreign office to Reichsbann, from civil authorities in East and western Europe to and ministers of Interior and Justice (Stuckart, Freisler at Wannsee), from Göring's office (Four Year Plan) to WVHA, GG, Warthegau authorities, and so on.
Balsamo wrote:AFAIK, I am not aware of any proposal addressed by Hendrich to Goering! Quite the contrary as Goering would soon be kicked out from the implementation of the Final Solution to come. There will be no collaboration, but complete submission asked to other authorities when possible, the concept of emigration will be dropped, and the one of evacuation redefined to evacuation to the East. And as I said, no proposition have ever been submitted to Goering’s approval.
But didn't Heydrich himself draft the "commission from Göring" and might he not have had his own ideas about what completing his homework assignment, which he gave himself meant . . . ? or the document just hasn't been found . . . ? or, as Browning pretty much says, we get this piecemeal . . . ?
Balsamo wrote:If you remember my last Wannsee post, I defined the East as the region where Himmler held most of his power, a power almost absolute, a power that did not have in the West at that time, as shown in the France 42-44 discussion.
This remains the point where we disagree - not on the power of SS vis-a-vis different areas - but on the degree to which the Final Solution became the Nazi's European-wide project, in all sorts of differing conditions. To take an illustrative example, the SS had little to no power in Hungary until the invasion of Hungary in spring 1944 and with it the installation of Eichmann's team in Budapest. Lack of power and advantage were problems for the RSHA to solve to implement the German policy of genocide. Much more can be said but I just want to highlight where you and I seem to disagree most.
Balsamo wrote:If one has a closer look at the sources you give concerning the context. Well here they are
“Himmler's note to Greiser of 18 September 1941 ("The Führer wishes that, from the West to the East, the Altreich and the Protektorat be emptied and freed of Jews as soon as possible. I am therefore striving to transport the Jews of the Altreich and the Protektorat in the Eastern Territories that became part of the Reich two years ago. It is desirable that this is be accomplished by the end of this year")”
It concerns the consolidation of Himmler’s power in the East where those RK could be painful to deal with. The wording is also important, Himmler speaks of Hitler’s wishes, not orders. Those wishes are nothing new, as there are also behind Goering’s Final Solution. ASAP means that there a no real time frame, and those wishes only concern the Altreich and the Protektorat. I am not denying that those were indeed Hitler’s wishes, but there is a difference between a wish and an order, the first does not have to be clearly defined as opposed to the second. From a wish you can define you own policy, from the second you are to apply or implenet someone else's policy.
Well, I think that the Führer's wish, at that time, was still Heinrich's command . . . but to your first point, here is how Browning describes this issue at the HDOT site, actually starting from the issue of their being no comprehensive report/plan:
No "comprehensive draft" for a Final Solution is among the surviving German documents found after the war. But other documents have survived that indicate a series of changes in Nazi Jewish policy in the fall of 1941 that, taken together, constituted a program for the systematic mass murder of European Jewry. The first was a reversal of Hitler's previous policy that the deportation of German Jews would not take place until after the war. On September 18, 1941, Himmler informed the Gauleiter of the Warthegau, Arthur Greiser: "The Führer wishes that the Old Reich and Protectorate be emptied and freed of Jews from west to east as quickly as possible." Thus Himmler intended, "as a first step" (als erste Stufe), to deport the Jews to the incorporated territories (especially the ghetto of Lodz) "in order to deport them yet further to the east the next spring."77 On October 10, Heydrich in Prague announced that Riga and Minsk would also be destinations for the deportation of German Jews.78 The deportations, first to Lodz, then began on October 15.
I would add that the Gauleiter, exemplified by Goebbels, were pushing for such a change in policy. There were pressure and growing consensus from many quarters during the months after Barbarossa . . .
Balsamo wrote:We find the same ambiguity in the second:
“Hitler on 6 October (according to Longerich at HDOT, "all Jews from the Protektorat needed to be 'removed' (entfernt) - and not into the Generalgouvernement first, but - 'straight on to the East'. This was said to be impossible at the moment, due to lack of transport capacity. Parallel to the deportation of the 'Protektorat-Jews' the Jews of Vienna and Berlin should 'disappear' (verschwinden)"”
Enfernt being more taken away than just remove. Again it just illustrates how Himmler used the wishes to gain authority on the whole Jewish question, as in this case are only concerned Jews from Germany including Berlin, the Protektorat and Austria. And those wishes were already present in the final Solution as concieved in 1939.
I guess I take more to heart the desire quickly to make a plan to remove the Jews from the Greater Reich - as the driving wedge here. I don't think this is Himmler's operation but rather a policy change, coming from the Führer - and drawing on "practical experience" and pressure across the board - which then gets into Himmler's hand to lead.
Balsamo wrote:
again in Longerich's words, instructions to German officials in France ("The expert on Jewish Questions of the German Embassy in Paris Carltheo Zeitschel, succeeded (through the aid of Ambassador Abetz) in securing Himmler's fundamental approval for the eastward deportation of the foreign Jews interned in France").
This kind of brings us back to the France 42-44 thread, but it shows the limit of Himmler’s authority at that time, as the order concerned foreign Jews as opposed to all Jews (which was Himmler’s own wish). The difference is that the fate of foreign Jews in France was covered and rendered feasible through the existent treaties ( Armistice, and occupation treaties)
All those sources illustrates that a New final Solution had to replace the old one which showed its limits, and where not profitable for the only SS.
But what is really fundamental is the policy turn - which then had diverse conditions to solve for, including impediments like those in Slovakia (where limited actions only could occur on account of the church and Tiso's cold feet), Hungary (where almost nothing could be done at the time), western Europe (as I've posted), Italy (holding out), etc.
Balsamo wrote:StatMec wrote:
We can conclude that where Korherr wrote "wenigstens im Reichsgebiet," he did so because he was beginning his analysis of the demographics with a note on the consequences of the emigration halt first and foremost for the Altreich and Ostmark, also the Protectorate, which is precisely what his first table in section V focused on. And since the Müller circular addressed two countries outside the Reich, Belgium and France, we can be confident that the prohibition applied beyond "wenigstens im Reichsgebiet."
In some aspects, you are right. But as I have shown, prohibition of emigration will only be imposed in Belgium three months after Muller’s order, and I fail to see where such an interdiction existed in the French free-zone at least for those who were not in Concentration camps. And even then, in Belgium, the MBH held the right to authorize such emigration, as long as the Jews were not from Germany or from the German empire so to speak – the MBH and not the RSHA. So my interpretation for Korherr “at least” means where such order could be imposed without restriction, where the order has been effective.
Again, thanks for bringing this up, I need to look at it for a bit.
Balsamo wrote:When Eichmann says:
“Since December 20, 1941, we had the Reichsführer's general order prohibiting all emigration.”
He tells the truth, but forget to mention that his Reichsführer’s lacked the authority for his order to be implemented everywhere. As only two authorities were obviously responsible for emigration in Nazi Germany: the Foreign office and the RKF…But the authority of the RKF will not be extended to the west before well into 1942, and the foreign office could only imposes its plan when the Jews concerned fell into his competence, that is foreign Jews.
In at least one case Eichmann told the truth! Strange things do happen. LOL.
Balsamo wrote:What I want to stress out, is that there is no doubt that Himmler wanted to have the most Jews under his sole authority, but that there was a temporal gap between his wishes and what he could effectively impose.
Again, where we disagree, I think, also includes the extent to which a consensus solution to the Jewish question had emerged by late 1941. And that brings up the exchange we had on means and ends, goals and implementation, etc.
Balsamo wrote:My wife best friend was one of those Spanish Jew who fled to Morroco, by the way, whether Himmler liked it or not, tens of thousands followed the way, among them Arno Meyer’s family, whether through Spain or even Vichy France. By 1948, 400.000 Jews were living in Morocco! From there the more wealthy could even reach the USA

Here we have the typical example of the two Final Solutions opposition. Vichy wanted as much as Germany to get rid of the Jews – even the French ones – but as long as they moved away, leaving their properties behind, the Solution was completed- aryanization and emigration or evacuation, whatever that would make them leave. Which was in fine the sole purpose of the Nurnberg Laws, right?
Obviously Himmler and his RSHA had other plans, but those plans could only be achieved in the East…full of new opportunities as they said…
Well, I am not sure that I was really clear.
I think you are being clear - but I also think, going back to Confino's Corfu example or Eichmann's refusal to let two men from the Netherlands get to Afghanistan, the new German policy by the end of 1941 was to destroy European Jews physically to the extent possible. About 25,000 Dutch Jews survived in hiding, maybe 300,000 in Poland, a few 1000s in Lithuania, and so on - not due to German policy or reluctance but due to the limits of what they could achieve in the time and space they had.
Balsamo wrote:But to sum up, I interpret the Muller’s order to a premise of the Wannsee take over, as a step in the passing of one Final Solution to the other, along with all other initiatives made by the RSHA to secure its property over the European Jews.

But we agree that Bloxham has it all wrong. Emigration to Belgium and France, especially the Free zone was the opposite that Himmler and his Men wanted, as the sole Dutch Jews who basically survived were the ones who managed to escape to Belgium and got away from hell through the Resistances networks (which mostly were passing through the French free zone and Spain)
No wonder Himmler wanted to halt this.
We agree to disagree! LOL, but thanks for your comments - and I do need to look at the specific issues you raised about Judenverordnung number 6 for Belgium (including part of northern France), Jewish emigration in Belgium, and the role of MBH.
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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Balsamo » Sun Feb 01, 2015 10:24 pm

Hi StatMec, and thanks for showing your interest.
I will adress your points tomorrow.

Just this:
What about Hitler's role? What about the assignment of the Final Solution (comprehensive/total solution) to Himmler's man Heydrich in summer 1941?
What about a third reading - as Eichmann calls it the "new conception" and which comes from the Führer in various ways - through Göring and as things radicalize in summer-fall 1941 through the 12 December meeting of Reich and Gau leaders, which Gerlach describes and which Frank replays in the G-G and with reverbations of Hitler's speech also in Goebbels' diary, through Himmler ("as partisans" on 18 December), Rosenberg's "suppressed" speech, etc . . . ?
But didn't Heydrich himself draft the "commission from Göring" and might he not have had his own ideas about what completing his homework assignment, which he gave himself meant . . . ?
Well, I think that the Führer's wish, at that time, was still Heinrich's command . .
Tough issues, right?
I know, and i am not pretending to hold the truth here, but just trying to make a swift change of perspective and see where it can go to.

You might have guessed that i am quite open to Martin Broszat's concept of Hitler being a weak dictator, not in a sense that he was weak himself, but because the structure of his regime made it impossible for him to exerce a complete control over how things were actually done, or to be more specific, they way he chose to rule over Germany's destiny, left a great deal of liberty to different authorities on how his "wishes" had to be translated into facts, or on the contrary when sudden wishes interfered on pre-existing policies...

We all know that a "Fuhrer's Befehl" had no price and allowed the bearer of this order to command all the Nawi structure of government. Strangely enough, Himmler - during the transition phase - was not claiming to have such a power! So the basic question at this point are:
- why use the term wishes in the first place IF Himmler could have obtained an order which would have clarified his supremacy over the Jewish question, a long time before Wannsee.
- why those Hitler's wishes did not materialize into a "Befehl"?
- Why did Heydrich use the famous Goering's order which basically will never be obeyed?

So just to respond your last question i have quoted?
Were Hitler's wishes Heydrich's command? or were those wishes the foundation of Himmler's new Policy - which at one time were Himmler's own whishes, those wishes being Heydrich's command?
That is basically the million dollar question.

See you tomorrow, i'll try my best to adress your points and defend my experimental perspective.

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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Sun Feb 01, 2015 10:42 pm

More tomorrow for sure . . . yes, I overstated the wish/command thing . . . I am more focused on the consensus which Hitler sat atop . . . weak dictator (but not so much as to remove him as a factor, leader, of course - "working toward the Führer" as a good concept for ways the regime and Party functioned), lots of infighting (not mostly policy of course), and so on . . .

And another thought to consider: I don't see in this period effective, fundamental disagreement, from Party or state officials, with the policy of genocide - in fact, here's where the table turns, you do see some debate, over extent and timing - but the strongest debate was in . . . the East, in the Baltics and Belorussia in particular, Wehrmacht and civil authorities to some extent, and you see the Wehrmacht foot-dragging at other times in the East, prompting Himmler counterattacks but even into '44 (e.g., Martin Dean has studied 30 Forced Labor Camps for Jews,ZALfJs, in Kreis Czortkow, Distrikt Galizien, which the Wehrmacht kept protecting against Himmler until late in the war) . . . but even then, the divergence isn't over wiping out the Jews so much as how and when . . .
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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Mon Feb 02, 2015 8:43 pm

An additional thought, Balsamo: this is all one reason I proposed discussing France-Belgium-Netherlands together. You've put forward two strong points:

First, even during late 1941-1942 a "two Final Solutions opposition. . . . Himmler and his RSHA had other plans," whereas I described an escalation and radicalized consensus . . .

Second, regional differences giving Himmler's FS a free hand in "the East as the region where Himmler held most of his power, a power almost absolute, a power that did not have in the West at that time, as shown in the France 42-44 discussion" - yet when I think of the Netherlands, I think of Rauter and Aus der Funten eventually gaining a rather strong remit - leading me to describe a converged European-wide FS with tactical differences, even concessions, based on implementation conditions by nation . . . albeit with competition among the Germans over competency, execution, etc.

Rooting the discussion in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, even with some nods to Italy, Slovakia, Hungary and points of comparison with the East, might help pin some of this down and enable us to test it. It might also be a first for an HD discussion to really focus on western Europe.

Just a thought.
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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Balsamo » Wed Feb 04, 2015 6:02 pm

Hi Statmec,

I have well understood the disagreements we have, even though i think you see more of them than i do. :D

As for my two points being:
First, even during late 1941-1942 a "two Final Solutions opposition. . . . Himmler and his RSHA had other plans," whereas I described an escalation and radicalized consensus . . .

Second, regional differences giving Himmler's FS a free hand in "the East as the region where Himmler held most of his power, a power almost absolute, a power that did not have in the West at that time, as shown in the France 42-44 discussion" - yet when I think of the Netherlands, I think of Rauter and Aus der Funten eventually gaining a rather strong remit - leading me to describe a converged European-wide FS with tactical differences, even concessions, based on implementation conditions by nation . . . albeit with competition among the Germans over competency, execution, etc.
Just remember that both points are only hypothesis I am playing with...while the more i play with, the more it make sense, and answered some questions... But i insist on the hypothetical nature of all this.

As a start, i'd like to rephrase my first point, which of course leads to the second.
This is how i came up with this idea:

And, as you may have noticed, the famous Goering’s 1941 letter is one of the key. Along with the wording, there is another element that should be outlined: the reference of the Decree of 24 january 39.

A decree is even stronger than an order, it has the force of LAW
Decree of 1939:
Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan
To The Reich Minister of the Interior

The emigration of the Jews from Germany is to be furthered by all possible means.
A Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration is being established in the Reich Ministry of the Interior from among representatives of the agencies concerned. The Reich Central Office will have the task to devise uniform policies as follows:
1. Measures for the preparation of increased emigration of Jews. This will include the creation of a Jewish organization that can prepare uniform applications for emigration; the taking of all steps for the provision and efficient use of local and foreign funds; and a decision on suitable target countries for emigration, to be selected in coordination with the Reich Center for Emigration.
2. The direction of emigration, including, for instance, preference for the emigration of the poorer Jews.
3. The speeding up of emigration in individual cases, by means of speedy and smooth provision of the State documents and permits required by the individual emigrant, through central processing of applications for emigration.
The Reich Center for Emigration will be headed by the Chief of the Security Police. He will appoint a Responsible Manager and make rules for the operation of the Reich Center.

Regular reports on the work of the Reich Center will be forwarded to me. I will be consulted continuously on measures requiring decisions of principle.

In addition to representatives of other agencies involved, the Committee will include Ambassador Eisenlohr, who is responsible for official inter-state negotiations, and Ministerial Director Wohlthat, who is responsible for negotiations in connection with the Rublee Plan.
This Decree clearly makes Goering as Head of the Final Solution- he had appointed Heydrich and Heydrich was to report to him - , covering all the measures that have been implemented prior to the Decree, and more importantly gives them a legal status, defining a National Policy that could not be contested or disobeyed. This status explains the efficiency of its international implementations: establishment of Jewish organizations, aryanisation of Jewish assets, laws that made life for a Jew impossible, thus pushing to emigration or to be interned for having broken the law, etc.

It was persecutions, spoilation, and pure evil in its applications...but it was legal!

As head of the Four Years Plan, and being corrupt to his toes, Goering was more obsessed by the aryanization process, stealing arts as well as business, etc. Being the head of the Final Solution was thus complementary to his control of the economic activities in Germany, and highly profitable for him personally.

TO SUMP UP the FS version of 39:
The head and chief was Goering through Heydrich, focus on the financial aspect, what to do with the spoiled Jews comes in second, open to initiatives from various institutions: ( foreing office :emigration to Palestine, international negociations,) Gauleiters and evacuation, Reichskommissar in the East (ghettos ), Rosenberg’s ministry, and the SS …), all this was not of Goering’s preoccupation: what mattered was The Herman Goering Werke and his wealth!

As it is backed by the law, it suffered some legal limitations in its possibilities which depended on each respective institution’s capabilities depending on territories and juridictions.

All this created a kind of anarchy where each authority essentially thought of its own interests in any given situation, The four years plan in Germany (Altreich) vs Greissler and the highly profitable Lodz Ghetto, GG Frank with his own Ghettos, and to a certain degree Vichy’s government in the Free zone, etc.

This in mind, Goering’s letter – even if being drafted by Heydrich who was still on paper his subordinate in those matters - cannot be taken to literally. Georing clearly tried to reaffirm a authority over the Final Solution which was only theoretical by that time, himself being more and more a useless personality within the Nazi Regime but still defending what he thought fell into his attributions. It is highly probable that he has been triked into writing it, wrongly convinced that it would keep him as the boss and future beneficiary of the Juden Politiek. His wording is almost identical as the 39 decree, re-applying for further collaborations, that he should be the one who decisions should be submitted to...It looks like a call for a status-quo or more cllearly a call for any future extention of the policy should be profitable to him. That would have resulted as a continuation of the mess!

This messy situation had to be somehow unbearable for the SS and Himmler: Inefficiency, corruption, unbearable initiatives like the trade of Aryanization certificate, local aryanization policy by some Gauleiters like Forster.
It must have appeared to him that this “Final Solution” was not the Solution at all!

This is why – in my hypothesis – he must have conceived another one, more radical to say the least, in order to make it possible to answer Hitler’s wishes, and to allow his SS to own a part of the pie, that is the huge financial profits other were making. Didn’t this old pig of Goering become the richest man within the Reich, weren’t the Herman Goering Werke not the bigger employer in Germany? And how the {!#%@} - Himmler must have thought - are we going to get rid of all those spoiled Jews under these circumstances? Hitler would like to kicked out the Jews out of the Reich, but where should i put them as those {!#%@} from the Party refused to accept them? Goering is a drug addict satisfied in the luxury he lives in, and nothing is centralized...and worst of all, the SS has nothing to gain from this mess!

Especially since it clearly appeared that Germany was heading to a total war. Huge profits were to be expected.

With both consideration in mind, Himmler will play his cards – as he held some aces – to bit by bit gain the absolute control on the Final Solution, newly defined by him (according to Hitler’s wishes and his own racial views) in a more radical way.

The conquest for power in the East will prove the easier part, given his attributions there, that would be the first step, the second would be to secure his taking over of the the Final Solution, to kicked out Goering, and to centralize the new Solution within his SS office, transforming the so called collaboration (chaos) into a complete submission of all others institutions. This Strategy will be completed to a certain extend at Wannsee, as far as the Reichs institutions were concerned - and that includes the Netherlands which were truned - as well as the Alsace-Lorraine - into German provinces.

Meanwhile, for some parts of occupied Europe - Belgium - France - the county of Nice - Greece (split into three zones of occupation - patience was still needed.
But Himmler was on the rise by the end of 1941, while Goering's party was on the decline, so he surely had felt optimistic.

This is why I speak of two Solutions, in opposition to the concept of the first one taking another direction…As this shift supposed a complete reorganization of who was to be in charge…
the answer was clear, if the Final Solution was to be a success, He, Himmler, had to take control of the thing. He was well aware that he had the authority to kill, to displace population in the east, and to create as many camps as he wanted, but while there was still a remain of constitution in Germany, the eastern territories had lost any legal status...those were colonies...with no such burden as Treaties of occupation or armistice, with no allied or neutral government which had to be respected.

I spoke before of two considerations: the second being MONEY. With Germany at the brink of a total war, the SS were small peanuts within the probable war effort industry. Of course the SS had their economic organization, and through some profitable companies like the DEST – based on the KZ system – but it was nothing compared with the Four Years plan and the Sauckel organization (the HG werke had 700.000 workers, and Sauckel could count on 5 millions reservoir of workers, and Sauckel was a Borman’s man working for the 4 years plan), the OT of the Armament industry (Todt, Speer).
The taking over of the Final Solution would allow the SS to compete or at least take a part of the pie ( which was an imperative if the SS had to become the post victory Elite within the Nazi empire) through the reorganized WVHA ( and the DWB, OSTI, etc). But in order to achieve this, one had to remove the Jews from their Ghettos, get the absolute property of ALL the Jews, to reorganize the whole thing, with the objective of extermination in mind, "this objective that had been neglected" he must have thought.

He will succeed in both, even if the west will prove to be a little more challenging for other reasons. Of course, this new Final Solution was no longer backed by any law or decree. It had to involve secrecy while the first one could be implemented in full light in an almost legal way, and it had to happen where he held most of his power, because to paraphrase 007, he was licensed to kill there.

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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Wed Feb 04, 2015 6:42 pm

Ok, thanks, I'll come back to this. The differences between us may be narrowing - so I have a question, two parts: 1) in the competition for control - into whose competency Judenpolitik would mainly fall - with Himmler and especially the RSHA winning (another example, Madagascar where the competition was with Foreign Office) by late fall 1941, what do you see as the role of the Führer? and 2) in this new version of the Final Solution (Eichmann's "new conception") - by whatever process it came about (radicalization of local satraps, Himmler-Heydrich pushing, Gauleiter pushing to be rid of Jews, everyone working toward the Führer, EGs gaining practical experience, etc) - are you arguing that it became the prevailing policy similar to Himmler's remit becoming clear - in other words, did a disagreement among the top leaders over goals/end results still exist or was their convergence, for whatever reasons, on the FS roughly as we know it?
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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Balsamo » Wed Feb 04, 2015 10:32 pm

1) in the competition for control - into whose competency Judenpolitik would mainly fall - with Himmler and especially the RSHA winning (another example, Madagascar where the competition was with Foreign Office) by late fall 1941, what do you see as the role of the Führer?
This is what I call a million dollar question! Lol.
I think that I am not the only one for whom Hilter remains a mystery. I have read so many memoirs from the member of his inner circle that I could not count them. A common point between them is that – with exception of some rants – the Jewish question and how to solve it is actually absent, especially when he was dedicating 90% of his time in micro-managing a war he did not even understand. But what is known is that he had always time to receive Himmler, but I know no sources of their private conversations. So we are left we suppositions and extrapolations.

At first, I would think that whatever his power, Himmler would not have dared to pursue such a policy without the Big Man’s approval. On the other hand, Hitler’s tactic to divide in order to rule, his physical incapacity to micro-managed everything, his tendency to leave authorities – even if counter-productive – I think of his gauleiters and his early “Kampf Kamaraden”, but also Goering, in peace and impunity as long as he did not feel betrayed, to close his eyes to some wrong doing, left a great room of liberty for the factions that were disputing his benefits, influence and attention, makes it difficult to be absolute and definitive on that question.

I admit I have still a hard time understanding those Nazi leaders psychology, especially when they were still conspiring against each other while their own apocalypse was close and inevitable.

What is certain, though, is that Hitler must have shared the idea that the final solution on the Jewish question, and thought, defined and made into laws, was not leading to any solution given the failure of Barbarossa…And if he was not a complete idiot, that would be around by the end of October 1941. By that time, he also lost most of consideration for Goering, but without getting farther than disdain. Goering was by far the most popular personality among the German people, he was still the number 2, the successor – even when he became just a pain in the ass for everyone in the Nazi sphere of power. And it is now known that Hitler was really anxious about Public Opinion.

That being said, I can very well imagine Hitler giving a white card to Himmler, like “ok, do it your way”…without being bothered with the details, as long as the job was being done, but I am also sure that Himmler was the most “obsessed about “Race and eugenic (eugenism?)” among the Nazi leaders, which were behaving mostly like gangsters more preoccupied by their own ambitions – money-power – while Himmler was the most ideological and dare I say "sincere" in his actions.

But no matter what, one of his argument to get Hitler’s approval would have been the benefits for Germany’s victory if the SS were allowed to participate in the war efforts….The War was nevertheless Hitler’s main obsession at that time. That would be the mission of the newly reorganized WVHA.

But we must content ourselves with that kind of suppositions as the extermination program was never backed by an official “Fuhrer’s Befehl” or an official decree. So it was not an official National Policy, despite the fact that every concerned institution played its role blindly.

One of the main question is why did it all happened in the East, right? There are no clear answers for that if it is taken as granted that it was an official national policy. In a sense it makes no sense to waste resources to bring hundreds of thousands of people to a destination 3000 miles away just to have them killed there. France was a country as big and as rural as Poland, there would have been hundreds of sites suitable for mass murder!
2) in this new version of the Final Solution (Eichmann's "new conception") - by whatever process it came about (radicalization of local satraps, Himmler-Heydrich pushing, Gauleiter pushing to be rid of Jews, everyone working toward the Führer, EGs gaining practical experience, etc) - are you arguing that it became the prevailing policy similar to Himmler's remit becoming clear - in other words, did a disagreement among the top leaders over goals/end results still exist or was their convergence, for whatever reasons, on the FS roughly as we know it?
If I understood your last question correctly , I would say that once the taking over had been completed, all others authorities (Nazi factions) just had to accept it, and that power struggle would be transferred to other fields, but there is one thing that I have to stress out again, as I already did. There was a common view, a consensus, on the nature of the Jews and how their fate had to be dealt with, depending on the situation: for example, the Wehrmacht was most likely to participate when there was a justification. The army would participate in massacre against Jews behind its rear or close to the front, the concept of “Jews being a partisan (and vectors of Bolshevism)” being shared, that was the case in Russia, the Baltic States and even Serbia, while the very same army would complain about the dismantling (through the shooting of workers) of a factory who was doing furs for its troops.

And that is one of the problems that the RSHA would face in the western MBH, the Jews were not posing an immediate threat, they were less likely to be tagged as Communists and in the case of Vichy France, the Collaborators were doing their job chasing the Reds anyway.
A Gauleiter of Bad Wurtenberg would just be happy to have his Jews removed – whatever the means – whether through emigration or to deportation to the “East”, while the Gauleiters in the East, just wanted them to be removed, even through mass murders, or in some cases just be able to make some bucks out of them for themselves – but as far as further deportation eastward is concerned, there were not much of alternatives anyway. And this is another reason why the eastern territories were the perfect spot to do that action. The Consensus was greater, and more deeply entrenched among the actors.

But I am sure that there had been some frustrations when Himmler transferred the Slave Labours from the Ghettos to his own camps, as millions of Reichsmarks just went from one pocket to another. Some other would complain about the loss of productivity for the war effort. Whatever the reason for complaining, once the SS held the grip of the Final Solution, there was nothing to be done – which by the way most certainly implied a Hitler open support, with some restriction. Himmler would not be able to take over the Lodz Ghetto completely until his nomination as minister of the Interior, that is by August 1943, and then again, he would have to deal with competing interests.

But if your question was did anyone care about the fate of the Jews – as people and persons – I would say NO, at least among the powers concerned…At least not in the East.
On the other hand, there were conflictual relations in both French and Belgian MBH (between the RSHA and the authorities there), as the primary role of those authorities was to keep the situation peacefully, and that the main focus was to organize the transfer of qualified workers – millions of them – from the occupied territories to Germany…and that the trouble resulting from the deportation of Jewish children was counter-productive for their own mission. Here the force relation between the OKW, the 4 years plan vs the SS, was still challenging. But soon the borders and respective jurisdictions were established, everything could go on as planned. The Nazi Regime was a vertical one, and danger for the one who woulf have wanted to cross the horizontal barrier. Everyone his own business, so to speak.
And one should not forget that Himmler's personnal power will keep growing to the very end.

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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Wed Feb 04, 2015 11:33 pm

Balsamo wrote: . . . he had always time to receive Himmler, but I know no sources of their private conversations. So we are left we suppositions and extrapolations.
- during that critical time of December 1941, Himmler's note Judenfrage / Als Partisanen auszurotten
- would need to look systematically at actions that follow Himmler's meetings with the Führer
- cannot imagine Himmler - until desperate at war's end and trying to carve out space in which to save himself - organizing a program like this behind Hitler's back
- Posen speech: speaks to large and senior group, people who meet with the Führer, of his orders ("in accordance with orders"), even calling the organization charged with the FS "this political instrument of the Führer"
- and, truly, could Hitler be kept in the dark? and, if not, well, then what?
- Gerlach's assessment of Hitler's 12 December 1941 meeting, Göring's diary notes on that occasion and others
- text of Wannsee protocol - "Another possible solution of the problem has now taken the place of emigration, i.e. the evacuation of the Jews to the East, provided that the Fuehrer gives the appropriate approval in advance"
- the centrality of the Jewish question and (Herf) its prominence in Hitler's view of the war
Balsamo wrote:On the other hand, Hitler’s tactic to divide in order to rule, his physical incapacity to micro-managed everything, his tendency to leave authorities
Again, "working toward the Führer"; Hitler need not manage the implementation.
Balsamo wrote:I admit I have still a hard time understanding those Nazi leaders psychology, especially when they were still conspiring against each other while their own apocalypse was close and inevitable.
Me too. The "burned bridges" concept, along with their racial and political arrogance: best I can do.
Balsamo wrote:What is certain, though, is that Hitler must have shared the idea that the final solution on the Jewish question, and thought, defined and made into laws, was not leading to any solution given the failure of Barbarossa…And if he was not a complete idiot, that would be around by the end of October 1941.
Even for Browning, but especially for Gerlach this is the critical period.
Balsamo wrote:That being said, I can very well imagine Hitler giving a white card to Himmler, like “ok, do it your way”…without being bothered with the details, as long as the job was being done
With, I think the calendars and diaries etc show, check-ins along the way . . .
Balsamo wrote:The War was nevertheless Hitler’s main obsession at that time.
I agree with a caveat: I don't think it was just propaganda when the Nazi leadership said that the Jews were behind the war and that the war wouldn't be worth it if the Jews weren't dealt with. The prophecies and much else support this view, I think.
Balsamo wrote:One of the main question is why did it all happened in the East, right?
But it happened "to" the West and South as well. I think the colonial, racist attitudes and plans of the Nazis for the East make the East a logical scene for the crime. Maybe that's too pat an answer, but it seems obvious to me: first and foremost, that where Lebensraum was to be conquered; second, as a colonial, demographic project, the East starts to see population reengineering projects - affecting Poles, Russians, Jews, and so on; the Hunger Plan, Generalplan Ost, RKF stuff, the Deutsche Volksliste; third, all these people are at best helots, that sort of attitude - and coupled with that, vs the West, a sense that anything goes whereas caution is needed in the West as the thought isn't simply to lay waste to the West but to keep peace, not drain off effort, etc; fourth, and really important, Greiser wants to get rid of "his" Jews, the Einsatzgruppen are used to cleanse huge amounts of territory, the G-G is a mess from Nazi point of view - so you get positive feedback loops, the law of increasing returns, a bunch of "strange attractors," so to speak . . . and all of this radicalizing mainly in the East as a result . . .
Balsamo wrote:If I understood your last question correctly , I would say that once the taking over had been completed, all others authorities (Nazi factions) just had to accept it, and that power struggle would be transferred to other fields, but there is one thing that I have to stress out again, as I already did. There was a common view, a consensus, on the nature of the Jews and how their fate had to be dealt with, depending on the situation: for example, the Wehrmacht was most likely to participate when there was a justification. The army would participate in massacre against Jews behind its rear or close to the front, the concept of “Jews being a partisan (and vectors of Bolshevism)” being shared, that was the case in Russia, the Baltic States and even Serbia, while the very same army would complain about the dismantling (through the shooting of workers) of a factory who was doing furs for its troops.
That's exactly what I was asking. Agree.
Balsamo wrote:And that is one of the problems that the RSHA would face in the western MBH, the Jews were not posing an immediate threat, they were less likely to be tagged as Communists and in the case of Vichy France, the Collaborators were doing their job chasing the Reds anyway.
A Gauleiter of Bad Wurtenberg would just be happy to have his Jews removed – whatever the means – whether through emigration or to deportation to the “East”, while the Gauleiters in the East, just wanted them to be removed, even through mass murders, or in some cases just be able to make some bucks out of them for themselves – but as far as further deportation eastward is concerned, there were not much of alternatives anyway. And this is another reason why the eastern territories were the perfect spot to do that action. The Consensus was greater, and more deeply entrenched among the actors.
Here's where we need to go step by step - because Seyss-Inquart was fine with extermination, e.g., but Vichy and Mussolini weren't - except Petain didn't give a rat's ass about eastern Jews; Tiso and Horthy had limits, but Salazi and the Iron Cross didn't, and so on. I think one needs to look at Berlin/RSHA and each case and then all the cases together. And I am definitely not there yet - although I do have, like you, a hypothesis . . . as explained before.
Balsamo wrote:But if your question was did anyone care about the fate of the Jews – as people and persons – I would say NO, at least among the powers concerned…At least not in the East.
I'd go a step further and say that the agencies which mattered were, to steal a term from earlier, "coordinated" around getting rid of the Jews by any means - and participated as needed.

More later . . .
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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Thu Feb 05, 2015 4:58 pm

Statistical Mechanic wrote:
Balsamo wrote:That being said, I can very well imagine Hitler giving a white card to Himmler, like “ok, do it your way”…without being bothered with the details, as long as the job was being done
With, I think the calendars and diaries etc show, check-ins along the way . . .
For example, by this route too:
State Attorney Bach: The next document, No. 1439, is a report by Seyss-Inquart himself, addressed to "Lieber Parteigenosse Bormann" (Dear Party Comrade Bormann), whom he informs that the Jewish question in the Netherlands has largely been settled.

Presiding Judge: This is late, February 1944.

State Attorney Bach: This is already February 1944. He mentions the number of Jews in hiding and that, little by little, they are seized and sent to the East, some 500-600 a week. The Jewish property has been seized and is being liquidated. Then he refers to the problems of mixed marriages. He says that until now it was the practice to take away what he calls the "juedische Partner" (Jewish partner) from mixed marriages, simply to take him away from his family and deport him; and then he says: Sooner or later we shall have to deal in the same way with the children of these marriages "...die Kinder dieser Gemeinschaft denselben Weg gehen lassen..." (to make the children of this union follow the same way). He also says that a considerable number of Jews agree to sterilization, that they accept the situation.

Presiding Judge: Why does he write this specifically to Bormann? What were Bormann's functions?

State Attorney Bach: Bormann was at that time the Fuehrer's deputy, and he frequently intervened also in the Jewish question. He had no defined functions in this matter, but from time to time we find that he is interested, that he makes decisions and that he receives reports.
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eic ... 35-03.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Balsamo » Sun Feb 08, 2015 7:00 pm

StatMec wrote :
But it happened "to" the West and South as well.
Hum...where?
By "it happened", i meant where the real extermination - including women and children - took place according to a policy. I don't deny that killings did take place, let say in the Balkan, but those were under opportunistic pretext (security), not systematic, IIRC, they killed the Serbian Jews on spot but "evacuated to the east" their families, while in the west, i fail to see where...
Logistically, extermination centers COULD have been built in France or in Germany...those countries were wide enough, but that is not what happened...so there must have been a good reason to choose for the burden to transport those hundreds of thousands 3000 thousands miles away just to kill them.
...Greiser wants to get rid of "his" Jews...
Yes, as long as he could keep some in his ghetto's factories...he would make some deal..."kill some polish and bring me some Germans ones"..."Help me to reduce the cost by eliminating the unproductive ones"...But for sure, Himmler could deal with such a bastard. But Himmler would have to wait before getting the Ghetto and its productivity.
the Einsatzgruppen are used to cleanse huge amounts of territory,
Of course, but their actions were backed by a Fuhrer's befehl that was vague and not explicitally targeting the sole Jews, even if in practice, it mainly focused on the Jews, by assimilating them to Bolshevists and co as a pretext.
That is one of the reason why i think Himmler had his own Solution to the Jewish question long before he would be formelly in charge.

But back to your first point, and you last post:
Statistical Mechanic wrote:
Statistical Mechanic wrote:
Balsamo wrote:That being said, I can very well imagine Hitler giving a white card to Himmler, like “ok, do it your way”…without being bothered with the details, as long as the job was being done
With, I think the calendars and diaries etc show, check-ins along the way . . .
For example, by this route too:
State Attorney Bach: The next document, No. 1439, is a report by Seyss-Inquart himself, addressed to "Lieber Parteigenosse Bormann" (Dear Party Comrade Bormann), whom he informs that the Jewish question in the Netherlands has largely been settled.

Presiding Judge: This is late, February 1944.

State Attorney Bach: This is already February 1944. He mentions the number of Jews in hiding and that, little by little, they are seized and sent to the East, some 500-600 a week. The Jewish property has been seized and is being liquidated. Then he refers to the problems of mixed marriages. He says that until now it was the practice to take away what he calls the "juedische Partner" (Jewish partner) from mixed marriages, simply to take him away from his family and deport him; and then he says: Sooner or later we shall have to deal in the same way with the children of these marriages "...die Kinder dieser Gemeinschaft denselben Weg gehen lassen..." (to make the children of this union follow the same way). He also says that a considerable number of Jews agree to sterilization, that they accept the situation.

Presiding Judge: Why does he write this specifically to Bormann? What were Bormann's functions?

State Attorney Bach: Bormann was at that time the Fuehrer's deputy, and he frequently intervened also in the Jewish question. He had no defined functions in this matter, but from time to time we find that he is interested, that he makes decisions and that he receives reports.
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eic ... 35-03.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
I'll adress your first point first (oups) as it is related to your last post.

The case of the Netherlands was very different in the sense that the country was not occupied (that is under an occupation treaty) – but was to be annexed – so it was neither a allied country or a neutral country, not friendly country (Spain, Portugal).
In order for the annexing to be accomplished a Reichskommisar was appointed – an a Austrian hard core Nazi –who implemented the so-called “Gleichschaltung” starting with the interdiction of political parties, worker’s organizations, etc to the full implementation of the Nazi political, cultural and social system, and of course the aryanization of the economy and the implementation of the same Jewish Policies as in the Altreich. As the AIM was common and well known – making the Altreich and the Protektorat judenfrei – by its Status, the Netherland would enjoy the same level of efficiency as in Germany.

The Gleichschaltung was clearly under the authority of the NSDAP (Bormann who was the head of the Party Chancellery). Seyss-Inquart, as a member of the Party, was under Borman’s authority. Hitler’s “wishes” to remove the Jews from Germany was well known, and given the status of the Netherland, Muller’s order applied there in full. Seyss-Inquart being a hardcore anti-Semite himself (as well as Bormann), was the ideal choice to make his part of the job within the FS, that is fill the trains with Jews and give them to Himmler.

Regarding this letter, it is dated February 44, and at that time, Bormann was also Hitler’s secretary…Note that the description of Bormann responsibility by Bach is a bit short. It is difficult to know if the letters is addressed to Bormann or to Hitler through Bormann.
Not that it matters, though, as my question essentially concerns the 41-42 period, that is the transition between the two plans.

And the main question is: what was the shared knowledge about how Himmler’s Final Solution would turn out to be, that is mainly extermination? The AIM was clearly shared, but was the Solution? How many knew what Himmler’s and co had in mind?

And this is another element which makes me speak about a new plan: the first one had been widely accepted, while even by January 42, difficulties and issues were to be dealt with prior to its full implementation.

There are confusing elements. As you asked about Hitler, and just quoted the Eichmann’s trial, beside his rants, of course, the only mention of an express order to solve the Jewish question through physical extermination comes from Eichmann’s testimony…But the date is not clear…three months after Barbarossa? The end of 1941? Then why does Heydrich still says at Wannsee: provided that the Fuehrer gives the appropriate approval in advance".
So, Did he or did he not approve the Plan by January 42? If he did was it to be shared with the German civil administration? If he didn’t, do we have then to conclude that the SS had taken some preliminary measures – the famous “practical experiences being collected” –were Himmler’s initiatives?

Now we know that Wannsee did not reach a definitive agreements and that other meeting were to follow, while the new plan was already being implemented.

If one looks at Goebbels diary, it is not that clear either. Although happy to participate in the effort to get rid of the Jews in his Gau, he seems quite ignorant of what will become of them once “evacuated”. I don’t remember the date, but he mentions the Madagasar plan at some point, and if I remember correctly, by the end of 1941, he wrote that they will be sent in camps built by the Bolshevists (maybe you quoted that, lol) – and he seemed to see a natural logic in that measure – only to be told the truth and write it by march 42 (the barbaric Solution). If a Reichsleiter, minister, Gauleiter, member of Hitler’s inner-circle is not in the known of what was happening at Chelmno and the fate of the first German Jews transports to Riga, who was? It is a sincere question: those present in the East knew for sure, but to what extend was the new plan shared with western authorities?
Was Goering when he signed “his” July letter?
Meanwhile, it is quite obvious that Himmler was already using his powers to kill Jews in the east BEFORE the new plan had been accepted, and it this context, was the “shoot as partisan” a consequence of a Hitler’s order or was it his decision, just because it could (by having a Befehl) do so?

Many questions indeed...

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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Sun Feb 08, 2015 9:41 pm

Balsamo, just some quick notes, I'll be back with more later . . .
Balsamo wrote:StatMec wrote :
But it happened "to" the West and South as well.
Hum...where?
By "it happened", i meant where the real extermination - including women and children - took place according to a policy. I don't deny that killings did take place, let say in the Balkan, but those were under opportunistic pretext (security), not systematic, IIRC, they killed the Serbian Jews on spot but "evacuated to the east" their families, while in the west, i fail to see where...
Logistically, extermination centers COULD have been built in France or in Germany...those countries were wide enough, but that is not what happened...so there must have been a good reason to choose for the burden to transport those hundreds of thousands 3000 thousands miles away just to kill them.
By happened "to" the West and the South I wasn't thinking of the relatively small (in comparison to murders in the East) numbers of in situ killings but what happened to, e.g., 100,000+ Dutch Jews, at least 450,000 Hungarian Jews, etc. They were hauled to the East and most of them killed there. So by "what happened to" them I meant what the Germans did to the Jews of western and southern Europe - what was done to them was that they were part of the Final Solution. I've already explained why the Germans carried out the main part of the murders in the East.
Balsamo wrote:
...Greiser wants to get rid of "his" Jews...
Yes, as long as he could keep some in his ghetto's factories...
For sure, but I had in mind how Greiser asked Himmler's approval to kill a large part of the Warthegau's Jews in summer-fall 1941 - I referred to this as another example of how, along with the killing operations of the Einsatzgruppen and other mobile killing units, the murders escalated and gave practical learning in what could be done. I could have mentioned events in Serbia or in Bessarabia and Bukovina, in the Transnistria, etc. As with the Ostland and Galicia, as we've discussed in recent threads, some % of Jews was retained for labor for some time, but I was focusing on the escalation to widespread mass murder and the "practical experience" that became a building block of the "new concept."
Balsamo wrote:
the Einsatzgruppen are used to cleanse huge amounts of territory,
Of course, but their actions were backed by a Fuhrer's befehl that was vague and not explicitally targeting the sole Jews, even if in practice, it mainly focused on the Jews, by assimilating them to Bolshevists and co as a pretext.
Yes and no. Again, I was referring to the escalation - in which men like Jäger, Lange, et al had the goal to cleanse large areas of territory of Jews via mass murder. This is one thrust of the radicalization process at work - and it is not a matter of anti-partisan operations (the entire paper trail on the EGs shows that, along with Himmler's note saying how to package the making of the occupied East judenrein - exterminate as partisans). What was happening in practice, the mass murder of Jews to cleanse occupied territories, was proving to the Nazis what could be done - practically, psychologically, logistically, diplomatically, etc.
Balsamo wrote:That is one of the reason why i think Himmler had his own Solution to the Jewish question long before he would be formelly in charge.
What I'm arguing is that before the policy was settled - which, unlike Bloxham, I do think it largely was, with some ebb and flow to be sure, but within an aim and approach that was agreed by the leadership - the escalation was much more complex than a conception of a Himmler operation gets us to: e.g., Greiser proposed the mass murder of Jews outside Lodz in the Warthegau, Gauletiers were beseeching leadership to get rid of "their" Jews somehow, the Wehrmacht (Böhme) was shooting Jews in Serbia, Jews were being killed en mass in Romanian territories, etc. Himmler got control of things, for sure - and while that's a big deal, someone had to, and Himmler had the organization, will, etc to take on the role.

I'm NOT minimizing Himmler's contributions - just trying to put them into a larger context and say that where he helped drive things, others were headed too - and pointing out the cross-fertilization among people and across power centers of ideas, actions, policy, and implementation plans.
Balsamo wrote:The case of the Netherlands was very different in the sense that the country was not occupied (that is under an occupation treaty) – but was to be annexed – so it was neither a allied country or a neutral country, not friendly country (Spain, Portugal).
Well, the Netherlands was defeated by the Germans and the Germans occupied the country - and to exert their power there, they imposed on the Dutch a government under Seyss-Inquart which utilized the country's intact administration - supported by German police units. The Dutch would be surprised to learn that they didn't live in an occupied country - the government fled after all - and Seyss-Inquart really did "coordinate" the governing of the place, along with RSHA and SS forces.

Nor is this point germane to the policy aims. It is critical to understanding execution of policy, ebb and flow, mechanics and procedures, and outcomes.

Remember that Slovakia wasn't occupied either - yet Jews were extracted from Slovakia in early 1942. Croatia wasn't occupied - yet Jews were slaughtered in their 1000s there by an allied state. Early on, Italy wasn't occupied, nor was Hungary, etc - yet there was the pressure on the Axis allies to surrender their Jews to be killed. Issues like occupation government, alliance role, etc, significant as they are for what occurred and how, aren't decisive for the general aims and thrust of the Final Solution as a policy.

With their Allies, with weird situations like Vichy, and where they saw "positive" possibilities (the Aryan countries!), the Germans had to work in more nuanced ways, proceeding step by step, moving forward, retreating, persuading, and so on. Through many agencies.
Balsamo wrote: < snip > Seyss-Inquart being a hardcore anti-Semite himself (as well as Bormann), was the ideal choice to make his part of the job within the FS, that is fill the trains with Jews and give them to Himmler.
But that's a terrific oversimplification and I would argue not what happened at all: Rauter (HSSPF), Aus der Funten (working for BdS Harster), and Zöpf (IVB4) filled the trains - with the help of Seyss-Inquart, the Foreign Ministry - and the Dutch General Secretaries, civil service, and police. And via his ERR, Rosenberg helped loot the murdered Jews. And the Wehrmacht (air force, also Economic Ministry and Four Year Plan) wanted to keep some but not all Jews working . . . and . . . and . . . : this was about the complicated, competitive power centers of the Third Reich converging on an overall policy, if we can call it that.
Balsamo wrote:Regarding this letter, it is dated February 44, and at that time, Bormann was also Hitler’s secretary…Note that the description of Bormann responsibility by Bach is a bit short. It is difficult to know if the letters is addressed to Bormann or to Hitler through Bormann.
Not that it matters, though, as my question essentially concerns the 41-42 period, that is the transition between the two plans.
My point was simply that the Führer was kept abreast throughout, I think mostly by Himmler by the way, but by other means too.
Balsamo wrote:And this is another element which makes me speak about a new plan: the first one had been widely accepted, while even by January 42, difficulties and issues were to be dealt with prior to its full implementation.
Ok, I've lost the argument - most historians also discuss a new approach, in line with a search for a solution that went through phases: an emigration phase - the so-called territorial solution (from Madagascar to reservation in East) - the eventual Final Solution: from emigration to evacuation (FS) to be overly schematic. Indeed, the policy changed - the aim (Jews out of Germany) was to become, by late fall 1941 / early winter 1942, "Jews to be exterminated where Germany can reach them" (military government, civil administration, Axis allies - and with the caveat of exploiting their labor along the way). What are you saying that is different from this search?
Balsamo wrote:As you asked about Hitler, and just quoted the Eichmann’s trial, beside his rants, of course, the only mention of an express order to solve the Jewish question through physical extermination comes from Eichmann’s testimony…But the date is not clear…three months after Barbarossa? The end of 1941? Then why does Heydrich still says at Wannsee: provided that the Fuehrer gives the appropriate approval in advance".
But I'm not pointing to a specific Führer order - rather I'm arguing that what took place was the incremental radicalization of policy through almost the co-opting of blocks of "practical policy" so that by December 1941 there was a crystallization of methods, aims, experience, and next steps that we can think of as an agreement on "what we are doing, and what we are now going to do," thus Frank's 16 December speech - following from the Führer's 12 December speech - to his peeps in the GG, which states the mission in almost in these terms. That, with reiteration and problem-solving, would get and keep the "new concept" moving. Himmler at Posen spoke of the order he had to bear . . . unless you want to take Irving's bizarre direction on this, I think we're stuck with a strong consensus across the regime on "ends."
Balsamo wrote:So, Did he or did he not approve the Plan by January 42?
I already answered this, although "Plan" isn't the term or concept I used, in a previous post in this thread. The December meetings are crucial. Browning says that they summed up the early fall's evolution - Gerlach says that they put a new understanding in place - that debate is about timing, not the aims and direction.
Balsamo wrote:If he did was it to be shared with the German civil administration? If he didn’t, do we have then to conclude that the SS had taken some preliminary measures – the famous “practical experiences being collected” –were Himmler’s initiatives?
I'm not sure I understand exactly . . . say more?
Balsamo wrote:If one looks at Goebbels diary, it is not that clear either. Although happy to participate in the effort to get rid of the Jews in his Gau, he seems quite ignorant of what will become of them once “evacuated”. I don’t remember the date, but he mentions the Madagasar plan at some point, and if I remember correctly, by the end of 1941, he wrote that they will be sent in camps built by the Bolshevists (maybe you quoted that, lol) – and he seemed to see a natural logic in that measure – only to be told the truth and write it by march 42 (the barbaric Solution). If a Reichsleiter, minister, Gauleiter, member of Hitler’s inner-circle is not in the known of what was happening at Chelmno and the fate of the first German Jews transports to Riga, who was? It is a sincere question: those present in the East knew for sure, but to what extend was the new plan shared with western authorities?
Will dig this up but this was all discussed at length in the Wannsee thread at RODOH - I will copypasta the salient points. In general, Goebbels was not always at center of this, though he was informed and was pressuring.

As with western authorities, I think we need to dig into specifics: in France, as discussed in the Grande Rafle thread, this was all very explicit. Also in the Netherlands, of course Seyss-Inquart knew what was going on and what he was participating in. I think digging into specific case studies is really essential.
Balsamo wrote:Was Goering when he signed “his” July letter?
This was prior to the "new policy." In July there wasn't a consensus to kill Europe's Jews, so, no, Göring didn't know, nor did anyone.
Balsamo wrote:Meanwhile, it is quite obvious that Himmler was already using his powers to kill Jews in the east BEFORE the new plan had been accepted, and it this context, was the “shoot as partisan” a consequence of a Hitler’s order or was it his decision, just because it could (by having a Befehl) do so?
But so too were others, e.g., Serbia. I just think that the summer-fall 1941 is more complex than Himmler orchestrating a new plan on his own and more or less behind the Führer’s back.
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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Jeff_36 » Mon Feb 09, 2015 3:44 am

I think that by March 27th it was pretty much written on the wall and by that summer it was in full swing.

There is a passage of Hitler's table talk that deniers love to cite from may of 1942 where he mentions Madagascar...... this was after the extermination had begun in the GG. That leads me to choose between three interpretations.

1. The GG exterminations until the summer of 1942 were targeted only at the Jews of the GG, with resettlement still in mind for the rest. This was scrapped sometime that summer.

2. Hitler was referring to the working Jews and what would be done with them after the war. The Final Solution for the non-working Jews was already in motion.

3. Hitler knew he was in mixed company and lied.

WHat do you guys think?

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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Mon Feb 09, 2015 10:55 am

LOL Balsamo and I have been through this in a long thread on Wannsee at RODOH . . . anyway, IIRC Goebbels made a note in his diary in early March about Madagascar as well. I can't improve on this explanation. Doors 1 & 2 are no go because by July 1942 when Hitler was belching about Madagascar the plan had been de facto kaput since 1940 and officially abandoned since just after Wannsee, a time when events and plans had been rendered irrelevant. Goebbels' diary entry reflects that his awareness of the FS was only growing during March 1942 - the Führer's in July 1942, coming after even Longerich has the European-wide extermination agreed, has to be for "other" purposes as Brechtken and Longerich argue.

By July 1942, formally, there was no Madagascar option, let alone plan - and there'd been no work on Madagascar since 1940 when the war situation, on the seas in particular, "intervened." As I argued in the RODOH Wannsee thread and again here, I think late fall 1941 is decisive.
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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Jeff_36 » Mon Feb 09, 2015 12:20 pm

So mixed company then?

I think December 12-18 is the critical time period.

There is too much other evidence to shrug the whole thing off based on Hitler's chit chat in mixed company methinks.

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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Mon Feb 09, 2015 12:35 pm

Yes mixed company and agree on critical time

I used to be more in agreement with Longerich but I don't see how you can read Oct through Mar the way he does
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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Balsamo » Mon Feb 09, 2015 3:59 pm

By happened "to" the West and the South I wasn't thinking of the relatively small (in comparison to murders in the East) numbers of in situ killings but what happened to, e.g., 100,000+ Dutch Jews, at least 450,000 Hungarian Jews, etc. They were hauled to the East and most of them killed there. So by "what happened to" them I meant what the Germans did to the Jews of western and southern Europe - what was done to them was that they were part of the Final Solution. I've already explained why the Germans carried out the main part of the murders in the East.
Ok misunderstanding, understand that. What I meant was that the actual extermination actions were organized in the east although logistically, the policy could have taken place in countries like France or Germany, I know we’ve been through it, but it has its place in the argument I am trying to defend. My point was pure geographic.
Yes and no. Again, I was referring to the escalation - in which men like Jäger, Lange, et al had the goal to cleanse large areas of territory of Jews via mass murder. This is one thrust of the radicalization process at work - and it is not a matter of anti-partisan operations (the entire paper trail on the EGs shows that, along with Himmler's note saying how to package the making of the occupied East judenrein - exterminate as partisans). What was happening in practice, the mass murder of Jews to cleanse occupied territories, was proving to the Nazis what could be done - practically, psychologically, logistically, diplomatically, etc
.

I agree 100% that!
The EK were a pure SS creation, who had to answer to their boss only (Heydrich and Himmler. There were killing any target given to them, not only Jews. They were already killing in 39 and 40, well before a real escalation of the Final Solution as policy. Of course, anti-partisans operation (while real) served as a cover to kill as many Jews as they could.
What I wanted to stress out here was that the “Fuhrer’s Befehl” allowing to EK to operate in Poland first, in the Baltic and Russia later, does not mention the Jews specifically.
What I meant his that EG actions were “covered” by a “Fuhrer’s Befhll” Hitler gave to Himmler as early as 1939-40 I think which more or less gave him something like “all means in order to prepare the political administration of the eastern territories”…the same way, the way he executed his duties as RKF was also kind of barbaric…mass execution or massive arrests of populations of selected villages, families from selected farms, massive expulsion of Poles, starvation, etc…
For the sake of my hypothesis, I consider that the way the “ostJuden” especially from Poland, The Balitcs and Russia, were dealt with had much in common with the later and generalized final solution…One could even speak that it was a territorial Final Solution which emerged from the first Aktionen in the Baltics and culminating at Babi Yar and later at Rumbula…And that the practical experiences for those aktionen are to be found in Poland in 39 and 40…
All those massacres happened before there was even a consensus on who was to be considered as a Jew in Germany.
My sole point here is to stress out that he might have thought as those practice to solve the Jewish problem BEFORE he’ll actually take the lead in the Final Solution, while some other authorities were still thinking in the context of the first Solution.

I think we agree that Nazi barbarism was at full in the east before the centralization of the final Solution in Himmler’s hand, the difference being that it was pure anarchy and quite inefficient in solving the Jewish problem as a whole.
Himmler was still facing annoying obstacles:
- First, he could only reach some Jews
- Second, he was excluded from the economical profits that could be drawn from the solution.
What I'm arguing is that before the policy was settled - which, unlike Bloxham, I do think it largely was, with some ebb and flow to be sure, but within an aim and approach that was agreed by the leadership - the escalation was much more complex than a conception of a Himmler operation gets us to: e.g., Greiser proposed the mass murder of Jews outside Lodz in the Warthegau, Gauletiers were beseeching leadership to get rid of "their" Jews somehow, the Wehrmacht (Böhme) was shooting Jews in Serbia, Jews were being killed en mass in Romanian territories, etc. Himmler got control of things, for sure - and while that's a big deal, someone had to, and Himmler had the organization, will, etc to take on the role.
Here I mus disagree with one aspect: I don’t think that a “Policy” was settled, and by policy I mean a structured plan – defined means and methodology – in order to achieve a goal. I see this transitional period in the east an anarchy which greatly depended on the respective personality of the persons involved. Gauleiters all over the German sphere were trying to get rid of their Jews, especially in the east where their inherited millions of them. That they were beseeching leadership is logical – which will make the job easier for Himmler – but there just was no real leadership and thus no real policy, which does not mean that there was no common AIM! Local initiatives also greatly depended on the jurisdiction, for example, Goebbels had to beg Hitler to order the evacuation of the Jews out of Berlin, while Greiser had much more powers and liberty to take initiatives within his own little kingdom, in other Gau’s, other will just choose to expel their Jews – as in the Alsace…Indeed, the Wehrmacht – or at least some units – were asked to select Jews as hostages – in its struggle in Yougoslavia, and of course, on the Russian fronts – but again that was not a policy as it depended on a specific situation and on a specific perception of the threats posed by the Jews. The Wehrmacht did not act like this on every fronts. And those Jews shot in Serbia were adult male, not their family.

Otherwise, we agree.
I'm NOT minimizing Himmler's contributions - just trying to put them into a larger context and say that where he helped drive things, others were headed too - and pointing out the cross-fertilization among people and across power centers of ideas, actions, policy, and implementation plans.
I understand that and you may be right. I have just the idea that the context maybe has been widened too much, so I am trying to dissect it a little…maybe too much.
Well, the Netherlands was defeated by the Germans and the Germans occupied the country - and to exert their power there, they imposed on the Dutch a government under Seyss-Inquart which utilized the country's intact administration - supported by German police units. The Dutch would be surprised to learn that they didn't live in an occupied country - the government fled after all - and Seyss-Inquart really did "coordinate" the governing of the place, along with RSHA and SS forces.
Lol
I meant that the Dutch were not occupied in a sense of a military occupation which as it was the case in Belgium and France was defined by a treaty. The Dutch were meant to be integrated in the German Volk, thus the Gleichschaltung policy. Seyss-Inquart’s mission was this, and not only to deal with the Jewish question. He took measure to deconstruct the whole Dutch society, so he did not just take over the administration, but placed a unique Dutch Nazi Party to power, Nazified the police force, helped to organize nazi youth movements, pro-Nazi militia, etc. He was chosen precisely because he was a hardcore anti-Semite who did not wait for orders to send some Jews to KZ, and a Nazi by heart, a loyal one. Of course he gladly cooperated with the RSHA as they shared the same goal. In addition, the Netherlands were considered as sharing the very same jurisdiction as the Reich, so the competence of the RSHA was not to be discussed so the RSHA would not even have needed the cooperation of Seyss in the first place, or to be more clear, Seyss would have appeared as a traitor had he not collaborate. The question is thus irrelevant, but as he was a AS himself, being a Bormann man – and I have always thought that Bormann role and his contribution to the FS have been overlooked – and that is why he was sent to the Netherlands. By contrast, it was the OKW who designated Falkenhausen in Belgium, and he was not even member of the NSDAP. Another example, again the Dutch Railway was placed under the authority of the Reichsbahn, it became an extension of the German Railway, while in France and Belgium the Railways was under the authority of the WehrmachtVerkherdirektion…
For the sake of clarity, I will leave the cases of allied countries for another topic, which one may very well not disagree at all…well maybe not…because again, those attempts will occur well after the transitional period, and because those specificity are beyond my own current knowledge of the details. I doubt though that Himmler just said to Tiso “hand me your Jew so I can kill them”.
But that's a terrific oversimplification
:lol:
Indeed it was... point addressed above...one should not answer point by point, but that is what I did.
My point was simply that the Führer was kept abreast throughout, I think mostly by Himmler by the way, but by other means too.
Of course, Bormann was his communication filter, as well as the head of the NSDAP structure (Gauleiters, etc), but Himmler was one of the few who could bypass him. I have never thought for one minutes that the extermination program could have happened without his knowledge and tacit approval. I just doubt that he was the master mind behind it.
Ok, I've lost the argument - most historians also discuss a new approach, in line with a search for a solution that went through phases: an emigration phase - the so-called territorial solution (from Madagascar to reservation in East) - the eventual Final Solution: from emigration to evacuation (FS) to be overly schematic. Indeed, the policy changed - the aim (Jews out of Germany) was to become, by late fall 1941 / early winter 1942, "Jews to be exterminated where Germany can reach them" (military government, civil administration, Axis allies - and with the caveat of exploiting their labor along the way). What are you saying that is different from this search?
Exactly, my hypothesis being that instead of ONE plan evolving through phases – which is what the facts are telling, one should consider the possibility of ONE AIM (The Jewish question) through two different Solutions, while they coexisted for a while. And, in this hypothesis, that less that a matter of timing, it is the switch in the leadership that influenced the direction. Two Plans differently structured, based on what was already happening, but extended to a global approach of the international Jewish question, with different mastermind behind them, for the same goal. The first one replaced by the second one because of its impossibility and inefficiency…
As we say in French, the devil lies in the details…But that would nevertheless change a lot conceptually, and therefore in the understanding of the final SolutionS…one of the main differences is to paraphrase you, I would use were the RSHA could reach them, instead of Germany. The second is that those plans involved different actors, instead of the former actors deciding “ok, we shall take this thing to the next level”… The actors active in the first plan were not automatically involved in the second, that submission replaced collaboration, etc.

In this perspective – my hypothesis – the Muller’s order (the topic of this thread) is to be considered as a prelude or premise to this taking over of the Final Solution, just as Wannsee btw, instead of a pure evolution of the first one.

It does not intend to exonerate Germany – though I prefer to use the term “third Reich” – because among other proposed alternatives were as murderous – like the General Ost Plan or even the Madagascar Plan – but even before the new Solution, opportunistic shootings, the deliberate starvations of the Ghettos, the slave labour – Ostworkers and Jews (not to be confused with the STO’s) – which in fine was supposed to end in pain and death, etc.

Too many issues for one post…
I’ll leave Frank’s and the Posen speech for tomorrow…

So I will leave it on the those last following points:
that debate is about timing, not the aims and direction.
Which is precisely what i am trying to look at in a different perspective...
I'm not sure I understand exactly . . . say more?
This is where I see confusions in Hitler ordering the shift, as, as you pointed out, the practical experiences did already take place even before December 41, and i would add that, as i said above, some of these experiences have been tested as soon as 1940…If one only look at the timing, how should we consider Babi Yar and later a switch ordered by Hitler, what belongs to a result of Hitler's order and what belongs to Himmler initiatives....As the rise in killings took place at a time when Hitler was dedicating 99% of his time to the conduct of miitary operation, are those killings the result of direct instructions by Hitler, or Himmler's way to deal with a vague mission?
In general, Goebbels was not always at center of this, though he was informed and was pressuring.
My point being that he, along with many others, was pressuring LONG BEFORE being informed of what would happened to the Jews of his Gau, outlining the difference or the gap between the common AIM and the Solution applied. Himself, being a hardcore AS, was calling for Evacuation long before the new definition of evacuation was being adopted...His diary shows that he was informed only after the evacuation took place, and after the beginning of Operation Reinhard.

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Re: Müller's emigration stop order & Bloxham's proposal

Post by Statistical Mechanic » Mon Feb 09, 2015 11:46 pm

Balsamo wrote:I agree 100% that!
The EK were a pure SS creation, who had to answer to their boss only (Heydrich and Himmler. There were killing any target given to them, not only Jews. They were already killing in 39 and 40, well before a real escalation of the Final Solution as policy. Of course, anti-partisans operation (while real) served as a cover to kill as many Jews as they could.
Agree to a point: they had pacification, including murder of leadership cadres, and anti-Jewish remits, actually T-4-ish, anti-Roma, etc in addition to their flavor of pacification. Here I was focused on the fact that within their scope they killed Jews as Jews, which we agree on.

But they got cooperation from the Wehrmacht and civil authorities including in anti-Jewish operations. Not to go through the evidence now but just to state the point.
Balsamo wrote:What I wanted to stress out here was that the “Fuhrer’s Befehl” allowing to EK to operate in Poland first, in the Baltic and Russia later, does not mention the Jews specifically.
In the Polish campaign I know of a Heydrich order to EG heads that focused on Jewish question but not extermination (concentration of the Jews, formation of ghettos, appointment of Councils of Elders, population and economic data on Jews, reporting requirements, etc) - this was the order that distinguished the final aim and then the steps to be taken immediately.

For Barbarossa Heydrich's orders at the outset included Jews among those to be executed but in a limited way: "Jews in Party and State employment." The radicalization on the ground overtook the mission statement.
Balsamo wrote:What I meant his that EG actions were “covered” by a “Fuhrer’s Befhll” Hitler gave to Himmler as early as 1939-40 I think which more or less gave him something like “all means in order to prepare the political administration of the eastern territories”…the same way, the way he executed his duties as RKF was also kind of barbaric…mass execution or massive arrests of populations of selected villages, families from selected farms, massive expulsion of Poles, starvation, etc…
As to a Führer order, I recall that Himmler on a number of occasions told his men that the killings were on the order of Hitler and had to be obeyed - IIRC similar to formula he used at Posen for the FS as a whole. These statements were made in particular during the summer of '41 as the scope of the EG killings expanded. There's an old AHF thread on this but I can't find the link right now. Will post it later.
Balsamo wrote:All those massacres happened before there was even a consensus on who was to be considered as a Jew in Germany.
Not following this: 1) there was never a full consensus on Mischlinge, to my knowledge but 2) the racial legislation of 1935 and its supplements laid out the basic definition - which was broadened in the East - although there's a Himmler note IIRC to the effect that in the Ostland the German authorities needed to stop defining and get on with business - thus, no formal definition promulgated.
Balsamo wrote:My sole point here is to stress out that he might have thought as those practice to solve the Jewish problem BEFORE he’ll actually take the lead in the Final Solution, while some other authorities were still thinking in the context of the first Solution.
I don't follow this.
Balsamo wrote:. . . Here I mus disagree with one aspect: I don’t think that a “Policy” was settled, and by policy I mean a structured plan – defined means and methodology – in order to achieve a goal.
I don't mean by "policy" what you mean by "policy": when I use this term I mean more the way forward that you alluded to - "the centralization of the final Solution in Himmler’s hand, the difference being that it was pure anarchy and quite inefficient in solving the Jewish problem as a whole." E.g., my company's policy is to fire the bottom 15% of employees each year: the manner of doing so, rules and procedures, timing, roles and responsibilities - that is, the plan to execute the policy - comes after. And may indeed, as we've said in the context of the FS, have consequences for the policy itself.
Balsamo wrote:I see this transitional period in the east an anarchy which greatly depended on the respective personality of the persons involved . . . but there just was no real leadership and thus no real policy, which does not mean that there was no common AIM! Local initiatives also greatly depended on the jurisdiction, for example, Goebbels had to beg Hitler to order the evacuation of the Jews out of Berlin, while Greiser had much more powers and liberty to take initiatives within his own little kingdom, in other Gau’s, other will just choose to expel their Jews – as in the Alsace…Indeed, the Wehrmacht – or at least some units – were asked to select Jews as hostages – in its struggle in Yougoslavia, and of course, on the Russian fronts – but again that was not a policy as it depended on a specific situation and on a specific perception of the threats posed by the Jews. The Wehrmacht did not act like this on every fronts. And those Jews shot in Serbia were adult male, not their family.

Otherwise, we agree.
We agree with two caveats: 1) I think anarchy is too strong a word, 2) this period, which you call transitional and I called the radicalization, was brought to a head into an agreed aim/policy in my definition by late fall 1941.
Balsamo wrote:Lol
I was hoping for a laugh in a discussion of such grim nature!
Balsamo wrote:I meant that the Dutch were not occupied in a sense of a military occupation which as it was the case in Belgium and France was defined by a treaty. . . . < etc >
But this is the heart of what I'm arguing: the general policy (exterminate the Jews in Europe) was implemented in very different situations - as enumerated in my earlier post and as you're describing two cases here.
Balsamo wrote:For the sake of clarity, I will leave the cases of allied countries for another topic,
You can't! LOL, my point is that across Europe the Nazis, once they had in view exterminating Europe's Jews (just before Wannsee) had to deal with all these variations - military occupation, civil administrations, G-G whatever the hell that was, Vichy and occupied France, allies and vacillating allies - in order to implement the policy.
Balsamo wrote: I doubt though that Himmler just said to Tiso “hand me your Jew so I can kill them”.
Worth going through this - it's interesting - Hilberg, Longerich, and even Silberklang can be used to piece it together. But in a way that is what Himmler did - acting through the Foreign Office at the beginning: according to Luther, what got the ball rolling was this, "The Reichssicherheitshauptamt therefore, acting on the instruction of the Reichsführer-SS, approached the Foreign Office to ask the Slovak Government to make 20,000 young, strong Slovak Jews from Slovakia available for deportation to the East." And recall that at Wannsee Heydrich already had taken satisfaction that in Slovakia "the matter is no longer so difficult, since the most substantial problems in this respect have already been brought near a solution."
Balsamo wrote:Of course, Bormann was his communication filter, as well as the head of the NSDAP structure (Gauleiters, etc), but Himmler was one of the few who could bypass him. I have never thought for one minutes that the extermination program could have happened without his knowledge and tacit approval. I just doubt that he was the master mind behind it.
He being the Führer? To be clear - I didn't mean that Himmler had to go through Bormann and only Bormann - just that the example I cited was one of the ways Hitler sought to be kept abreast. Plus, I'm not sure what mastermind means - I know what it implies - so that's not how I'd formulate it - I'd state it more as feedback loops as previously discussed and then Hitler expressing his wishes and giving the green light, as below.
Balsamo wrote:. . . As we say in French, the devil lies in the details…
We say that in US too. LOL, we also say that it's a French aphorism that the solution is no good because, while it works in practice, it doesn't work in theory. LOL - I'm still having trouble understanding how your view differs to that of say Gerlach. I think all historians would say that the "transition" period wasn't smooth, clean, abrupt but saw chunkiness in survival of old formulas, thoughts, reflexes mingling with the new, more radical extermination solution.
Balsamo wrote:one of the main differences is to paraphrase you, I would use were the RSHA could reach them, instead of Germany.
Again, I agree on the importance and leading role of the RSHA but there are too many other actors, from slaughters in the very East that were not at the hands of Himmler's men to all the agencies cooperating, as discussed in my last post, to narrow this to the policy or even the project of solely the RSHA - the genocide in that sense was a mission and project of the Third Reich, led by the RSHA. IMO.
Balsamo wrote:The second is that those plans involved different actors, instead of the former actors deciding “ok, we shall take this thing to the next level”… The actors active in the first plan were not automatically involved in the second, that submission replaced collaboration, etc.
Well, Himmler was involved throughout, Greiser, and so on, like you've mentioned there was a bit of an Austrian mafia, throughout, in different roles, or like Katzmann who was SSPF in Radom during '39-'41 and then went to Galicia and was active, as we've seen, in the FS - but yes, the new policy and new challenges brought new leaders to the fore and changes to institutions, WVHA and so on. I don't see any this as a takeover by new actors but rather how the change for the Reich got worked through.
Balsamo wrote:In this perspective – my hypothesis – the Muller’s order (the topic of this thread) is to be considered as a prelude or premise to this taking over of the Final Solution, just as Wannsee btw, instead of a pure evolution of the first one.
On this we agree! With implications for all of Europe, IMO.
Balsamo wrote:It does not intend to exonerate Germany – though I prefer to use the term “third Reich” – because among other proposed alternatives were as murderous – like the General Ost Plan or even the Madagascar Plan – but even before the new Solution, opportunistic shootings, the deliberate starvations of the Ghettos, the slave labour – Ostworkers and Jews (not to be confused with the STO’s) – which in fine was supposed to end in pain and death, etc.
I use Germany as shorthand for the Reich as, sadly, the Reich governed Germany at the time and acted for Germany - just as I'd say the Soviet Union for the Stalinist government in the USSR during this period. I agree it is a bit ungainly.
Balsamo wrote:This is where I see confusions in Hitler ordering the shift, as, as you pointed out, the practical experiences did already take place even before December 41, and i would add that, as i said above, some of these experiences have been tested as soon as 1940…If one only look at the timing, how should we consider Babi Yar and later a switch ordered by Hitler, what belongs to a result of Hitler's order and what belongs to Himmler initiatives....As the rise in killings took place at a time when Hitler was dedicating 99% of his time to the conduct of miitary operation, are those killings the result of direct instructions by Hitler, or Himmler's way to deal with a vague mission?
Hitler, and especially with his style of leadership, didn't need to be working through the details of the FS - he needed to green light it, maintain it, etc - but entrust it to Himmler, whom he could trust unlike the generals.
Balsamo wrote:My point being that he, along with many others, was pressuring LONG BEFORE being informed of what would happened to the Jews of his Gau, outlining the difference or the gap between the common AIM and the Solution applied. Himself, being a hardcore AS, was calling for Evacuation long before the new definition of evacuation was being adopted...His diary shows that he was informed only after the evacuation took place, and after the beginning of Operation Reinhard.
We agree on this point. But I can't figure out its bearing on the discussion! LOL.
. . . all right we are two nations . . .