France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Fri Sep 19, 2014 1:52 pm

Quick recap:

Balsamo and I, albeit with differing perspectives and interpretations, have, taken as a whole, provided secondary and primary sources summarizing how the Germans and French came to agree to deport certain Jews out of France; the points we've covered include:
- number and timing of Jews deported
- foreign and citizen composition of Jews deported
- destinations of transports
- internment of Jews within France
- Himmler's goals and basic order for France and the Jewish question in the country
- initial target numbers decided by the Germans
- negotiations between Germans and Vichy regarding timing and composition of transports
- negotiating positions of different German agencies (embassy, HSSPF, BdS, Amt IV-B-4, etc) and of French officials (police, administration, Laval, Petain, etc)
- compromises made by the Germans including Himmler
- details on obstacles to Germans' realizing Himmler's goals including Vichy position on deportations/size of German force in France/geographic conditions/progress of war
- frustration of German officials with pace of deportations and cooperation of French
- Eichmann's interventions
- arrangements made with railway officials for deportation trains
- handling of expenses of the deportations
- issue of children being deported
- samples of guidelines for roundups issued by Germans
- July '42 shock roundups and deportations
- French public opinion
- summary of groups in France opposing or resisting German deportation goals and actions
- a German order in April '44 aimed at realizing the goal originally set by Himmler and deport all Jews from France
- comparisons of France to other countries in western Europe
- information on German plans for Jews in France and elsewhere and the context for the final solution
- comparison of situation of Jews in France to non-Jews targeted by Germans
- details on citizenship status and national background of the Jews in France and those deported

In this presentation, two documents have been critical - from July 1942 RF-1223 in which Dannecker and Eichmann restate Himmler's June 1942 order to remove all Jews from France and from April 1944 NO-1411 a directive from Knochen and Brunner reinstating that all Jews in France were to be subject to deportation.

David's response has essentially been that none of the above is relevant because the answer is simple - mostly foreign Jews were deported from France, and that is all one needs to know. As a result, David has ignored the above discussion of goals, negotiations and compromises, parties involved, and how these and other factors shaped actions; repeated, erroneously, that only 5% of French Jews who were citizens were eventually deported; argued that this result speaks for itself; and obsessed on the role of Dannecker and a single, minor document, RF-1221 (which, along with Dannecker's role, David misunderstands).

David has advanced the preposterous argument that the sum total of the German anti-Jewish action in France was to support Vichy in returning foreign Jews to the East, despite many of these Jews not even being from the East and despite key documents (left alone by David) showing German intentions, and tactical compromises in a very different light.

The ineptitude and inconsequentiality of David's argument - with his gyrations about the 5% - are underscored by the fact, which he ignores - that everyone agrees that the Germans deported overwhelmingly foreign-born Jews from France: the critical question - the point of this thread - which David shuns as though it were Black Plague - is why, at the end of the day, the Germans deported mainly the foreign born Jews and how this result came to pass. Which is, on the other hand, exactly what Balsamo and I have been discussing.

Until David replies to the pointed questions asked of him by a number of us, and until he takes into account the documented interactions, which have been well ventilated in this thread, of the Germans and French, I don't see any purpose to this thread continuing - at least the portion in which David has stuck his head in the soil and pretended not to hear how the deportations of Jews from France were agreed, planned, and implemented.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Balsamo » Fri Sep 19, 2014 6:52 pm

David wrote:

In this case we have a wide range of Believers who ARE trying to deny the reality of the actual deportation figures by conflating the status of various groups of Jews
in France. I think that most Believers in the thread are Denying "that the French Jews – as opposed to the Jews of France – were relatively spared, along with the Belgian Jews (not the Jews of Belgium), the Bulgarian and of course the Danish."



That is where you are wrong. No one denies – no Historians nor Posters here – that the French, along with the Belgian, the Danish Jews were relatively spared. Whatever the accepted % is, it is a fact. The same way, historians as well as posters among the “Believer” don’t interpret this fact unanimously, at least after a certain point.
But, “Believers” being more rational that you might think, we agree that this fact should not be considered isolated…There are other facts that only you, choose to ignore.
The most important being documented proofs that at least some Germans intended to deport ALL the Jews from France. The divergence of interpretation between me and StatMec, or between historians and scholars at the upper level, only regards the reasons why this intent did not become effective.
I am still waiting for your interpretation, by the way.

Indeed, the discussion would be clearer if you decided to expose your interpretation of the numbers.

once you quote:
But of them specifically states that
"Jews of French nationality must be deprived of their nationality before being deported, or at the latest on the day of the deportation itself." if only on the
day of deportation. This document implies that there was an agreement with
the Vichy to protect French Jewish citizens but the agreement was flouted by
cynical Germans.


The next post, you write:
You have a wonderful way of provided support for my arguments.
The French argument at Nuremberg was that the Germans were the sole cause
of the deportation of Jews in France. In fact, you have cited evidence showing that
the contrary is significantly true...it was the Vichy French who quickly passed their
own anti-Semitic legislation.


If you see any consistency in those two arguments, please explain me.

- The first – despite the fact that it was the will of the French representatives to exonerate his country as far as possible from any responsibility the best they could –just confirm that the German intended to deport all the Jews – including the French ones – asking the French authorities to deprive their Jewish citizens from their nationality in order to bypass some “legal burdens”.

- With the second you seem to want to share the responsibility between the Nazis and Vichy.

Anyway, at the very least, you should explain why those thousands of "protected Jews" - how many thousands does not matter, 8000-15000-25000- pick one - were sent to their fate. What happened? Who is to blame?

So What are your conclusions from those two arguments? I still – and I think I am not alone – don’t know.

Sometimes you come up with strange argument like the SS rank of Dannecker, as here:

You seem to be referring to Theodor Dannecker as making some very important decisions. What was the rank of this key decision maker?


You get confused by the distinction between Rank and the mission he was entrusted with. The Fuhrer’s aide-de-camp also held low rank. Eichmann despite the scope of his mission was only colonel (and only since short before Wannsee). Dannecker did not make any decision, he was in charge to execute instruction from Eichmann’s desk, himslelf receiving instruction from above up to Himmler. In Nazi Germany more than in other country, the given mission was more important than the Rank. Skorzeny was a perfect example of that – outside the Judenpolitiek: Heydrich was “only” Sturmbannfuhrer when he was made head of the SD, while some German princes were made Gruppenfürher and above. He was “only” Gruppenfurher at Wannsee while because of its charges and missions he had authority over most of his theoretical superiors.

Again, where you wanted to go with this argument is a mystery.

I will give you an example, as it regards the transportation aspects, I think it is quite relevant.
As we have seen – maybe in another thread – the operation to bring a population or a group from point A to point B involved various steps and the cooperation of various authorities. For the deportation of the ReichsJuden, the cooperation was with the Reichsverkherminister Dorpmuller and Himmler. But practically, the coordination of all operations were organized by “small peanuts” – Otto Stange for the Reichsbahn and Haupturmfuhrer Franz Novak. You won’t find anything about the first one, the second is only famous because he was – a Dannecker – working directly for Eichmann.

Anyway, I see no point in keeping discussing the matter with you, unless you propose a concrete matter to discuss – at least better that the operation to bring eastern Jews back east – which even in a revisionist point of view makes no sense.
Remember that “revisionists” pretend not to deny that the Nazi wanted to solve the Jewish problem in their territories through “emigration”…What would be the point to bring back “emigrated Jews” back to the territories that were supposed to be free of Jews through emigration?

Now, as my next post will be addressed to StatMec, you may want to read it as it will show were the difference in interpretation between evil and naïve Believers stand.

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Sat Sep 20, 2014 1:49 pm

Here, to complete my summary of how the Germans decided on deportation, at the outset of the final solution in France, of principally stateless and foreign-born Jews in that country is a quick survey of some key documents. Contrary to David's assertions (which he's not supported with documentary evidence), these documents reveal that the German goals - a Jew-free France - were pressed on the French, and that the French gave the Germans difficulties, making agreement so difficult that the two parties compromised to focus at first on non-French Jews:

An important, as-yet-undiscussed document (RF-1217) comes from mid-June 1942 and is headed “Future Deportation of Jews in France.”

This minute reported the decision of a “conference attended by the SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Dannecker” as follows:
it was agreed that 15,000 Jews would be deported from Holland, 10,000 from Belgium, from France (including the Unoccupied Zone) making up 100,000 in all.
It was decided that this deportation would be made up of Jews wearing the yellow Jewish star, as long as they weren’t living in mixed marriages.

Note on German "yellow star" decrees and which Jews were subject to compulsory wearing of the yellow star:
On May 29, 1942, German authorities issued a decree—to take effect on June 7—that Jews in occupied France wear the yellow star.

USHMM online article; also 1942 JTA news story and Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, p. 90, where it is explained that the yellow star order applied to both
French and most foreign Jews over six in the occupied zone . . .

See also NG-3668, 22 May 1942
decreeing that all Jews be forced to wear the star . . .
on order of Zeitschel, in the German embassy. Thus, describing deportation-eligible Jews as those people branded with the yellow star, RF-1217 contemplated an action against the Jews in France, no matter their national background.

The document also included the provision that the Germans in Paris were to make transport arrangements and instructed how the deportations were to be paid for.

Finally RF-1217 directed that the Germans were to get the French government to proclaim “a law” under which
all Jews residing outside of France or emigrating outside of France, would lose their nationality and their rights as French citizens.
That is, the deported Jews, among whom were contemplated at this time to be French citizens, were to lose their citizenship on leaving France. David's view that these plans didn't include French citizens is made nonsensical by this order to strip deported Jews of French citizenship, which, in David's view, none of the Jews slated for expulsion ever had in the first place!

A meeting among Jewish experts was set for 2 July 1942 in Eichmann’s office at the RHSA in Berlin “for a closing conference” on the summer Jewish action. At this conference (RF-1223, signed Eichmann and Dannecker), there was a focus on how to deal with the fact that
The preparatory work of a political order, regarding the practical realization in the Unoccupied Zone, is not completely done since the French Government is making things more and more difficult.

We’ve discussed at some length already how the Germans pressed the French, to get them on board realizing Himmler's goal of expelling the Jews from France, but ultimately settled with French officials on compromises (concerning which Jews to include in the upcoming deportation actions). According to RF-1223:
As per the order of the Reichsfuehrer SS (addressed to the office IV B 4 by the head of Service IV on 23 June 1942), all Jews residing in France must be deported as soon as possible. It is necessary, in the pursuit of this goal, to exert necessary pressure on the French Government.

The Himmler order referenced here is discussed by Wildt, Uncompromising Generation, p. 422, with reference to an entry in Himmler's diary for 23 June ("Dienstkalendar Himmler 464-465"). Balsamo's position that verges on the idea that a rump faction or layer within the Third Reich pushed the maximal approach becomes extremely dubious given that we are here staring at evidence for a Himmler order and thus intention of the Reich. (To remind readers, lest they doubt that the French Jewish action came from the highest level of the NS state, let me re-quote from Safrian, Eichmann's Men, p. 140, on how Eichmann and Dannecker managed the actions they were entrusted to carry out:
At the end of June 1942 Eichmann rushed from Berlin to Paris to assist Dannecker. . . According to a file entry bearing his and Dannecker’s signatues, they “negotiated” the fastest possible expulsion of all Jews from France. . . . The pressure on the French government executives, however, did not proceed as smoothly as Eichmann and Dannecker had imagined. . . . During a conference . . . the SS did not risk failure, although they did make it known that French government opposition during the arrests “certainly would not find favor with the Fuhrer.” They did not insist on the arrest of French Jews, as Eichmann and Dannecker demanded. Bousquet and the SS officers agreed that French police in the Occupied and the Unoccupied Zones were to arrest only Jews of foreign nationalities.

emphasis added; "French government opposition during the arrests 'certainly would not find favor with the Fuhrer'"!)

Eichmann and Dannecker also noted practical obstacles, including French recalcitrance, to the Himmler's goal and the upcoming summer deportations:
Results are not obtained overnight; thus we will continue to arrange transports from the Occupied Zone while waiting for the SS Reichsfuehrer's order to be carried out despite difficulties met in the Unoccupied Zone.
Along these lines, meetings took place with the Commandant of the Police of Surete in Paris, SS Standartenfuehrer Dr. Knochen.
He was specific with SS Haupsturmfuehrer Dannecker that all deported Jews be considered "stateless” . . .

Again, we learn of German pressure for a maximal effort, targeting all the Jews in France, and push-back from the French to limit the summer 1942 actions to non-French Jews. The note continued with attention to logistical issues:
In conclusion, it was decided that the previous schedule of deporting Jews by 1,000 a week from France must be increased considerably in order to free France from the Jews as early as possible. As for transportation, all necessary measures were to be taken in Berlin.
The Service in Paris was in charge of adhering to the schedule of deportations in the interest of a "definite solution" to the Jewish question.

By early July, then, the Germans had backed off their initial goal - stated in RF-1217 and RF-1221 - of including citizens and non-citizens in the July Jewish deportations. This compromise was reaffirmed in another note signed by Dannecker (Dannecker minute of 6 July 1942, Paris, referenced in Longerich, Holocaust, p.329):
The negotiators with the French government have come to the following results:
All “stateless” Jews, both in the Occupied Zone and the Unoccupied Zone, may be deported at any time.
President Laval proposed, along with deporting of Jewish families in both Zones, to take children under 16 years old as well. The question of Jewish children in the occupied zone didn’t interest him.

This latter agreement surprised the Germans, and thus Dannecker “urgently” asked Eichmann for guidance on whether the children were to be included in the transports.

Last, Dannecker noted, in line with the evolving German-French compromise, that
to begin round-ups
the Germans would start
for the moment with
”stateless” Jews or foreigners.”(Note: begin, for the moment, stateless Jews and foreigners - a temporary, first step to be taken all as a result of the negotiations in which the Germans got the French to begin going along with the final solution.) Dannecker noted, significantly, that in a “second phase” the Germans would
attack
those
Jews naturalized in France since either 1919 or 1927,
as we’ve outlined previously in this thread.

David has expressed inordinate concern for the logistical planning of the actual roundups. A memo of 8 July 1942 (CDCJ Document XXV b-55) summarized the results of a meeting on the “Organization of Future Deportations from France,” this being the first meeting of the “Committee for the Organization of Raids.”

Attendees were, for the Germans, Dannecker and SS Unterscharfuehrer Heinrichsohn and, for the French, Darquier de Pellepoix, Leguay (fro the police), Francois (internment camps), Hennequin (municipal police), Tulard (Jewish Section/Paris Police), Garnier (Seine prefecture), Gallien (Pellepoix’s cabinet), and Guidot (municipal police):
Opening the meeting, Darquier de Pellepoix stated that the Occupation Authorities were ready to rid France of Jews and that his meeting was to discuss how to do this.

The frame - a German program which the French were to help execute - thus set, Pellepoix turned the meeting over to Dannecker. Dannecker stated the immediate objective, as I’ve written earlier in the thread, to arrest 28,000 Jews - and additional Russian Jews; of this number it was expected that 22,000 would be transported from Paris. Young children still apparently a nettlesome issue, at this meeting Dannecker declared that Jews from 16 to 50 years old were to be subject to arrest (a significant number of children, as we know, were included in the July round-ups and interned).

Dannecker reviewed how arrests were to be made as well as a projected timetable, including the role of the Velodrome d’Hiver as the “Assembly Center.” The French would carry out the transfer of Jews from there to camps. Drancy, Compeigne, Pithiviers, and Beaune-la-Rolande were named as the camps to which the arrested Jews would be taken - 6,000 each to Drancy and Compeigne and 5,000 each to Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande.

Dannecker went on to discuss “Deportations to the East” including makeup of convoys and how they were to be guarded. He reviewed what deported Jews could bring with them on the RSHA transports. The French agreed to all this, with the clarification that
This measure only concerns Jews of the following nationalities: German, Austrian, Polish, Czechoslovakians, Russians (refugees or Soviets, or white or red), "stateless," or without a definite nationality.

The position that the deportations came at the initiative of the French is untenable in the face of the documents surveyed here; the position that the Germans did not intend, in line with their conception of the final solution, to include all Jews in France in their actions is at variance with the specific plans initially made for the summer 1942 deportations; and the argument that the eventual focus on stateless and foreign-born Jews proves that the French were interested in simply returning Jews to the East flies in the face of the documented negotiations the Germans carried out with the France, the respective positions of German and French negotiators on whom to deport, the long-term goal articulated by the Germans in the paper trail, the eventual identities of those Jews deported, and, outside the scope of this summary, the destinations and fates of the Jews deported from France.

I want to thank David, of course, for his own-goal here, in bringing up the case of France. The documents show that French Jews were not intended by the Germans to be "exempt" from the final solution, as David claimed without evidence; rather, the Germans targeted all Jews in France at the outset, compromised on this target along the way, but were by 1944 reconfirming the broad, all-inclusive scope of their anti-Jewish program in France. What we see in France, as I argued at the very outset, is the extreme and radical program which the final solution represented - along with tactical maneuvering by the Germans taking into account local conditions, politics, diplomacy, and other factors affecting implementation of German goals for the Jews. Whether the argument is the absurdity that nothing more in France was at stake than Vichy's desire to return foreign Jews to the East (David) or the dubious view that western Europe, because the course of the final solution there differed to the final solution in the East, shows the limits of German aims toward the Jews (Balsamo), the case of France underscores that the final solution by 1942 meant the elimination of the Jews from Europe through their mass extermination, which extermination took many forms and was arrived at via different routes.

France from 1942-1944 is not a challenge to the final solution but an important confirmation of it.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Balsamo » Sat Sep 20, 2014 10:01 pm

Hi StatMec, and thank you for your two posts. They brilliantly summarize the case of the implementation of the final solution in France.

It is indeed a complex topic, not because it is not documented, but as usual because the way one looks at those documents depends on the initial approach, the initial perception of the whole thing and those differences – between approach and perception, can be really tiny at the start and still lead to larger divergences in the conclusions.
The most obvious example is the issue of the chronology in the implementation of the Final Solution – but you know that.

My reading starts with the assessment of the extraordinary efficiency of the implementation of every steps of the final solution in the East – as well as in Germany, Austria and Bohemia which i tried to present in my “Wannsee” post.

To sum it up, I consider that the killings were the results of individual initiatives motivated by opportunies and legitimation, which will develop into a policy (or policies) because of the problems caused by instructions from the top. The efficiency is explained by the facts that those instructions were a confirmation of all actors core mission, that the perception of the thread posed by this specific eastern Jewish target was shared by almost every branch of the German authorities in the concerned regions, and thus the availability of various form of - if not legal – at least “para-legal” legitimation. That means that the Final Solution was indeed a solution for existing problems – sanitary, security, food, lebensraum, “germanization” plans…Every part of the German authorities – from the military (concerned with security and the need of all resources available for its troops) to the Gauleiters whose mission was to Germanize their new provinces, to the GG who did not want his territory to become a bin for Jews, to every service within the RSHA who need to find rooms to obey Hitler’s whish of making the Greater Reich “Judenfrei”. This all resulted in an astonishing convergence of interests which made the final solution there – and the mass murder of millions –not only possible but terribly effective and in a very short period of time.

As the source of all this operation was a result of a concrete Reich’s official priority: Germanization and colonization of new territories, dejudeization, Himmler and his service were granted extra powers that I have described which would prove decisive when conflict with other authorities will appear.
So to put what I just said in the perspective of your – a little hard to understand- following sentence:
“Solution and implementation, goal and tactics, policy and plans: these are sometimes, IMHO, confused, and even by Longerich. Politics and diplomacy, both being the art of the possible, I find most of the "conflictual" evidence to lie on the plane of implementation, tactics, plans, and progress - not solution, goal, or policy. France, in fact, is a good case study for this. I am aware (at last) of Bloxham's counter argument but not convinced of it (Confino's Corfu example being just a small sample of why).”


I my perspective, a solution refers to one or more problems. The more the problems are consensual the more the solution will be – even the most evil one…
There lie the source of the conflictual evidence, in my view. My inspiration comes from the multiple aspects of the German concept of Anti-Semitism – word that seems too weak in regards of its consequences. The problem with the central and eastern Jews was more practical and less theoretical than the one posed by the western Jews.
Regarding the eastern Jews, the consensus regarding the problem – or this case the perceived threat they posed – went even beyond the Nazi sphere. It was more or less shared by all the States – including Poland, before the war – and especially with Germany’s eastern allies even though at different degrees. The reasons to make those eastern territories “Judenfrei” was logical in a Nazi perspective because along with racial theories, there was also the imperative to prevent the propagation of “Judeo-bolshevism”. Now it would have been surprising that the racial arguments or Rosenberg foolish theories would have sufficed to gather a great consensus, contrary to the second. Not everyone – even with the most Nazi spheres – was interested in all those eugenic and racial theories, or at least as interested as Himmler. Himmler had dreams, visions, ambitions of his own…He believes in Racism more than anyone else.

You brought up this conflict:
“Himmler did not have full power in the East. Ask, well if you could, Albert Forster Gauleiter and Reichstatthalter of Danzig-West Prussia. Himmler had to take into account and arrange affairs with the civil officials and the Wehrmacht in the East…”


Which is a very good example. Albert Forster was in some regard even more evil than Himmler as he was a pure practical and pragmatic killer, almost in a Antic roman way.
He posed problem to Himmler as RKV first, and even after. But they shared the same goal – it was more a matter of who was to be the leader. The case of the gauleiters would be perfect for your “Third Reich Judenpolitiek” and the powers in the third Reich. Anyway, let’s just say that those gauleiters – and even more the Reichstatthalter’s – were as powerful as Hitler in their kingdoms, they depended only from Hitler – which considered most of them as his nostalgic “old guard” and therefore tended to cover them whatever they could do. They could pose problem even for Himmler. But in this case, Himmler held weapons – the only one effective against Gauleiters – a “Fuhrer Befehl”, a mission by the fuhrer written on a paper, so he would eventually prevail…especially since there was no opposition regarding the goal. The divergences were only on who would be the authority that would make “the Fuhrer’s wishes” come true (in Kershaw's sense). Forster had his own plan and was not member of the SS…He did not wait for any order to start shooting people at will, and more importantly, he had his own “Fuhrer’s blank check” to do so. (a detail forgotten by Irving, btw)

And this is what I call a Reichspolicy from the top…Everything was perfectly clear at every level of the Nazi authorities.

You won’t find anything comparable in France or Belgium, and even not in the Netherlands…But that will be for tomorrow…

EDIT: Typo and omissions
Last edited by Balsamo on Sat Sep 20, 2014 10:36 pm, edited 3 times in total.

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Balsamo » Sat Sep 20, 2014 10:19 pm

Just in between
StatMec said
the dubious view that western Europe, because the course of the final solution there differed to the final solution in the East, shows the limits of German aims toward the Jews (Balsamo)


Just to clarify this point.
i am not arguing that Himmler's services had different plans per se - the goal was the same.
What i am trying to explain here is that the plan was less a "Reichs policy" - as defined in my post above - the goal was the same, but the convergence of interests - as defined above - was no longer there.

I am not sure neither to adhere with Bloxham thesis, but i agree with the reasons why he feels like to propose his thesis (is that clear?)...I agree with him that the "conflictual evidences" are too obvious to just be explained by pure technical, political or diplomatical constraints...

But it is late now, and i'll explain myself further tomorrow

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Sun Sep 21, 2014 12:51 am

Balsamo wrote:
. . . I consider that the killings were the results of individual initiatives motivated by opportunies and legitimation, which will develop into a policy (or policies) . . . . That means that the Final Solution was indeed a solution for existing problems – sanitary, security, food, lebensraum, “germanization” plans… . This all resulted in an astonishing convergence of interests which made the final solution there – and the mass murder of millions –not only possible but terribly effective and in a very short period of time.

I have to add to this list ideology in the deep sense, a world-view, and practical politics and social practices, ascribing to "the Jew" a pervasive, negative power and a focus on solving the supposed problem posed by this as a way out of the period's problems - on every plane, including culture and daily life.

I also want to focus on the phrase you used, which I agree with (although I might use the verb "will crystallize"):
initiatives motivated by opportunies and legitimation, which will develop into a policy (or policies).



That is, at some point the phase of individual initiatives, probing, proofs of concept, daring overreaching and affirmation, etc comes to an end - and crystallizes into a policy with programs in support of it. This leads to an answer to this implied question:

Balsamo wrote:
So to put what I just said in the perspective of your – a little hard to understand- following sentence:

“Solution and implementation, goal and tactics, policy and plans: these are sometimes, IMHO, confused, and even by Longerich. Politics and diplomacy, both being the art of the possible, I find most of the "conflictual" evidence to lie on the plane of implementation, tactics, plans, and progress - not solution, goal, or policy. France, in fact, is a good case study for this. I am aware (at last) of Bloxham's counter argument but not convinced of it (Confino's Corfu example being just a small sample of why).”

What I was trying to get at with this was that even Longerich's late dating of the crystallization (May-ish 1942) seems to confuse the necessary implementation twists and turns, logistical challenges and tactical solutions, the short-term planning in support of the final solution, as a policy (or even set of policies), with the policy itself. The implementation hesitations and compromises, leaps ahead, pauses - including the obstacles of bottlenecks, workload, logistics, and so on - appear as "conflictual evidence" and even a "not yet crystallized" policy.

Balsamo wrote:
You won’t find anything comparable in France or Belgium, and even not in the Netherlands…But that will be for tomorrow…

Looking forward to it . . .
Last edited by Statistical Mechanic on Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:27 am, edited 4 times in total.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Balsamo » Wed Sep 24, 2014 11:56 pm

:?

Well that was not exactly tomorrow, as the first draft got deleted after being completed, but before being posted.

First, let start with a quick remark:

StatMec wrote:

“What I was trying to get at with this was that even Longerich's late dating of the crystallization (May-ish 1942) seems to confuse the necessary implementation twists and turns, logistical challenges and tactical solutions, the short-term planning in support of the final solution, as a policy (or even set of policies), with the policy itself.”


I agree, I too think Longerich is overstretching the date of the crystallization (I like the word and it is indeed more appropriate). Anyway, it all depends on your initial approach. I am more convinced by October 41, as far as Himmler and his services are concerned – when he prohibits emigration which was at the core of the first version of the “Final Solution”. One can give Longerich’s position some credit if one considers the time when the “new solution” was imposed and accepted on a more global scale, when the policy has crystallized itself completely in the East which is indeed as you say “May-ish 42”, that is when local initiatives were recognized and accepted as the best way to solve the problem globally. But of course, it is a funny way of dating. It is like the old question about the chicken and the egg: who came first? Most of the interpretation are acceptable if consistent with the Historian’s initial approach.

“The implementation hesitations and compromises, leaps ahead, pauses - including the obstacles of bottlenecks, workload, logistics, and so on - appear as "conflictual evidence" and even a "not yet crystallized" policy.”


To sum up my first part through this sentence: hesitations – maybe at first, not many – compromises again a little on who would be responsible for what and some guarantee that the little Nazi kings would still be king in their kingdom, helped by the agreement to find a global solution – leaps ahead as experiments and indeed some times to – once Himmler global authority on that matter accepted and recognized – some times to organize things. Point is I see very little “conflictual evidences” in the application of the Final Solution in the east beyond the kind of “I need those workers” arguments. I am excluding exceptional behavior like the “major Plagge” ones, which are irrelevant on a general scale.

Now, you know my position on Wannsee and what it represented for me, that is basically, the extension of Himmler authority and ownership to the Jews of the Greater Reich, making the official Reich’s institutions subordinates of the RSHA regarding the Jewish question and its solution. I also deducted that concerning the more western Jews, the projects that were proposed were more wishes than immediately realizable projects. And here is the start of my following interpretation.


So Back to the West – in this topic Paris and in this post Brussels.

And indeed, it is a complex topic.
Not because it is not documented, but because, as usual, the way one reads and replaces one documents in one’s narrative depend on the initial approach.

Mine here is to understand why the application in the West were much less – to say the least – successful than in the East. And to speak frankly, if everything is quite clear in my head (good for me) to sum it up in a forum’s post is not such an easy task, especially in a foreign language…It was not the first time, and it is still not.

As you have already brilliantly covered most of the aspect of the case in France, I will focus on Belgium.
The two have more in common that one might think, especially regarding the implementation of the final solution as well as differences that are essential. I will leave alone the case of the Netherlands for obvious reasons.

The first observation is that the Reich had no plan for those territories prior to their military occupation.
They are both occupied within the same months of 1940 by the Wehrmacht, negotiated a capitulation through their head of State (I won’t lose myself in the Belgian “royal question”), and thus became military districts.

Here comes the first difference, while France kept its political institutions, the Belgian government chose to flee to London, while the king as head of the army chose to stay: thus, where in France part of the political administration was still in French hands, the MBH in Belgium (which included a part of northern France) hold the political position while relying on the high civil servants (les Secretaires generaux).

As a consequence, the Sipo-SD of Paris working under the MBH for France had to deal with the French government while the Sipo-SD in Brussels was subordinated to the sole MBH for Belgium.

If I insist on that situation, it is because the final results of the deportation of Jews from those countries were rather similar – a relative failure – while the explanation for both failure cannot be commonly applied. An important element though is that the representative of Heydrich – Sturmbanfuhrer Max Thomas, was until his revocation by the French MBH, 1941 common for both Paris and Brussels. (Note that after his revocation, he will be replaced in Paris, but not in Brussels)

So let’s go to Brussels: The MBH is von Falkenhausen. Its administration is led by SS-Brigadenfuhrer Eggert Reeder. He is head of all the German police forces : the “fledgendarmerie” and the “Geheime Feld polizei”, etc…and even theoretically the Sipo-SD, at first barely 20 people, was if not submitted to his authority, it could not make any arrest without the approval of the MBH – or at least was to retreat in case of what was considered as “Abuse” by the MBH (or its verwaltungchef).

Here we have a major difference: Himmler and Heydrich were of course the ones who – through Eichmann – were sending their instruction to their “bureau” in Brussels (along with Paris and Amsterdam), but this one had to get the authorization and the cooperation of the MBH to proceed. And as another example of limitation, despite various attempts, there will be no HSSPF allowed until the very last week of occupation and after the MBH was dismissed.

This all creates a very different environment for the implementation of the final Solution than the one in Himmler’s eastern kingdom – I call it kingdom because only there his accumulated powers and authorities allowed him to dispose of his Jews as he pleased.
It is important as one can conclude that his RSHA services in the west were not supposed to solve the Jewish problem by themselves, that is to kill them on the spot like in the Baltic States, but were basically “only” to deport them, that is to put them on a train heading East.

So at the very top, one finds a fundamental divergence in a sense that the goals of the occupation authorities were different: Germanization and colonization in the East, vs. to keep order and economical exploitation with the help of national institutions – this last goal was potentially threatened by the RSHA own plans.

As far as the MBH in Belgium (and northern France) is concerned, the “jewish question” is not a priority. Of course, it will implement the “German AS legislation” but gradually, starting in October 40 to put the last decree in place well into 1942. Not that there was no consensus or active collaboration between the MBH and the SS up to that point, but just that it was not the priority.

The registration of the Jews in Belgium was also done differently as the task had been given to the local authorities (the counties or municipalities) and were thus less reliable, then to the AJB (Association des juifs en (IN) Belgium, created in November 41).

The deportations start at the same moment – in the Netherland as well as in Belgium – but the modus operandi is different. The first convocation sent by the AJB were “Arbeiteinsatz” or “convocation to work – only a few responded – which placed the Sipo-SD in a difficult situation. Normally, the Sipo-SD had no authority on the Belgian police forces – but it still used them to organize the first round-up, starting in Antwerp in September 42. It is to be noticed that this round-up had not been ordered by the MBH, but that the Sipo-SD bypassed the authority by negotiation with the local ”Kommandantur” with the help of the local police force. This round-up and the following were successful though and will make it possible for the Sipo-SD to at least fulfil party the quota assigned to it at Berlin. Until the MBH forbade the Sipo-SD to use the Belgian police force.

A detailed look at the Jewish deportations statistics – provided by historians by Pim GRIFFIOEN and RON ZELLER (La persecution des Juifs en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas) shows their erratic character.
- The Start of the Aktion 27/07/42 – 15/08/42 : convocation for the Arbeiteinzats : 2.997 Jews.
- The round-ups (while the convocation was still going) from the 16/08 to 31/10/42 : 13.624

That means that 66% of the Jews deported from Belgium were sent to their fate in those 4 months, while both tactics raised such suspicion that an estimated 25.000 Jews went into hiding – which was facilitated by the fact that the original measures to control the Jews only applied to the 4 cities.

Those unapproved initiatives created so much fuss that the MBH – through Reeder – prohibited from that day the use of the Belgian police force by the Sipo-SD – putting a definitive end to the round-ups and a temporary halt to the deportation process (until 1943). He also ordered the release of all belgian Jews who had been caught, among other restictive measure.
As a detail, he was promoted SS-Gruppenfuhrer in January 1943, certainly not for his cooperation with the Sipo-SD.

Without the possibility to use the Belgian police force, the Sipo-SD had to improvise new means to pursue their Aktion. Those means will be to count on the Anti-Semitism of existent German forces and the cooperation of local Anti-Semitic organizations. As for the German forces, those would be the lesser known “Propaganda Abteilung” (from Goebbels ministry) and the “Devisenshutzkommando” ( DSK – not the French pervert from NY) as well as more indirectly the Feldgendarmerie and the GeheimeFeldpolizei in their duty to control the borders.

The DSK is representative to the leverage available to the Sipo-SD in Belgium, as it was also a hybrid organization which received instruction from Berlin by SS related services but was theoretically depended on the MBH. Its mission was to collect the goods of the enemies of the Reich – and of course of the Jews. All the German forces involved now had to track the Jews in a more legal environment, the non-compliance with the existing legislation – that is those who dissimulated their belongings or tried to cross the border.
Regarding the Belgian collaborators, the first noticeable action is the work done by the propaganda abteilung through the Anti-Semite organizations like the “Volkverweering” of Rene Lambrichts who will supervise the diffusion of As movies beginning with “Der Jude Suss” (mars 41) up to “The Ewige Jude” (April). Before the projection, the German project of the Final Solution is presented and explained as the “Territorial solution” it was then. Those speeches are promoted by the “official” Belgian press. This activity will participate to the denunciation by Belgians.

Depending on how one see things, the results – after the summer 42 – can be considered (from a Nazi point of view) good or disappointing. Anyway, according to the previous summary:
There will be no more deportation until 1943. From that date, the rate will turn at around 500 per month ( 1500 each trimester) until September 43 ( when for the first time Belgians jewish citizens will be deported). Deportations will slow further to 132 for the 4th trimester 43.
The year 44 is as follow: 1st Trim: 1022, 2nd trim: 1132, 3rd Trim: 563.

The total for the period between November 42 and May 44 is 8.782, a little bit more than half of what was achieved in the summer of 42. Good numbers considered the means available to the Sipo-SD deprived from the services of the Belgian police force, not so good of one considers that the Germans counted 52.000 Jews before the deportation, which means that after the first success of summer 42, they caught only 8.500 out of a theoretical number of 35.379 or less that 25% (while the real number of Jews was closer to 55-60.000).

A very important point to outline is that it was certainly not the fault of the RSHA and the Sipo-SD. The officers nominated there was hard-core zealots: like Strumbanfuhrer Ernst Ehlers who participated to Actions in Byelorussia, compiling the reports of the EK’s there, or Max Thomas who after his revocation was promoted Brigadenfuhrer and given the command of an EG, or the Judenreferent in Brussels, Kurt Asche who was in an EK in Poland. Those guys certainly did not lack any personal motivation.

Now, there are many works that deal with that question, especially those I got those elements from. (STEINBERG, SAERENS, and lately, insa MEINEN, GRIFFIOEN, etc ), which led to the commonly accepted explanations – which you used in the case of France. They are all valid. Still they failed to address the question of why Himmler and his services accepted this limitation of power in their project to solve the Jewish question. That is why didn’t they got from Hitler an intervention that would have force the MBH to let the Sipo-SD use the Belgian police force after October 42?

Indeed, there were clear limits in what could be done in Belgium, and I suspect, in France too.
Not because their own project differed, but their freedom of action as well as the means at their disposal were not up to the task.
Both limitations could have been lifted had a clear decision been taken from the top, like Hitler putting the SS and the OKH at the same table in Berlin, or giving the RSHA in France and Belgium the same taskforce – a kind of einzatsgruppen – but none of those happened for the most time of the occupation. Why?

The example of the Hungary Aktion proves that swift and very effective actions were still possible even near the end when consensus from the top to the bottom existed. Force is to admit that this consensus was not in place in Belgium.

My view is that the consensus – from the top to the bottom – for those territories were just different, as well as the official priorities which were the economic exploitation for the war effort, the need of manpower – STO’s – and workers needed by the German industries which is also a number that has not been given up to now. Hundreds of thousands Belgians workers were “deported” to work in Germany – some voluntarily some forced – as well as 650.000 French. One can very well imagine the influence of people from the OKW, Speer or Sauckel promoting this priority over Himmler’s.

Another explanation possible is that the nature of the perceived threat posed by those Belgian or French Jews, which was more linked to their economic positions, they supposed links to the Masonry and international finance (all the {!#%@} described by been-there), was not to be dealt with anyway as the center of this power was seen in New York and London. Depriving them of their wealth and property was probably seen as enough for the time being nor did they pose any health or sanitary thread, as it is clear that in both countries (France and Belgium) the consensus for deportation settled on the same category of Jews: Poles (2/3), Germans (1/5), Austrian and Czechoslovakians, as well as Russians(the rest) – the ownership over those Jews had been granted to the SS for a long time and at least at Wannsee while the ownership over French or Belgian Jews – as hinted in the minutes of the meeting – had never been settled or so it seems.

Certainly not very clear, and probably incomplete...not the kind of subject that fit with a forum format...anyway here it is.

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Fri Sep 26, 2014 2:47 pm

Balsamo - I am not forgetting to reply! I will get back to this in a bit . . . - Best, SM
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Sat Sep 27, 2014 10:02 pm

Balsamo,

I want to take a little time to write something on Mueller's October 1941 order, so that will be next. For now, we don't diverge all that much, really, except . . . and instead of repeating a lot I will just make two points:

(1) the consensus as it emerged out of the actions, problems, and escalations in the East, took from '39 really into '42. Serbia is a good example. In part 1 - summer/fall '41 - with tenuous connections to the partisan situation but heavy self-justification reprisals against Jewish men; women and children by and large "parked" in the Judenlager at Semilin across the Saba, in Croatia IIRC. Part 2 saw the solution of what to do with these inmates - one of those self-imposed problems the increasingly extremist Jewish policy created - in winter 1942: gas vans. (To be a bit schematic.) There is a long trail of escalations, pep talks, top down and bottom up urging. Then by December '41 - the crystallization of what to do about the Jewish problem.

Our difference remains that I think that once that crystallization occurred - recall what prerogatives Heydrich claims at Wannsee and for where - it applied to Europe, with tactical, political, diplomatic, geopolitical (as you rightly note), economic, and military factors causing, not to go all Leninist on you :), uneven development of the final solution to the Jewish question . . .

2) Which brings me to this:
Indeed, there were clear limits in what could be done in Belgium, and I suspect, in France too.
Not because their own project differed, but their freedom of action as well as the means at their disposal were not up to the task.
Both limitations could have been lifted had a clear decision been taken from the top, like Hitler putting the SS and the OKH at the same table in Berlin, or giving the RSHA in France and Belgium the same taskforce – a kind of einzatsgruppen – but none of those happened for the most time of the occupation. Why?

The example of the Hungary Aktion proves that swift and very effective actions were still possible even near the end when consensus from the top to the bottom existed. Force is to admit that this consensus was not in place in Belgium.

Where I agree wholeheartedly is the sentence that reads
Not because their own project differed, but their freedom of action as well as the means at their disposal were not up to the task.

Such factors are what I find decisive in how the final solution was implemented and thus in the historical traces it left for us to study. The Hungary Aktion can be understood in the light of my interpretation as one of those times/places that, through events and logistics, impediments cleared and the task force went to work - and failed, remember, for reverse developments in the same spheres, to complete the job. Confino's example of Corfu, which I posted on earlier, speaks to the radical, uncompromising, all-embracing character of the anti-Jewish program decided in winter '41-'42.

One more point relative to Confino: Bloxham in his book on the Final Solution examined the counterfactual "what if the war hadn't ended so soon?" and concluded, in line with his overall argument, that, the core of the project being done, the Nazis may not have proceeded to murder the rest of Europe's Jews. I can't tell, but this argument "sounds" like one you'd agree with. Bloxham argued IIRC that small populations of Jews, for example, were already being overlooked in favor of other priorities. Confino concluded his recent book with a different and, to me, fascinating counterfactual (which I've been told he borrowed from Dirk Rupnow. Having spent some time discussing the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg and other war-time "memory" projects, Confino wondered how the victorious Nazis would have remembered the Jews and re-written Jewish history in the aftermath - that is, with the Jews gone from Europe. In Confino's scenario, the Jews of Europe have been wiped out, as the Nazis even "cleansed" Corfu of its Jews when the military and economic situation suggested other priorities.

That's where I come down too.

Mueller - in a bit!
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Balsamo » Sun Sep 28, 2014 12:48 am

Hi StatMec, and thanks for your reply.
As your said, i think that the bases of our divergence are really thin, but still essential enough to continue this discussion.

So while waiting for the rest of you writings, i will reply to the following part:

One more point relative to Confino: Bloxham in his book on the Final Solution examined the counterfactual "what if the war hadn't ended so soon?" and concluded, in line with his overall argument, that, the core of the project being done, the Nazis may not have proceeded to murder the rest of Europe's Jews. I can't tell, but this argument "sounds" like one you'd agree with. Bloxham argued IIRC that small populations of Jews, for example, were already being overlooked in favor of other priorities. Confino concluded his recent book with a different and, to me, fascinating counterfactual (which I've been told he borrowed from Dirk Rupnow. Having spent some time discussing the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg and other war-time "memory" projects, Confino wondered how the victorious Nazis would have remembered the Jews and re-written Jewish history in the aftermath - that is, with the Jews gone from Europe. In Confino's scenario, the Jews of Europe have been wiped out, as the Nazis even "cleansed" Corfu of its Jews when the military and economic situation suggested other priorities.


I must admit that I agree with Bloxham, but only to a certain point. As I said in another post, I essentially agree with the reasons why he proposes his thesis. Nevertheless, I don’t agree with an essential point of his reasoning (if I understood it right, as it is a rather tough book to digest in a foreign language .lol ) He seems to attribute the variants of the Jewish policy to Himmler’s decision or indecision, while I only see limitations to his power to execute his plan. As I tried to show is that the person sent to the Sipo-SD in Brussels were not selected because of their diplomatic skills, most had participated in the eastern killings. If their mission was to be different, Heydrich would have chosen different people, and that was clearly not the case. It is also clear the Eichmann did not spare his efforts to fulfil his mission. Basically only the results are so obviously different that there is a need by historian to take notice and think or re-think certain aspects which are more related to the authority structure within the third Reich, especially the aspect of what was needed for a authority to get things done. This is what I meant when I said that the usual arguments, while true and important, give a feeling of “imcompleteness”.

My “epiphany” is the result of the readings of many “Nazi’s memoirs”, and in this case, Albert Speer’s “Inside the third Reich”, but also Guderian’s etc. What stroke me was that despite the situation, and the absolute power given to his ministry, even Speer – whose action was essential and allowed Germany to fight for an additional two years- had to fight for his program to be passed, essentially through “special decree signed by the Fuhrer”. Or in another case, Skorzeny’s ability to basically take over power – even if only for a couple of days – in Hungary – thanks to “A Fuhrer’s befehl”. If Speer had obstacles then maybe Himmler had some too. I am far from pretending to hold a “grail” here, but I do think that there is a space that needs to be researched more deeply. And in this case, Bloxham opened a very interesting door.

Now I also share his opinion concerning the “what if”…even though I consider that those kind of speculations are outside the scope of historians, i think that there are some actions possible in a context of war that are not possible in a context of peace, and a genocide in such an educated society as Germany, is certainly one of them. It is obvious that a clear victory would have open a great deal of choices on how to solve the Jewish problem, including death, but through different and maybe less evident ways, that is through a dishonest territorial solution – such as the Nazi Madagascar Plan. The means would have been starvation instead of shooting or gazing: But the problem with that speculation is that it is my opinion that mass murder started – among other factors – because the prospect of clear victory disappeared quickly, which makes it irrelevant.

I have not read Confimo, but I will. So I cannot really speak about that. But following my logic, there is the “fear factor” due to the threat of the Bolshevist invasion that could have given an extra motivation to the murderers. I know close to nothing about this episode, but I would be interested on who the “decision makers” were, among other things. Again, I still think that the “infamous Judeo-Boslshevist threat” was the more consensual. As for the economic interests of Greece, i fail to see it except maybe olive oil and feta cheese - the military interest was clearly to withdraw from this geographical dead end...

I will wait for your Müller’s 1941 order interpretation – you mean the interdiction of emigration, right?.

PS: Regarding the ERR actions, did you know that the MBH managed to protect the collection of the baroness Lambert, from the famous Jewish Baron Lambert – founder of the Banque Lambert (later the Banque Bruxelles Lambert or BBL bought by ING in 1998) - as non-jewish?

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Sun Sep 28, 2014 10:40 am

Balsamo wrote:I will wait for your Müller’s 1941 order interpretation – you mean the interdiction of emigration, right?.

Yes indeed. I too have thought a lot about this order. It will take a bit of time to reply on that one as I want to weave in something Bloxham said regarding it . . .

Thanks for your comments. Again, I of course agree that the authority structure, as you call it, differed in various countries, and east versus west in general. Still, we have those RSHA men from IV-B-4 in these countries . . . and Luther's office trying to win diplomatic agreements for deportations . . .

Confino's book is the real deal, IMHO.

(Apparently Bob, who has written that
Historiography does not define events known as Holocaust differently - AFAIK they all agree there was a deliberate systematic plan to exterminate Jews –
hasn’t noticed this discussion, not to mention some of the scholars we’ve referred to!)
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Sun Sep 28, 2014 1:29 pm

I think the discussion of France, introduced by David, has sailed right over his pinhead!
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby scrmbldggs » Sun Sep 28, 2014 2:48 pm

Statistical Mechanic wrote:(Apparently Bob, who has written that
Historiography does not define events known as Holocaust differently - AFAIK they all agree there was a deliberate systematic plan to exterminate Jews –
hasn’t noticed this discussion, not to mention some of the scholars we’ve referred to!)

Just give it a little time... when the "Iron Grilles" thread is lost, fools will rush in where there's some action.

Of course, Sobibor could take the lead, but it seems unlikely. Too many unknowns looming in the near future. :-P
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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Matthew Ellard » Mon Sep 29, 2014 12:19 am

Statistical Mechanic wrote:I think the discussion of France, introduced by David, has sailed right over his pinhead!
David stopped posting when Bob started posting. This happened last time when Bob posted and other times when people like Eric Hunt posted here. I assume the reason is because David makes so much stuff up, that he knows we will throw his fake evidence at the other holocaust deniers and make all of them look stupid. David is a pathetic loner.

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Re: res ipsa loquitur

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Mon Jan 26, 2015 1:34 pm

Statistical Mechanic wrote:. . . Instead of hand-waving the problems away, please tell us why the death tolls in France, the Netherlands, and Slovakia differed. You can include Belgium and Italy, even the Scandinavian countries. I've told you why I think death tolls differed. It's your turn. . . .

I don't recall where David answered this. As we've seen, he ran out of BS on France. So let's move on now and let's talk about the Netherlands, for starters, where about 75% of Jews were deported in contrast to the 25%-ish taken out of France to camps in the East. David, anyone: tell us about this.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Mon Jan 26, 2015 7:12 pm

Balsamo,

I’ve wondered for a while about a post you made in this thread distinguishing the Germans' “modus operandi” with the early transports from Belgium from that of their approach to the initial deportations from the Netherlands - on the ground that, in contrast to the Dutch deportations, the Belgium transports were for “Arbeiteinsatz” or “convocation to work” Can you explain this further in the light of the information below? Specifically, I cannot figure out what, in your view, differentiates the early Belgian transports from typical RSHA transports which were characteristic of deportations during the Final Solution?

For the first three transports from Belgium, I find the following:

Danuta Czech, Auschwitz Chronicle, p 211, 5 August 1942,
998 persons arrive with the first RSHA transport from Malines Camp in Belgium. There are 570 men and boys and 428 women and girls in this transport. After the selection, 426 men, who receive Nos. 54633-56858, and 318 women, who receive Nos. 14784-15101, are admitted to the camp as inmates.

The arithmetic goes as follows: 998 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 744 were admitted to the camp and given numbers, leaving “an excess” of 254 people (25%). In other words, a selection occurred, with 75% of the deportees from Malines being retained for labor or other purposes and, by inference and by definition, 25% murdered in the gas chambers. Correct? Also, the transport contained adults and children (according to the Auschwitz Museum camp history, Auschwitz 1940-1945, v3 p 27, 240, or 14%, of those on this transport were children, hardly appropriate for labor). Correct?

Czech, p 215, 13 August 1942,
999 Jews from Belgium arrive with the second RSHA transport from Malines Camp. There are 407 men and 79 boys and 445 women and 68 girls in the transport. After the selection, 290 men and 228 women are admitted to the camp as inmates and receive Nos. 58226-58515 and 16737-16964. The other deportees are killed in the gas chambers.

In the case of the 2nd Belgian transport from Malines, the arithmetic is as follows: 999 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 518 were admitted to the camp, leaving “an excess” of 419 people (42%). In other words, a selection occurred, with 68% of the deportees from Malines being retained for labor or other purposes and, explicitly, 42% murdered in the gas chambers. Correct? Also, the transport contained adults and children - and by inference all the children were gassed. Correct? This transport differed from the first not in kind (both were “normal” RSHA Final Solution transports - not special labor transports - with selection when they arrived at Birkenau) but in quantity, with the 2nd transport having a significantly higher % killed on arrival.

Czech, p 220, 17 August 1942,
1,000 Jews from the Malines Camp arrive in the third RSHA transport from Belgium, which includes 342 men and 86 boys and 486 women and 86 girls. After the selection, 157 men and 205 women are admitted to the camp as inmates and given Nos. 59344-59500 and 17317-17521. The other 638 people are killed in the gas chambers.

In the case of the 3rd transport from Malines, Belgium, the arithmetic works out as follows: 1,000 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 362 were admitted to the camp, leaving “an excess” of 638 people (64%). In other words, a selection of the arriving Jews was carried out, with 36% of the deportees from Belgium being retained for labor or other purposes and, explicitly, 64% murdered in the gas chambers. Correct? Also, the transport contained adults and children - and by inference all the children were gassed. Correct? This transport differed from the first two not in kind (all were “typical” Final Solution transports undergoing selection on arrival at Birkenau) but in quantity, with the 3rd transport having a substantially higher % killed on arrival than either the 1st or 2nd transport. (The Auschwitz Museum camp history, Auschwitz 1940-1945, v2, p 223, says that overall about 19% of Belgian deportees were children under 16; on the two early transports for which we have comparable data, we see that 16% of the deportees were children, very much in line with the %’s for all 27 transports from Belgium to Auschwitz.)

In the case of the early transports to the East from the Netherlands, we can read the following in Czech:

Czech, p 198, 17 July 1942,
In two transports of the RSHA, 2,000 Jews arrive from Westerbork and Amersfoort camps in Holland. 1,303 men and boys and 697 women and girls arrive. After the selection, 1,251 men and 300 women are admitted to the camp. . . . The other 449 deportees are killed in the gas chambers.

In the case of the 1st Dutch transports from Westerbork (and Amersfoort), the arithmetic is as follows: 2,000 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 1,551 were admitted to the camp, leaving “an excess” of 449 people (22%). In other words, a selection occurred, with 78% of the deportees from the Netherlands being retained for labor or other purposes and, explicitly, 22% murdered in the gas chambers - roughly the same %’s as with the 1st Belgian transport. Correct? Also, as did the 1st Belgian transport, the transport contained adults and children - and by inference all the children were gassed. Correct?

Czech, p 201, 22 July 1942,
931 Jews arrive from the Westerbork Camp in an RSHA transport. After the selection, 479 men and 297 women are admitted to the camp as inmates. . . . The other 155 deportees are killed in the gas chambers.

In the case of the 2nd Dutch transport from Westerbork, the arithmetic is as follows: 931 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 776 were admitted to the camp, leaving “an excess” of 155 people (17%). In other words, a selection occurred, with 83% of the deportees from the Netherlands being retained for labor or other purposes and, explicitly, 17% murdered in the gas chambers - that is, a sharply higher % kept alive on arrival for labor than from the 1st Dutch transports and a higher % than any of the early Belgian transports. Correct? Also, as with the other early transports, the 2nd Dutch transport contained adults and children - and by inference all the children were gassed. Correct?

Czech, p 204, 25 July 1942,
An RSHA transport of 1,000 Jews from Westerbork Camp arrives. In it are 577 men and boys and 427 women and girls. After the selection, 516 men and 293 women are admitted to the camp. . . . The other 191 people are killed in the fas chambers.

In the case of the 3rd Dutch transport from Westerbork, the arithmetic works as follows: 1,000 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 809 were admitted to the camp, leaving “an excess” of 191 people (19%). In other words, a selection occurred, with 81% of the deportees from the Netherlands being retained for labor or other purposes and, explicitly, 19% murdered in the gas chambers - roughly the same %’s as with the 2nd Dutch transport but still a higher % retained temporarily for labor than with any of the early Belgian transports surveyed here. Correct? Also, as with the other early transports, the 2nd Dutch transport contained adults and children - and by inference all the children were gassed. Correct? (Czech’s data on these transports do not provide a breakdown for % of children included; the Auschwitz Museum history, Auschwitz 1940-1945, v2, pp 222-223, reports that according to a detailed study of 38 Dutch transports to Auschwitz, about 12% of deportees were children and that the July-August 1942 transports had “the greatest number of children.” This was at the very time that the authorities were explaining the deportations as for labor in Germany! Also, p 223, the history says that children were almost always sent directly to the gas chambers.)

Now, the first three transports from the Netherlands were, according to both Presser and Mechanicus, like those from Belgium, presented as being for work; in the Dutch case, IIRC these early deportations from Westerbork were said specifically to be for labor in Germany and to enhance the picture elderly and sick people were not included. I am not familiar with the details of how the authorities in Belgium presented the early transports to the East. Still, I wonder if “pretext” isn’t a better word than “modus operandi” in that all these transports - Belgian and Dutch - went as normal RSHA transports, no matter how they were presented.

In the first place, as we know from the Wannsee protocol, Goebbels’s diary, and other sources, selections for labor vs death were understood by those carrying out the Final Solution to be an element of the destruction of the Jews - and we know that %’s kept alive vs killed on arrival, as on the surveyed transports, varied.

All these transports included children, and all were subject to ramp selections on arrival at Birkenau, with a % of the deportees consigned for murder in the gas chambers. But also I wonder if there really is a difference in pretext, in that in both the Belgian and Dutch cases, the authorities presented the rationale as labor but in reality sent Jews to the East for selection as part of the Final Solution. What distinction to the Netherlands deportations are you trying to make by calling the Belgian transports Arbeiteinsatz rather than simply RSHA transports?

Thanks, SM
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Balsamo » Tue Jan 27, 2015 4:38 pm

Statistical Mechanic wrote:Balsamo,

I’ve wondered for a while about a post you made in this thread distinguishing the Germans' “modus operandi” with the early transports from Belgium from that of their approach to the initial deportations from the Netherlands - on the ground that, in contrast to the Dutch deportations, the Belgium transports were for “Arbeiteinsatz” or “convocation to work” Can you explain this further in the light of the information below? Specifically, I cannot figure out what, in your view, differentiates the early Belgian transports from typical RSHA transports which were characteristic of deportations during the Final Solution?

For the first three transports from Belgium, I find the following:

Danuta Czech, Auschwitz Chronicle, p 211, 5 August 1942,
998 persons arrive with the first RSHA transport from Malines Camp in Belgium. There are 570 men and boys and 428 women and girls in this transport. After the selection, 426 men, who receive Nos. 54633-56858, and 318 women, who receive Nos. 14784-15101, are admitted to the camp as inmates.

The arithmetic goes as follows: 998 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 744 were admitted to the camp and given numbers, leaving “an excess” of 254 people (25%). In other words, a selection occurred, with 75% of the deportees from Malines being retained for labor or other purposes and, by inference and by definition, 25% murdered in the gas chambers. Correct? Also, the transport contained adults and children (according to the Auschwitz Museum camp history, Auschwitz 1940-1945, v3 p 27, 240, or 14%, of those on this transport were children, hardly appropriate for labor). Correct?

Czech, p 215, 13 August 1942,
999 Jews from Belgium arrive with the second RSHA transport from Malines Camp. There are 407 men and 79 boys and 445 women and 68 girls in the transport. After the selection, 290 men and 228 women are admitted to the camp as inmates and receive Nos. 58226-58515 and 16737-16964. The other deportees are killed in the gas chambers.

In the case of the 2nd Belgian transport from Malines, the arithmetic is as follows: 999 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 518 were admitted to the camp, leaving “an excess” of 419 people (42%). In other words, a selection occurred, with 68% of the deportees from Malines being retained for labor or other purposes and, explicitly, 42% murdered in the gas chambers. Correct? Also, the transport contained adults and children - and by inference all the children were gassed. Correct? This transport differed from the first not in kind (both were “normal” RSHA Final Solution transports - not special labor transports - with selection when they arrived at Birkenau) but in quantity, with the 2nd transport having a significantly higher % killed on arrival.

Czech, p 220, 17 August 1942,
1,000 Jews from the Malines Camp arrive in the third RSHA transport from Belgium, which includes 342 men and 86 boys and 486 women and 86 girls. After the selection, 157 men and 205 women are admitted to the camp as inmates and given Nos. 59344-59500 and 17317-17521. The other 638 people are killed in the gas chambers.

In the case of the 3rd transport from Malines, Belgium, the arithmetic works out as follows: 1,000 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 362 were admitted to the camp, leaving “an excess” of 638 people (64%). In other words, a selection of the arriving Jews was carried out, with 36% of the deportees from Belgium being retained for labor or other purposes and, explicitly, 64% murdered in the gas chambers. Correct? Also, the transport contained adults and children - and by inference all the children were gassed. Correct? This transport differed from the first two not in kind (all were “typical” Final Solution transports undergoing selection on arrival at Birkenau) but in quantity, with the 3rd transport having a substantially higher % killed on arrival than either the 1st or 2nd transport. (The Auschwitz Museum camp history, Auschwitz 1940-1945, v2, p 223, says that overall about 19% of Belgian deportees were children under 16; on the two early transports for which we have comparable data, we see that 16% of the deportees were children, very much in line with the %’s for all 27 transports from Belgium to Auschwitz.)

In the case of the early transports to the East from the Netherlands, we can read the following in Czech:

Czech, p 198, 17 July 1942,
In two transports of the RSHA, 2,000 Jews arrive from Westerbork and Amersfoort camps in Holland. 1,303 men and boys and 697 women and girls arrive. After the selection, 1,251 men and 300 women are admitted to the camp. . . . The other 449 deportees are killed in the gas chambers.

In the case of the 1st Dutch transports from Westerbork (and Amersfoort), the arithmetic is as follows: 2,000 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 1,551 were admitted to the camp, leaving “an excess” of 449 people (22%). In other words, a selection occurred, with 78% of the deportees from the Netherlands being retained for labor or other purposes and, explicitly, 22% murdered in the gas chambers - roughly the same %’s as with the 1st Belgian transport. Correct? Also, as did the 1st Belgian transport, the transport contained adults and children - and by inference all the children were gassed. Correct?

Czech, p 201, 22 July 1942,
931 Jews arrive from the Westerbork Camp in an RSHA transport. After the selection, 479 men and 297 women are admitted to the camp as inmates. . . . The other 155 deportees are killed in the gas chambers.

In the case of the 2nd Dutch transport from Westerbork, the arithmetic is as follows: 931 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 776 were admitted to the camp, leaving “an excess” of 155 people (17%). In other words, a selection occurred, with 83% of the deportees from the Netherlands being retained for labor or other purposes and, explicitly, 17% murdered in the gas chambers - that is, a sharply higher % kept alive on arrival for labor than from the 1st Dutch transports and a higher % than any of the early Belgian transports. Correct? Also, as with the other early transports, the 2nd Dutch transport contained adults and children - and by inference all the children were gassed. Correct?

Czech, p 204, 25 July 1942,
An RSHA transport of 1,000 Jews from Westerbork Camp arrives. In it are 577 men and boys and 427 women and girls. After the selection, 516 men and 293 women are admitted to the camp. . . . The other 191 people are killed in the fas chambers.

In the case of the 3rd Dutch transport from Westerbork, the arithmetic works as follows: 1,000 Jews arrived at Auschwitz and 809 were admitted to the camp, leaving “an excess” of 191 people (19%). In other words, a selection occurred, with 81% of the deportees from the Netherlands being retained for labor or other purposes and, explicitly, 19% murdered in the gas chambers - roughly the same %’s as with the 2nd Dutch transport but still a higher % retained temporarily for labor than with any of the early Belgian transports surveyed here. Correct? Also, as with the other early transports, the 2nd Dutch transport contained adults and children - and by inference all the children were gassed. Correct? (Czech’s data on these transports do not provide a breakdown for % of children included; the Auschwitz Museum history, Auschwitz 1940-1945, v2, pp 222-223, reports that according to a detailed study of 38 Dutch transports to Auschwitz, about 12% of deportees were children and that the July-August 1942 transports had “the greatest number of children.” This was at the very time that the authorities were explaining the deportations as for labor in Germany! Also, p 223, the history says that children were almost always sent directly to the gas chambers.)

Now, the first three transports from the Netherlands were, according to both Presser and Mechanicus, like those from Belgium, presented as being for work; in the Dutch case, IIRC these early deportations from Westerbork were said specifically to be for labor in Germany and to enhance the picture elderly and sick people were not included. I am not familiar with the details of how the authorities in Belgium presented the early transports to the East. Still, I wonder if “pretext” isn’t a better word than “modus operandi” in that all these transports - Belgian and Dutch - went as normal RSHA transports, no matter how they were presented.

In the first place, as we know from the Wannsee protocol, Goebbels’s diary, and other sources, selections for labor vs death were understood by those carrying out the Final Solution to be an element of the destruction of the Jews - and we know that %’s kept alive vs killed on arrival, as on the surveyed transports, varied.

All these transports included children, and all were subject to ramp selections on arrival at Birkenau, with a % of the deportees consigned for murder in the gas chambers. But also I wonder if there really is a difference in pretext, in that in both the Belgian and Dutch cases, the authorities presented the rationale as labor but in reality sent Jews to the East for selection as part of the Final Solution. What distinction to the Netherlands deportations are you trying to make by calling the Belgian transports Arbeiteinsatz rather than simply RSHA transports?

Thanks, SM



Hi Statmec,
You are raising good points which make me suspect some misunderstanding.
To clarify the first point, once the Jews put in the train, their fate is the same: they are handed over to Himmler who makes no distinctions (with maybe the sole exception of Denmark).
The "pretext" is also common to every occupied country. They are supposed to be sent to work or at least to be resettled somewhere in the East. To what degree the military authorities or the collaborators in France knew the reality of their fate is still unclear. What is sure is that since Wannsee, the RSHA had complete control over the Jewish question in the east, in Germany, that is over all Jews from those nationalities, those had to be hand over to the SS, and this was taken as an order by the MBH as well in France as in Belgium.

During the first period (1940-mid42) there are few differences in the Modus operandi, except maybe in the rigour the anti-Jewish measures are implemented.
More fundamentally, while the mission of the "Eichmann's men" were identical, their ability to fulfill their task was different, which will later influence the "Modus operandi" of the Final Solution in those three countries (France, Belgium, Holland).
The most obvious example - but there are many - is the use of local police force. In the Netherlands - turned into a German province - it will be complete and last until liberation. In Belgium, the MBH will forbid the RSHA to use the belgian police by november 42. As an obvious consequence, the way (modus operandi) the RSHA will continue his mission after that day differs greatly from what was going on in the Netherland, with a consequence on effeciency: only 33% of the total of deported Jews would be deported between the end of 42 and liberation, while 66% were rounded up within four months (end of July 42 to october 42). The slowdown is obvious and unfortunately not to be found in the Netherlands where the civil administration was working hand in hand with the SD and the HSSPF Rauter.
In Belgium, the Caserne Dossin was given as a transit-camp, while a huge transit camp was built at Westerbork with a capacity three times more important. The SS also built KZ in the Netherland. There were no obstacles to the implementation of the Final Solution.
I am not going to rewrite what I already did, but this is how my assertion is to be understood.

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Tue Jan 27, 2015 5:41 pm

Balsamo, thanks for quick reply. See comments.

Balsamo wrote:You are raising good points which make me suspect some misunderstanding.

I kind of wondered if I were following . . . !

Balsamo wrote:To clarify the first point, once the Jews put in the train, their fate is the same: they are handed over to Himmler who makes no distinctions (with maybe the sole exception of Denmark).

Ok, I follow that . . .

Balsamo wrote:The "pretext" is also common to every occupied country.

With some differences, e.g., Belgium and France to rid country of "foreign Jews," etc.

Balsamo wrote:They are supposed to be sent to work or at least to be resettled somewhere in the East.

Pretty much universal, agree.

Balsamo wrote:To what degree the military authorities or the collaborators in France knew the reality of their fate is still unclear.

Agree, very true of the Netherlands, Dutch civil servants generally and victims (!) maybe worried, fearful of worst, but definitely without good knowledge. Excellent paper on this by Bart van der Boom, in ten Have, ed., The Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940-1945.

Balsamo wrote:What is sure is that since Wannsee, the RSHA had complete control over the Jewish question in the east, in Germany, that is over all Jews from those nationalities, those had to be hand over to the SS, and this was taken as an order by the MBH as well in France as in Belgium.

During the first period (1940-mid42) there are few differences in the Modus operandi, except maybe in the rigour the anti-Jewish measures are implemented.

But also in the internal dynamics, based on different approaches to occupation, making for RSHA having to deal differently in each country; also even in camouflage and execution, e.g., in the Netherlands families were split up (fiction of healthy and young people sent for labor) whilst in Hungary "camouflage" entailed shipping families off intact (fiction of people work better surrounded by family).

Balsamo wrote:More fundamentally, while the mission of the "Eichmann's men" were identical, their ability to fulfill their task was different, which will later influence the "Modus operandi" of the Final Solution in those three countries (France, Belgium, Holland).

Agree, as noted above!

Balsamo wrote:The most obvious example - but there are many - is the use of local police force. In the Netherlands - turned into a German province - it will be complete and last until liberation. In Belgium, the MBH will forbid the RSHA to use the belgian police by november 42. As an obvious consequence, the way (modus operandi) the RSHA will continue his mission after that day differs greatly from what was going on in the Netherland, with a consequence on effeciency: only 33% of the total of deported Jews would be deported between the end of 42 and liberation, while 66% were rounded up within four months (end of July 42 to october 42). The slowdown is obvious and unfortunately not to be found in the Netherlands where the civil administration was working hand in hand with the SD and the HSSPF Rauter.
In Belgium, the Caserne Dossin was given as a transit-camp, while a huge transit camp was built at Westerbork with a capacity three times more important. The SS also built KZ in the Netherland. There were no obstacles to the implementation of the Final Solution.
I am not going to rewrite what I already did, but this is how my assertion is to be understood.

Got it, and it makes sense. Tying this back to France, the foot-dragging and outright opposition of Vichy led the RSHA to "back off" temporarily and "accept" tactic of removal of just (more accurately, mostly) foreign-born and stateless Jews, which temporary "compromise" tactic David mistakes for policy and end goal.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Balsamo » Thu Jan 29, 2015 11:40 pm

Statistical Mechanic wrote:
Balsamo wrote:I will wait for your Müller’s 1941 order interpretation – you mean the interdiction of emigration, right?.

Yes indeed. I too have thought a lot about this order. It will take a bit of time to reply on that one as I want to weave in something Bloxham said regarding it . . .

Thanks for your comments. Again, I of course agree that the authority structure, as you call it, differed in various countries, and east versus west in general. Still, we have those RSHA men from IV-B-4 in these countries . . . and Luther's office trying to win diplomatic agreements for deportations . . .

Confino's book is the real deal, IMHO.

(Apparently Bob, who has written that
Historiography does not define events known as Holocaust differently - AFAIK they all agree there was a deliberate systematic plan to exterminate Jews –
hasn’t noticed this discussion, not to mention some of the scholars we’ve referred to!)


Any chances for some follow up on this point ?

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Thu Jan 29, 2015 11:53 pm

You mean Müller's October 1941 emigration halt order? LOL, argh, yes, I have a very, very long set of notes on this - I will try editing them up over the next couple of days . . .
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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The Order to Back off

Postby David » Fri Jan 30, 2015 6:00 am

Statistical Mechanic wrote:Tying this back to France, the foot-dragging and outright opposition of Vichy led the RSHA to "back off" temporarily and "accept" tactic of removal of just (more accurately, mostly) foreign-born and stateless Jews, which temporary "compromise" tactic David mistakes for policy and end goal.


My that is a lot of wind trying to explain the fact that
less that 5% of French/Jewish citizens (as defined by the Vichy government)
were deported during 4 years of German occupation.

So when did Hitler issue this hypothetical order to "back off" temporarily and concentrate on Stateless Jews? Do you have a copy of this Hitler Order?


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Re: The Order to Back off

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Fri Jan 30, 2015 12:07 pm

David wrote:My that is a lot of wind trying to explain the fact that less that 5% of French/Jewish citizens (as defined by the Vichy government) were deported during 4 years of German occupation.

Well, well, look who's back and thinking he needn't deal with what's been posted since his last participation in this thread. Same MO as on Treblinka . . . my, my.

David just reverts to what he was saying months ago as though Balsamo and I haven't made a single post in the meantime. Trouble is, we both summed up - to help David understand the evidence and facts he kept tripping over - and, surprise, David's not seen fit even to acknowledge the summaries we posted.

So to help David catch up - and before we start spinning up new posts covering old turf - here are the two summary posts which I made and which David has yet to deal with. First, I listed the factors involved in the changing plans and course of the deportations from France, focusing on two key documents, as described in the post:
In this presentation, two documents have been critical - from July 1942 RF-1223 in which Dannecker and Eichmann restate Himmler's June 1942 order to remove all Jews from France and from April 1944 NO-1411 a directive from Knochen and Brunner reinstating that all Jews in France were to be subject to deportation.

David's response has essentially been that none of the above is relevant because the answer is simple - mostly foreign Jews were deported from France, and that is all one needs to know. As a result, David has ignored the above discussion of goals, negotiations and compromises, parties involved, and how these and other factors shaped actions; repeated, erroneously, that only 5% of French Jews who were citizens were eventually deported; argued that this result speaks for itself; and obsessed on the role of Dannecker and a single, minor document, RF-1221 (which, along with Dannecker's role, David misunderstands).

David has advanced the preposterous argument that the sum total of the German anti-Jewish action in France was to support Vichy in returning foreign Jews to the East, despite many of these Jews not even being from the East and despite key documents (left alone by David) showing German intentions, and tactical compromises in a very different light.

The ineptitude and inconsequentiality of David's argument - with his gyrations about the 5% - are underscored by the fact, which he ignores - that everyone agrees that the Germans deported overwhelmingly foreign-born Jews from France: the critical question - the point of this thread - which David shuns as though it were Black Plague - is why, at the end of the day, the Germans deported mainly the foreign born Jews and how this result came to pass. Which is, on the other hand, exactly what Balsamo and I have been discussing.

Until David replies to the pointed questions asked of him by a number of us, and until he takes into account the documented interactions, which have been well ventilated in this thread, of the Germans and French, I don't see any purpose to this thread continuing - at least the portion in which David has stuck his head in the soil and pretended not to hear how the deportations of Jews from France were agreed, planned, and implemented.

The second part of my summary brought in another key document, RF-1217, and concluded:
By early July, then, the Germans had backed off their initial goal - stated in RF-1217 and RF-1221 - of including citizens and non-citizens in the July Jewish deportations. This compromise was reaffirmed in another note signed by Dannecker (Dannecker minute of 6 July 1942, Paris, referenced in Longerich, Holocaust, p.329)
and
The position that the deportations came at the initiative of the French is untenable in the face of the documents surveyed here; the position that the Germans did not intend, in line with their conception of the final solution, to include all Jews in France in their actions is at variance with the specific plans initially made for the summer 1942 deportations; and the argument that the eventual focus on stateless and foreign-born Jews proves that the French were interested in simply returning Jews to the East flies in the face of the documented negotiations the Germans carried out with the France, the respective positions of German and French negotiators on whom to deport, the long-term goal articulated by the Germans in the paper trail, the eventual identities of those Jews deported, and, outside the scope of this summary, the destinations and fates of the Jews deported from France.

I want to thank David, of course, for his own-goal here, in bringing up the case of France. The documents show that French Jews were not intended by the Germans to be "exempt" from the final solution, as David claimed without evidence; rather, the Germans targeted all Jews in France at the outset, compromised on this target along the way, but were by 1944 reconfirming the broad, all-inclusive scope of their anti-Jewish program in France. What we see in France, as I argued at the very outset, is the extreme and radical program which the final solution represented - along with tactical maneuvering by the Germans taking into account local conditions, politics, diplomacy, and other factors affecting implementation of German goals for the Jews. Whether the argument is the absurdity that nothing more in France was at stake than Vichy's desire to return foreign Jews to the East (David) or the dubious view that western Europe, because the course of the final solution there differed to the final solution in the East, shows the limits of German aims toward the Jews (Balsamo), the case of France underscores that the final solution by 1942 meant the elimination of the Jews from Europe through their mass extermination, which extermination took many forms and was arrived at via different routes.

France from 1942-1944 is not a challenge to the final solution but an important confirmation of it.

David needs to address these two posts, using sources, as they explain why his argument lacks foundation and is dumb; I'm not cycling back to repeat what we've discussed.

I'd also like to see David address Balsamo's posts but will let Balsamo speak for himself.

David wrote:So when did Hitler issue this hypothetical order to "back off" temporarily and concentrate on Stateless Jews? Do you have a copy of this Hitler Order?

This is so sad. David is under the impression, apparently, that Balsamo and I, or some historians, think that Hitler was in charge of implementing the deportations of Jews from Western Europe! LOL. Even after we've discussed the roles of Eichmann's team, the Foreign Office, and the police . . . not to mention Himmler. Well, to remind David, Hitler didn't have a planning or operational role for the deportations of Jews to the East; he entrusted the staging and orchestration of this work to Himmler, who in turn delegated utilized others - those others, as we've described, were expected to implement the policy and resolve impediments, timing, etc issues. As Balsamo and I have discussed at length in this thread.

But wait, there's more. For months, without variance or explanation, David has been intoning "5% of French/Jewish citizens" as though anyone disputes the fact and in the hope that the more times he writes the phrase, the more someone is likely to think he's told us something. David's wishful thinking isn't actually studying the history using inconveniences like documents and other evidence or comparative cases. That's why I reminded David here that he'd "forgotten" to explain how the situation in France compared to what happened in other western European countries, starting with the Netherlands:
Statistical Mechanic wrote:
Statistical Mechanic wrote:. . . Instead of hand-waving the problems away, please tell us why the death tolls in France, the Netherlands, and Slovakia differed. You can include Belgium and Italy, even the Scandinavian countries. I've told you why I think death tolls differed. It's your turn. . . .

I don't recall where David answered this. As we've seen, he ran out of BS on France. So let's move on now and let's talk about the Netherlands, for starters, where about 75% of Jews were deported in contrast to the 25%-ish taken out of France to camps in the East. David, anyone: tell us about this.

A comparative discussion would expose further the dishonest crap David's been peddling by repeating, like a prayer, "5%" and trying to make believe that this partial result explains German goals and the entire course of the deportations from France.

Again, as I've show citing documents, the Germans sought to deport all French Jews, Vichy cooperated but only so far, the situation in France led the Germans to start with the foreign-born and stateless Jews living in France, the round-ups and deportations thus focused on the foreign-born and stateless Jews, and by 1944 German documents show that the Germans were trying to get back to the full goal of deporting all Jews from France. Pretty much as they tried to deport all the Jews from the Netherlands . . . David's turn.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Sat Jan 31, 2015 1:41 pm

Sorry, David, it strikes me that what I posted above may be too difficult for you for your level of knowledge and reading skills.

So let's do this in baby steps.

The Germans planned the deportations from the Netherlands, Belgium, and France together. Yet, very approximately, the result by war's end was as follows:

Netherlands: 71% of resident Jews didn't survive the war
Belgium: 44% of resident Jews didn't survive the war
France: 22% of resident Jews didn't survive the war

Orchestrated plan, different results. How come?

source: Braber, This Cannot Happen Here, p 12; we could throw in Italy, where 17% of the Jews residing in the country at the outset of the war didn't survive, p 121
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Sat Jan 31, 2015 3:15 pm

Balsamo - long post on Müller stop order in this new thread (sorry for the length, I think it's an important issue . . . over to you!)
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Wed Feb 04, 2015 1:49 pm

Ok, David, let's start even more simply: why were 107,000-ish Jews deported from the Netherlands by the Germans, where were they taken, and how do you know?
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Fri Apr 17, 2015 11:19 pm

In the thread above, I've alluded to the point that the deportations of summer 1942, focusing on stateless and foreign-born Jews living in France, were the beginning of a broader program and what was practical, for a variety of reasons, at that time. I argued against the baffling claims made by David that the Germans' program was intended to, when practical, encompass French as well as foreign Jews. Recently I came across Nuremberg document RF-1234 (IMT Blue Series, vol XXXIX, pp 6-8); this is a note from Röthke (Dannecker's replacement as Jewish adviser to HSSPF Oberg with dual reporting to Eichmann) and Danneker himself to Jean Leguay (second in command in the French police) from 13 August 1942.

The Röthke/Dannecker note informs Knochen, who reported to HSSPF Oberg, that Leguay
was told that we have no cause to doubt the fulfillment of promises made by Laval in the presence of Bousquet, during the meeting with the BdS. It was made very clear to Laval on that occasion that this was a definitive action, the last phase of which would also include Jews of French nationality.

This statement is clear and, to borrow a word, "definitive," an explicit repudiation as it were of David's fantasy. The express goal of the Germans in France was to deport Jews from France, including "Jews of French nationality." No amount of cherry-picking and muddying of waters alters the documentary trail outlined in this thread.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Balsamo » Tue May 12, 2015 5:19 pm

Hi Statmec,

Is the document available online?

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Tue May 12, 2015 6:41 pm

Balsamo wrote:Hi Statmec,

Is the document available online?

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/ ... -XXXIX.pdf

The exact quotation is on pp 7-8. My German being rudimentary at best I posted translation I found in Marrus & Paxton.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Thu May 28, 2015 1:09 pm

On Bloxham and the European-wide scope of the Final Solution: Goebbels' diary comment on Himmler's 2nd Posen speech
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Fri May 29, 2015 1:54 am

Balsamo wrote:. . . - Why was Himmler so convinced that the problem would be solved by the end of 1943? Especially when one considers the case of France.

By the october 1943, on can estimate that less than a quarter of the Jews of France have been deported, and even more strangely, there is even a kind of deceleration of the number convoys following the speech. 2 in October 43, 1 in November, 2 in December 43. This trend continue in 1944, with 1 or 2 convoy each month (except 3 in May 44).

In the case of Belgium, there will be no transport at all between September (EDIT) 43 and January 44. And then "only" 2500 Jews will be deported in 1944, in 5 small convoys.

It still shows the existence of priorities, if cone compares those western deportation with the frenzy and the efficiency which the Hungarian Jews will be deported with.

Final solution in France, high level time line, late 1942-1943:

In mid-1942 Dannecker projected 100,000 Jews would be deported in 1942 alone. Even with the massive July actions, the year’s total came to just 42,000, not even half of the goal set out by Dannecker. Röthke predicted that the 270,000 Jews remaining in France at the end of 1942 would be deported during 1943. (Röthke report, 21 July 1943, CDJC I-54, in Steinberg, Autorités, p 149; the actual number was not even 20,000!)

Marrus & Paxton (p 260) discuss the stoppage of transports from France in fall 1942 hypothesizing that either the number of Jews “deportable” by Vichy’s consent or interruptions in railway availability caused the stoppage, which lasted pretty much until February 1943. The former explanation may be correct as Jackson (p 218) explains that Röthke wanted to press deportations through this period, but “Knochen and Oberg were willing to take account of Laval’s difficulties.”

It was in early September 1942 that Laval requested, due to pressure from the church, that Oberg relent in requiring the French to keep rounding up Jews. Discussions between the French and Germans over changing the citizenship law (to make more Jews eligible for deportation as Vichy had agreed to deportation of non-French Jews from France - ensued, with the Germans pushing to revoke citizenship granted after 1927 and Vichy proposing a 1933 cut-off. As discussions took place, Röthke was complaining that the French were not keeping to commitments to deport non-French Jews in the Vichy zone.

On 26 September 1942, Knochen reported to IV B 4 explaining that the effort had been made
to deport Jews who are French citizens . . . the French authorities resisted, and the matter was discussed at the highest levels. Oberg had accepted the French position, and the RFSS accepted his recommendation not to exert pressure on this matter because Pétain’s position was uncompromising. This being the case, we have no choice but to satisfy ourselves with deporting Jews of other citizenships, which requires coordination with their governments. I request, he concluded, that the foreign ministry take care of the matter.
(Lozowick, p 214, TR.3-270)

Of course, the Germans occupied almost all of the southern zone in late fall, and they pressed forward with the Final Solution. By late January they were ready to resume deportations. According to Marrus & Paxton (p 232), writing about a meeting between Knochen and Laval on 12 February 1943,
Knochen came away from [the meeting] convinced that the French premier would ‘swallow’ a complete Endlösung – the wholesale removal of all Jews from France, French citizens included – if he thought that he could thereby win political concessions for the rest of the French people. Knochen knew Laval well . . .
But the round-ups proceeded slowly, as Jews by this point were aware of what being arrested meant and many went into hiding and/or were assisted by sympathetic Frenchmen and organizations and also by the Italians. And in February 1943, during large-scale operations in the south, as Knochen reported to Müller, the French police chief Bousquet informed the Germans that French police would not cooperate if arrested French Jews were deported.

The deportations could not therefore continue at pace,
Only twice more during the entire war did the Germans manage to send three or more trains in a single month. . . . The French position prevented this. In a conversation between them, Eichmann demanded of, or notified, Knochen that Jews of French citizenship should be deported. Knochen responded by applying to Eichmann’s commander, Müller, in order to explain to him what Eichmann apparently refused to understand. First of all, the French. Pétain at the head, he said, opposed deporting Jews who were French citizens. . . . Second, the direction the war was taking was encouraging the French to toughen their position. . . . Third, the Italians opposed deportation of the Jews, and were dragging the French along with them; in any case, so long as the Italian zone of occupation was safe Jews would continue to stream there to escape deportation.
(Lozowick, p 216) Collaboration between French and Germans wasn’t close, and the Italians “took an entirely independent line.” Röthke was aware of the Italian stance as early as 21 August 1942 when
he complained to the German embassy in Paris that the Italians were trying to protect their Jewish citizens against all German measures.
(Lozowick, p 217). From then on, German police had to conduct round-ups on their own (Jackson, p 361). The Italian Jewish liaison, Lospinoso, was sent to coordinate with the Germans, and he stalled and offered Italian protection to endangered Jews in the south of France.

In March the Germans demanded that Vichy revoke the citizenship of naturalized Jews (1927 and after) in order to make numbers to fill the deportation trains now available to carry Jews to Poland. On 23 March Pétain ordered French police not to participate in the deportations - and Bousquet offered to help arrest only foreign Jews.
Hagen summoned Leguay to Oberg’s headquarters , and the conversation repeated itself. Leguay announced that the French police would not cooperate with the deportation of French Jews. Hagen expressed his astonishment – they’re only Jews, after all, he exclaimed. He also noted the importance that Hitler attached to the deportations, which he emphasized in his speeches. . .
(Lozowick, p 227)
Knochen returned to Paris and Röthke placed on his desk a long and detailed memorandum. . . . The last Jew should be removed from France before the end of the war, he maintained. No French leader should have any say in this. The Führer’s will should be the only determining factor, and he had made himself clear in his recent speeches. Deportation was important because French Jewry was still strong and was behind the Communists, the terrorists, the Gaulists and the other enemies of the Reich. The most effective war against all these elements was the war against the Jews. . . . In conclusion, Röthke proposed forcing the French police to cooperate.
(Lozowick, p 227)

In April the French finally produced a citizenship revocation draft; needing Pétain’s approval, the Germans were optimistic - and even about a 1927 cut-off. By June, no law yet promulgated, Röthke put a plan of action together for deportations of Jews whose citizenship would be revoked. About this time Alois Brunner arrived in France to take a lead in roundups and deportations. But on 15 July, Röthke was meeting with French still pressing for passage of citizenship law. The Germans notified the Security Police in Brussels of approval to deport Jews with French citizenship to
accustom the French authorities to the deportation of their citizens.
(Lozowick, p 229, TR.3-1522).

Also, important during this period, with Vichy holding back police support for the roundups, when Röthke demanded 250 Security Police officers from IV B 4 in Berlin – to assist roundup slated for July and to include Jews to be denaturalized – Müller replied that the men were not available and that Brunner and 3 others were it (Lozowick, p 229; see also Jackson, p 362 where it is noted that Röthke’s request was for French-speaking Gestapo officers). In summer 1943 the Germans assumed control of Drancy, putting Alois Brunner in charge (Jackson, p 361, Marrus & Paxton, p 330); regular convoys - but at a reduced pace - would depart France from this point on. (Marrus & Paxton, p 329)
To fill these trains, the Germans gradually abandoned all their earlier limitations. Former prisoners of war, foreign volunteers for the French armed forces, members of the Legion of Honor, UGIF personnel – all of these categories, which at one time or another the Vichy regime had attempted to hold back, could now be taken away.
Even so, due to lack of French police cooperation, Röthke was unable to conduct the major roundup planned for Paris in July. (Jackson, p 229)

By 3 August Röthke was aware that no French citizenship law was forthcoming and he requested help from the German embassy; Leguay confirmed (to Hagen) that the requested law was doubtful. Furthermore, in a 7 August meeting of Knochen and Hagen with Laval, Laval refused the German demands; the German police officers were furious with Laval, Röthke noting that “impertinence is becoming a method”! (Lozowick, p 230) On 14 August 1943 there was a meeting of Laval with Röthke who
reminded him of his past promises. ‘The Führer’s order concerning the "Final Solution” of the Jewish question in all of Europe was crystal clear.'
(CDJC: XXVII-36, in Steinberg, Autorités, p 151) Röthke reported that, in the light of the denaturalization dust-up,
the French government no longer wants to go along with us on the Jewish question.
(Marrus & Paxton, p 329) Knochen informed Bousquet about this time that the Germans will proceed on their own. (Marrus & Paxton, p 326)

Per Marrus & Paxton (p 326), why the change in Vichy’s stance? Pressure from the Pope on denaturalizations, Stalingrad in early 1943, Allied landing in North Africa, German withdrawal from Tunisia in May, Soviet advances Kursk and Orel in July, Allied invasion of Sicily in July – per Knochen, listing some of these events, Marrus & Paxton (p 327) also cite prefects’ reports reflecting strongly negative French reactions to roundups and deportations.

On 19 August 1943, relative to the delayed new citizenship law,
Röthke visited the offices of the Commissar for Jewish Affairs and announced that since Pétain was procrastinating on signing the law, the Germans were preparing to deport masses of Jews without consideration of their citizenship.
(Lozowick, p 231, citation to Klarsfeld)
In August [Röthke] reported: ‘It is no longer possible to count on the assistance of the French police on a significant scale for the arrests of Jews.’
(Jackson, p 229; reflecting reactions to the STO, growth of maquis, and changes in French public opinion)
German evaluations of the French police first became seriously negative. On 19 August, Oberg submitted a long report on the French police. Today, he concluded, the French police could not be counted on ‘in case of emergency’ to intervene in any significant numbers for the defense of German interests. He conceded that the French police provided ‘indispensable’ (unentbehrliche) cooperation against the Communists but lacked initiative in the ‘struggle against Judaism.’ . . . Bousquet, he said, gave ‘his primary allegiance to France.’
(Marrus & Paxton, pp 322-323)

By September 1943, the month before Himmler’s Posen speech, Röthke and Hagen assumed, as the Wehrmacht took over Italian zone, that successful deportations could be undertaken; their plan was to comb the area for Jews and provide bounties to locals; Brunner was in charge of these operations – and all Jews caught were to be shipped to camps, sorting them there to meet any French objections on citizenship. Knochen and Röthke became less critical, as the brutality and near lawlessness escalated, and “Alois Brunner and his thugs took their place.” Manhunts ensued. (Lozowick, p 231).
Now that the Germans were carrying out most arrests, the distinction between French and foreign Jews no longer counted. . . . The biggest operation occurred in the autumn in Nice to which 30,000 Jews had fled while the city was occupied by the Italians. When the Italians signed an armistice, Brunner moved in [and] the Germans hunted all the Jews they could find.
Which was only 1,800 – far short of the targeted 25,000. (Jackson, p 361; see also Marrus & Paxton, pp 320-321) By 21 September 1943, Laval instructed regional prefects to protest against arrests of Jewish French citizens but not to interfere with German roundups of foreign Jews. (Marrus & Paxton, p 330)

A German report of September 1943 showed that only 24,000 Jews had been naturalized between 1927 and 1933 - far short of the Germans' prior estimates. Also, 1000s of these not available for deportation – due to their having citizenship issues and other issues.
There were hardly enough for the Germans to make the effort. . . . Röthke [had earlier] reported to his SS colleague in Brussels that, despite the difficulties over denaturalizations, French Jews were being deported anyway. French citizenship, he said, no longer provided protection. The Judenreferat urged that French Jews living in other Nazi-held territory be sent to the east without further ado.
(Röthke to Ehlers, 15 July 1943 CDJC: XXVII-31, in Steinberg, Autorités, p 149, Marrus & Paxton, p 339)

As a result of all this, during 1943 the Germans deported 17,069 Jews from France. (Jackson, p 360) Deportations continued through 1944 - with the total number Jews deported in 1943-1944 coming to 33,500, which was a figure almost 10,000 less than in 1942 alone, when the French police had participated. (Marrus & Paxton, pp 335-336)

Comment:

Throughout this time line, it is clear that the German intent and will to deport the Jews from France existed and that many efforts were made to expand the scope and increase the pace of the roundups of Jews and the transports of arrested Jews to the east.

That the pace of deportations slowed in 1943, already rendering null the RFSS's statement at Posen that the Final Solution would be completed by the end of 1943, was due to limiting factors, not a low priority assigned the Final Solution in France by that point, not to some sort of exemption of France, and not to the conviction on the part of German leaders that is wasn't necessary to push through to complete the Final Solution in western Europe.

The limiting factors were Vichy’s political and legal framework (which made foreign Jews available for deportation but not French citizens), the refusal of Vichy finally to revoke citizenship of naturalized Jews, government and popular attitudes and eventual lack of cooperation of the French in the overall deportation scheme, withdrawal of the support (so crucial to 1942’s big raids) of the French police, Jewish resistance (flight and hiding), Italian and French protection of Jews, and the course of the war, which gave Vichy strong reasons not to accede to German demands relative to the Final Solution. We can also see that, due to these factors, throughout late 1942 and 1943, German plans and expectations were frequently unmet in France. In this light, Himmler's Posen promise was unrealistic, one of a number of unrealistic assessments and statements made by officials of the Third Reich during the war.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Mon Jun 01, 2015 11:09 am

Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Balsamo » Thu Jun 04, 2015 12:45 am

Hi StatMec,
Not that I am ignoring your last posts, but I decided to finally get Brayard work which is traveling across the ocean right now.

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Fri Jun 05, 2015 12:24 pm

Wachsmann's coverage (KL, pp 295-307) of the development of the Final Solution, with special attention to KL Auschwitz, is interesting - hardly earth-shattering, but clarifying as to how Wachsmann sees the western component of the Final Solution playing out during 1942:

1) January 1942 represented a change in SS thinking - Wachsmann connects Wannsee (20 January) and a telex which Himmler sent to Glücks (25 January) on 150,000 German Jews - 50,000 of them women - to be sent to KLs, for labor, in place of Soviet POWs - with the failure of the Soviet POW-labor program (incapacity and uncontrolled mortality among Soviet POWs), Himmler substituted Jews for POWs; to an extent, this spelled a changed role for the KLs in the light of Wannsee.

2) The decision to send 150,000 Jews to the KLs was "impulsive" on Himmler’s part and accompanied by a Hitler rant about "total annihilation" of the Jews if "they don't go voluntarily" to the east. Contrary to Mills at AHF (Hotel Majestic thread), Heydrich was briefed and in the know - Himmler’s office diary at this time recorded a call the RFSS had with Heydrich (“Jews into the KL”). (Mills wrote at AHF: "Heydrich seems to have had no connection with the sending of Jews to Auschwitz." Mills is flat-out wrong, as he was on the France deportation program.)

3) Himmler's telex to Glücks promised more than could be delivered (reminiscent of his promises at Posen in 1944!) - and it was two months before the labor transports got underway (which would be April) but in a different way than conceived in January.

4) His decision to use German Jews in KLs for labor not working out, Himmler shifted to Slovakian and western European Jews as substitutes for Soviet POWs. By March 1942, not just Slovakian and western European Jews (to Auschwitz) were now replacing the intended German Jews but Polish Jews were to be sent to KL Lublin for labor; as argued in the AHF thread, transports of Jews from the Reich resumed in March - but not to Auschwitz.

5) "The new role of Auschwitz prompted the SS authorities to take two major initiatives toward the end of February 1942," namely, location of the new, large crematorium to Birkenau (to deal with corpses of Jews dying in the ”annihilation through labor" program) and preparation for influx of women, per the January order by Himmler.

6) "Systematic" deportations of Jews to Auschwitz began, with the RSHA transport of 999 Slovakian women in late March; Wachsmann links the first transport from France (the 27 March transport) to this, not mentioning its reprisal context. Wachsmann’s focus is on annihilating labor at this point.

7) By June 1942 there had been 16 RSHA transports bringing 16,000 Jewish prisoners to Auschwitz, far short of Himmler's 150,000 target and revealing how much his original thinking fell apart; at this point the deportees were still marked for labor - none to be killed on arrival.

8) But Wachsmann argues that labor, in the harsh conditions of Auschwitz, meant death for most of those deported to the camp that spring: "The reality turned out very differently. Even if Auschwitz was not yet a full-fledged death camp, it was already deadly for Jews." About 2/3 of those arriving in spring-summer '42 died within 8 weeks. Also, the first selections, for gassing, of weak/sick/unfit prisoners from within the camp’s population took place in May 1942.

9) Key steps occurring during spring '42 thus included a) the start of RSHA transports in March, as above; b) as we said Auschwitz becoming regional killing center for unfit Upper Silesian Jews parallel to killing of unfit Jews in Warthegau (already in June some Silesian localities were to declare themselves “Jew free”), c) the transformation of the camp at Birkenau (little red and little white house).The readying of Auschwitz-Birkenau for its role in the Final Solution took months, during spring-summer 1942.

10) There were two key elements of the Final Solution by this time: “immediate extermination and murderous forced labor.” Deniers always fail to grasp this simple point, which was also made in the Wannsee protocol.

11) Wachsmann makes a lot of Eichmann’s frequent visits to Auschwitz spring ’42 and coordination on numbers and timing of arrivals with Höss; ditto Pohl whose first visit to Auschwitz came in April ’42 amidst frequent meetings he was having with Himmler: “he was no doubt in the picture about the general plans of Nazi leaders, who were finalizing the outline of their pan-European extermination program.” Note that Wachsmann conceives the coordination that spring at continental, not Polish-centered, even though Auschwitz also emerged as a regional extermination site for Silesian Jews during this period.

12) Bunker I (little red house) was put in operation “probably mid or late May”; “Birkenau was designated [at this time] as the new center for mass extermination in the Auschwitz complex,” replacing the gas chamber in the main camp.

< pause, deep breaths >

13) Wachsmann makes the pivotal 11 June 1942 Eichmann-led meeting at RSHA in Berlin . . . well, pivotal, planning for a formal and systematic deportation program from western Europe to commence in July 1942 - I summarized this meeting (which Mills tried moving to March) in discussion in the AHF Hotel Majestic thread of RF-1217; there is nothing different in Wachsmann’s account to what was said there, including that most of the Jews sent east would be slave laborers. As I told Mills, Wachsmann also stresses that Himmler “made a crucial exception: the transports that were to commence in mid-July could also include a smaller proportion of Jews - some ten percent - who were unfit for work. Their fate was clear to Eichmann and the other SS managers. They would be murdered on arrival.” Exactly as discussed in the AHF thread: a new layer and new context, slave labor continuing but new dimensions in play. In Wachsmann's view, the deportations of March were not solely about labor (they were about annihilation through labor); the formal program to start in July was about labor, annihilation through labor - and straight-out murder.

14. Now Wachsmann’s account thrashes Mills’ view as outlined in the Hotel Majestic thread: for Wachsmann what was going on during these months concerned getting Auschwitz “ready to play a major part in the Holocaust” (it was ready by June-July 1942), adding to its labor-camp function that it was to “become a sizable death camp,” the infrastructure built and proven out with the earlier gassings of Soviet commissars and then the Silesian action; June saw activity focused on Zyklon B provision and face to face meetings between Glücks and Höss, Glücks coming to Auschwitz 16 June 1942 (Wachsmann notes that the camp death rate among Jewish prisoners “shot up” after this visit); also in June the white house (bunker II) was being made into a gas chamber at Birkenau, “almost certainly as a result of the recent decision to make Auschwitz a European death camp.” (Bunker II joined the little red house going into operation in late June or early July, to handle the western European wave planned 11 June in Berlin.)

15. Höss was at WVHA headquarters on 25 June as part of preparation for the new deportation program to begin the next month.

16. (I like this next point as I had kicked myself for writing in the AHF Majestic thread that the transports to and gassings at Auschwitz at this time were “sporadic” . . . ) The major deportation program began as planned in July; “In previous months, mass transports of Jews had still been sporadic.” Aha! The program that started in July included the first ramp selections (gas or labor) and involved large numbers - 60,000 Jews arriving at Auschwitz in July-August. (Only about 20% of arriving Jews were selected for labor during fall 1942.) RSHA and Eichmann pressed authorities in France, the Netherlands, and Belgium for acceleration. Regular transports rolled to Auschwitz from the Greater Reich starting starting in fall ’42, via Theresienstadt and from Berlin. And so on, with Auschwitz remaining "a junior partner" in the FS for some time, including for forced labor and, for extermination, the main thrust of genocide in '42 occurring elsewhere, in the Einsatz Reinhard camps during 1942, by year’s end only 300,000 Jews alive in the General-Gouvernement.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Fri Jun 05, 2015 12:48 pm

But wait! There's more!

I also consulted Longerich, Himmler bio. On p 559 Longerich goes through Himmler's telex to Glücks sent late January 1942, referenced above: "In fact, during the following months tens of thousands of Jews were deported to the district of Lublin," where the work capable were assigned to slave labor in Majdanek and other camps (Longerich goes into more detail on this, describing an Eichmann program to do these deportations as of March 1942, p 562); OTOH it was Slovakian, not German Jews, who were sent at this time to Auschwitz. Wachsmann mirrors this coverage, showing how the January snap decision failed to work as planned.

Blatman, in the introduction to his book on the death marches, also deals with Himmler's telex to Glücks, describing it as helping establish the framework for the Final Solution: murder as the central goal with labor considerations taken into account as economic needs dictated; this is a bit different to how Wachsmann has it; the important point seems to be that in January (following the December conferences and just after Wannsee) there was integration of the KLs into the Final Solution; recall too that Pohl was installed in spring 1942 and oversaw a changeover of KL management (p 36).

Another significant point is the introduction of the yellow star in France, planning for which dates from before and then around the time of, er, Heydrich's visit to France in early May 1942:
The decision to impose an identifying badge reached Western Europe from Berlin. The RSHA considered this a necessary condition for the beginning of deportations, making it more difficult for Jews to evade arrest. . . . Dannecker heard about it when he visited Berlin in March 1942. The badge under discussion was a Jewish star, which would be instituted in Belgium and Holland as well.
(Lozowick, p 190) In early May Abetz in France signed on, in discussion with Knochen. Zeitschel followed up for Abetz the next day, writing to Dannecker urging haste – but Dannecker slowed things down so that they were properly prepared. “The regulations themselves were issued over the signature of the military governor on May 28, to take force June 7.” (Lozowick, p 191)

Mills in the Majestic thread tried to make of Heydrich if not a cypher, then a daydreamer whose mind wandered to the far-away vistas of the wild east, the White Sea, and new frontiers; in fact, relevant to the point of the thread, Heydrich was in on gas van planning (gas vans specifically mentioned by Bargatzky), in on "Jews into the KL," in on Einsatz Reinhard per Mills' star witness Eichmann, in on the March planning for deportations from France (meeting with Dannecker per Lozowick), and in on the plans for the July deportations (meeting on that with Bousquet during the very trip to Paris in question).

Also very important: 5 days after Himmler had telephoned Heydrich in January 1942 on the topic of “Jews into the KL,” and Himmler had ordered 150,000 Reich Jews into the KLs for labor, on 30 January 1942, Heydrich met with Himmler. The following day Eichmann was to notify all Gestapo stations by express letter that the "evacuations" of the Jews to the east were "the beginning of the final solution to the Jewish question." (Gerwarth, Heydrich bio, p 260; this came less than two weeks after Wannsee.)

To add to Wachsmann's argument that by March the “Reich Jews into KLs for labor program” was already defunct: at a conference at Gestapo headquarters in Berlin on 9 March Eichmann “explained that over the course of the next few months 55,000 Jews would be deported from the Reich and the Protectorate to a number of ghettos in the Lublin district” and that the older Jews would be sent to Theresienstadt. (Gerwarth, p 260) Heydrich conferred with Himmler 11-13 March on progress in the final solution. Lublin was cleared starting 16 March, with mass shootings in the ghetto and the remaining Jews (30,000) gassed at Bełzec. The Reich Jews were sent into ghettos near Lublin – Izbica, Piaska, Zamosc and Trawniki – where mortality was extremely high; in May surviving Reich Jews in Lodz were shipped to Chelmno and gassed (4-15 May). The Slovakian action at Auschwitz took place during April; “In France, from where 1,000 Jewish hostages were deported to Auschwitz on 30 March in retaliation for bombing attacks by the French Resistance, Heydrich pressed his Jewish expert, Theodor Dannecker, to step up the pace. . . ." (p 261) Dannecker recorded Heydrich’s determination to have ‘further Jews deported in the course of 1942.” [citation: note of 10 March 1942, in Klarsfeld, 374f, referencing the additional 5,000 Jews who would be deported in June; further discussion of these numbers is on p 274]

Gerwarth continues: During March, the little red house was converted to a gas chamber where unfit Jews were gassed later that spring; by May, Sobibór was operational, Bełzec was being expanded, construction on Treblinka began, and the second wave of Einsatzgruppen mass killings began. (p 262)

Heydrich and Himmler met seven times between 23 April and 3 May. No records of these meetings survived. In March Dannecker was to write Knochen that the French deportations would be, in Gerwarth’s words, “far more extensive . . . the following year.” [citing Klarsfeld, doc 28]

I know there's a lot here - I'm more or less dropping it for future reference when Balsamo returns to the topic.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Jeff_36 » Fri Jun 05, 2015 3:11 pm

Himmler's telex to Glücks sent late January 1942, referenced above: "In fact, during the following months tens of thousands of Jews were deported to the district of Lublin," where the work capable were assigned to slave labor in Majdanek and other camps


That's very interesting

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Fri Jun 05, 2015 4:37 pm

Jeff_36 wrote:
Himmler's telex to Glücks sent late January 1942, referenced above: "In fact, during the following months tens of thousands of Jews were deported to the district of Lublin," where the work capable were assigned to slave labor in Majdanek and other camps


That's very interesting

For KL Lublin, the figures for Jewish population in the camp are as follows - and show fewer headed for labor at KL Lublin and other camps than into the various ghettos/transit sites/etc in Lublin district:

16 January 1942 - 210
3 February 1942 - 0
22 April 1942 - 5,847
20 May 1942 - 11,464
30 June 1942 - 9,779 (about 95% of the camp's inmates)

The Jewish population of Majdanek would not reach 10,000 again until 5 May 1943 when it was reported at 12,822 (the peak came ten days later - 17,527; there is a report for mid-June - 15,421 - and then, following Erntefest the December 1943 report is 0, although there were still 600 Jews in the camp at the time who were formally registered elsewhere - the women in the Flugplatz camp, the men at Lipowa street camp).

The data are incomplete because, as at Auschwitz some (although a far greater number and lower proportion) of the Jews sent to KL Lublin were not registered but gassed straightaway. Additionally, Jews who were sent to the DAW, Ostindustrie, and Bekleidngswerke factories as well as to construction projects were not listed in the above reported figures even though they were processed through KL Lublin. Some number of Jews also were sent directly to Lipowa Street and the airfield (Flugplatz). Kranz estimates 4,000 additional Jews in these categories.

The 74,000 Jews passing through KL Lublin break down as follows:

Poland: 56,500 (not quite half of these from Lublin district)
Slovakia: 8,500
Protectorate: 3,000
France, the Netherlands, Greece: 2,000
Others: 1,000

A snapshot of the camp's population for 23 July 1943, a year after the period under discussion, has 3,221 Polish Jews in the camp, 883 Jews from Slovakia, 449 from Greece, and 166 Czech, French, Lithuanian, German, Dutch, and Serbian Jews.

from Kranz, The Extermination of Jews at Majdanek Concentration Camp, pp 26-31

For this period (through late June 1942) I’ve constructed a summary of transports to the General-Gouvernement from central and western Europe, each train carrying about 1,000 Jews (this summary is probably incomplete but it is suggestive of what Longerich was getting at). It shows

- 14 trains to Durchgangsghetto Izbica in Lublin district, southeast of Lublin city
- 4 trains to Piaski, near Izbica
- 1 train to Rejowiec, near Izbica and Piaski
- 1 train to Krasnystaw, near Rejowiec
- 1 train to Wlodowa, northeast of Lublin
- 3 trains to Zamosc, which lies south of Izbica
- 1 train to Kraśniczyn, to the west of Izbica
- 1 train to Belzyce - southwest of Lublin
- 2 trains to Lublin city
- 4 trains to Warsaw ghetto
- 1 train to Ujazdow, near Zamosc
- 1 train to unspecific location in the G-G
- 8 trains direct to Sobibòr

(Most Jews on these transports were subsequently taken to one of the Einsatz Reinhard camps for gassing; some went to the Lublin area camps, including Majdanek, as slave laborers - e.g., the action of 14 May 1942 sent many Czech Jews from Izbica to Sobibór and fit Jews from Izbica to Majdanek. There were 8 deportation actions from Izbica from March 1942 to April 1943 sending most victims to Sobibór or Bełzec.)
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Jeff_36 » Sat Jun 06, 2015 2:40 am

That telex deserves to be included in the chain of evidence proving the Judeocide in my opinion.

Other documents worth including: Globuses mention of gasoline needed for "processing shipments from abroad" LOL

The Brack document that he authenticated on trail and the Boehler doc discovered by Gerlach.

The Antipartisan report 51.

The Aumier Document contrasing anti=polish with anti-Jewish mesures.

The Vendel Report

The Decimation Documents from Lwow.

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:24 am

Statistical Mechanic wrote:I also want to focus on the phrase you used, which I agree with (although I might use the verb "will crystallize"):
initiatives motivated by opportunies and legitimation, which will develop into a policy (or policies).

That is, at some point the phase of individual initiatives, probing, proofs of concept, daring overreaching and affirmation, etc comes to an end - and crystallizes into a policy with programs in support of it. This leads to an answer to this implied question:
Balsamo wrote:So to put what I just said in the perspective of your – a little hard to understand- following sentence:
“Solution and implementation, goal and tactics, policy and plans: these are sometimes, IMHO, confused, and even by Longerich. Politics and diplomacy, both being the art of the possible, I find most of the "conflictual" evidence to lie on the plane of implementation, tactics, plans, and progress - not solution, goal, or policy. France, in fact, is a good case study for this. I am aware (at last) of Bloxham's counter argument but not convinced of it (Confino's Corfu example being just a small sample of why).”

What I was trying to get at with this was that even Longerich's late dating of the crystallization (May-ish 1942) seems to confuse the necessary implementation twists and turns, logistical challenges and tactical solutions, the short-term planning in support of the final solution, as a policy (or even set of policies), with the policy itself. The implementation hesitations and compromises, leaps ahead, pauses - including the obstacles of bottlenecks, workload, logistics, and so on - appear as "conflictual evidence" and even a "not yet crystallized" policy.

So, in a number of posts I've tried making a distinction between a state policy (Longerich's Judenpolitik, in the case of Jewish policy in the Third Reich) and a plan for the FS. As above. This distinction is not trivial, and is not merely linguistics. A plan suggests roles, timetables, requirements and obligations, costs and resources, activity outlines, technical and operational needs, and so on - a structured scheme to get a policy implemented. OTOH a policy is higher level - it's briefer, it is more generic, it is meant to inform plans - and plans should conform to policy goals. A policy should be short on details and, in keeping with the intended goals, enable flexible planning and implementation decisions. A policy is something like "get the Jews out of Europe" or "make Europe judenrein" - and even "by working them to death, starving them, murdering them, driving them out, getting completely rid of them - anything goes"; a plan, however, concerns how to execute the policy, and making choices about means, roles, tactics, and so on, as above.

Deniers, like Maryzilla, have been known to reduce the Holocaust to six/gas/plan - that is, to define (and deny) the Holocaust by three key elements: 6 million Jewish victims, the use of gas chambers, and a master plan to murder all the European Jews.

To be clear, this is not my definition of the Holocaust. I have a different view of how the extermination of the Jews came about and occurred, in line with what I've tried explaining in this and other threads. In particular, I don't think the Germans had a plan, spelling out at a technical, operational, and detail level how Jews across Europe were to be done away with. Here, however, rather than re-assess the denier proposition in full, and rather than say yet more on how I think the Holocaust took place, I want to drill down on the last element - the existence of a basic or master plan - and a statement that Raul Hilberg made on this issue.

Now, before quoting from Hilberg, one more point: deniers have a corollary to simplistic definitions like six/gas/plan, turning their claim into a strawman. You see, according to deniers "a master plan" is supposedly a core component of an "official" story. And, according to deniers, historians have their knickers in a twist because they are unable to defend "the master plan" plank of Holocaust belief in the face of the revisionist critique.

But it is not just me - and the current generation of historians - who don't conceive the Final Solution, let alone the Holocaust, in terms of the unfolding of a pre-determined German master plan. Here's where Raul Hilberg comes in: "The Germans did not have a basic plan, but their actions fell into a basic pattern."

Hilberg wrote this in . . . 1955. In his doctoral dissertation. He considered the point important enough to have included the statement on the very first page of his dissertation. Deniers are at least 60 years behind events.

As our discussion in this thread continues, I will come back to Hilberg's very important point.
Last edited by Statistical Mechanic on Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:35 am, edited 1 time in total.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Jeff_36 » Tue Jun 09, 2015 2:30 am

I deny the existence of a master plan BTW. I think that the Germans had a number of regional plans that involved extermination. IMO it goes like this.

Summer 1941 onward: Killing of Soviet Jews

October-January: Killing of nonworking Jews of Lublin District and Lodz Ghetto

March-April: Expansion of Lublin action to all of the GG. Further plans for nonworking Jews of Europe.

May-July: Implementation of further plans, with general acceptance at this point that most of the slaves would not survive.

Later, 1943: Extermination "root and branch"

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Re: France '42-'44: La Grande Rafle & beyond

Postby Statistical Mechanic » Tue Jun 09, 2015 3:24 am

I see things not quite so clearly structured and in that sense more in Hilberg's terms as above - patterns not a plan: by December 1941, a policy turn to get rid of the Jews at all costs including by working them to death, starving them, and murdering the weak and the survivors (as expressed at Wannsee), with local implementation plans, responsibilities pushed out and down, the use of existing and new agencies, the many agencies involved cooperating/competing, mammoth preparation and logistical issues, and acute foreign policy dilemmas.

I do agree with you on radicalization and escalation (e.g., even summer 1941 has to be thought of as before August and after August, when women and children in large numbers were then targeted; in my conceptualization Greiser's extermination program in the Warthegau began before an overall policy direction was agreed and both reflected radicalization and caused further radicalization; same for open-air shootings in the occupied Soviet Union).

I see stickiness in implementation (transport, politics and foreign policy, extermination facility readiness, trial and error, etc) provoking bursts of urgency and acceleration; thus, what appear to be decision points are actually results of stickiness in execution of the plan - the practical difficulties in turning policy into plans. As Christopher Browning says, there is just so much evidence of so much talk and so much prep by late fall '41, that you know that the minds that mattered were made up by then. (In the case of France, our focus here, Vichy's stance, the availability of transport, competing military priorities, French public opinion and especially the police, the resistance broadly construed, and the state of the killing installations all factored in.)

Whatever is the time line, for neither of us did a master plan exist - nor did a master plan figure in the thinking of Hilberg, one of the "believers in chief" and co-creator of the "orthodoxy" to which deniers attribute a master plan.
Nazism conspired to create a sense of festival time. . . . Tragically for humanity, the party generating it was the type not associated with the coloured costumes of the Brazilian Carnival, but with the brown-shirted thuggery of the NSDAP. The contrast between the dance and the march, between the samba and the strains of the Horst Wessel Lied, points to the gulf separating a life-asserting community from a community which exists only by creating a demonized other. - RG '97


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